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ABSTRACT
Power, Legitimation, and Drawing Distinctions: Renderings of ‘Public’
and ‘Private’ in U.S. Domestic Violence Policymaking
by
Christina Drum
Dr. Craig Walton, Examination Committee Chair
Professor and Graduate Coordinator, Ethics and Policy Studies
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Contested claims about the public/private distinction have always been central to
liberal democratic principles, to feminist ideologies, and (more narrowly) to domestic
violence policymaking. Historically, treatment of domestic violence as a phenomenon
that is relegated to the so-called ‘private sphere’ has served as justification for limiting
such public policy remedies as prevention, intervention and recovery initiatives.
From the grassroots battered women’s movements of the 1970s to the current network
of shelters, community agencies and advocacy groups, the last several decades have seen
significant progress toward increasing public and political awareness of domestic
violence. In the United States, many of these efforts culminated with the 1994 passage of
the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), the first comprehensive federal legislation to
address the issue. Events since then, however, suggest that the public/private distinction
continues negatively to restrict domestic violence policy responses, resulting in greater
harm to victims as well as to the larger society. These circumstances call for further

111

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

examination of the distinction in light of domestic violence policy, and for the
formulation of alternate or supplemental policy recommendations.
This thesis will examine the theoretical underpinnings of the public/private distinction
in Western democratic traditions in the context of United States vs. Morrison and U.S.
domestic violence policymaking in general. In so doing, it seeks to establish a more
precise understanding of how various conceptions o f ‘private’ and ‘public’ have bearing
on domestic violence policies. It will conclude by elucidating prescriptive policy
recommendations, with the ultimate aim of possibly improving lives.
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CHAPTER 1

UNITED STATES DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICY
AND THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION:
A CASE FOR FURTHER INQUIRY
Contested claims about the public/private distinction have always been central to
liberal democratic principles, to feminist ideologies, and (more narrowly) to domestic
violence policymaking. During recent decades, domestic violence has gained widespread
recognition in the United States as a serious social problem—one with significant
criminal justice, public health, and civil rights policy implications. Such recognition is
indeed a relatively recent phenomenon: for centuries, perpetrators of domestic violence
have acted “with almost absolute impunity.”*
Historically, domestic violence and social responses to it have been profoundly
shaped by social norms and beliefs associated with family and the home, where privacy
stands alongside other culturally sanctified values. Relegation of domestic violence to
the so-called private sphere, however, has served as justification for severely limiting
such public policy remedies as prevention, intervention and recovery initiatives. From
the grassroots battered women’s movements of the 1970s to the current network of
shelters, community agencies and advocacy organizations, the last three decades have
seen significant progress toward increasing public and political awareness of domestic
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violence. In the United States, these efforts culminated with the 1994 passage of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), the first comprehensive federal legislation to
address the issue.^
Events since the initial passage of VAWA, however, suggest that various renderings
of the public/private distinction continue to detrimentally restrict domestic violence
policy responses, resulting in continued harm to victims as well as to the larger society.
This thesis seeks to develop a much-needed, further specified understanding of how
various conceptions of ‘private’ and ‘public’ have bearing on United States domestic
violence policymaking—with the ultimate aims of elucidating prescriptive policy
recommendations and possibly improving lives. In this introductory chapter, I first set
out to describe domestic violence as a prevalent, complex social problem with serious
social consequences. Following this, I make the case that the public/private distinction’s
role in United States domestic violence policymaking warrants further examination.
Finally, I outline the method, chapter by chapter, by which this thesis undertakes such an
examination.

Understanding Domestic Violence
Domestic violence is a complex, dynamic and multidimensional problem that has
been studied extensively in a variety of disciplines, including sociology, psychology,
criminal justice, public health, law, and social work. The complexity of the problem
poses challenges to researchers and gives rise to a host of problem definition issues.
Moreover, as several theorists have argued, the definitions and causes of domestic
violence are culturally constructed.^ Such considerations are important because, in the
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words of one scholar, “our choice of approach to define intimate violence has widereaching repercussions . . . from offering services to making laws to planning
prevention.”"* Additionally, how we conceptualize domestic violence (or any social
problem) from the outset potentially informs our understanding of the broader power
relations and social norms in which the problem occurs.
In addition to basic definitional issues, the theoretical frameworks employed in
identifying the causes and consequences of domestic violence can serve to illuminate
some aspects of the problem while obscuring others. At one end of the spectrum are
theories that locate the origins of such violence at the levels of the individual and the
family. At the other end are fi-ameworks that connect the problem to larger societal
structures. Increasingly, scholars are recognizing that any comprehensive empirical
analysis of domestic violence requires a multidimensional approach that incorporates
both individual and systemic factors. A general assumption as to the soundness of this
standpoint underlies this thesis—as well as, more specifically, the following attempt to
overview of the nature of the issue.
Since the 1970s, ‘domestic violence’ has referred to violence occurring between
intimate adults who are living together or have previously cohabited.^ In more recent
years, this definition has broadened to include any such violence that is perpetrated
between current or former spouses, partners or dates—regardless of age or living
arrangements. As such, terms like ‘intimate partner violence’ and (more simply)
‘intimate violence’ are increasingly used to describe the phenomenon.^ However it is
labeled, this type of interpersonal violence typically connotes some degree of physical
and/or sexual assault, especially as it is addressed from legal standpoints. Nevertheless,
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emotional abuse and coercive control are almost always present as well, and are often the
more significant factors from the perspectives of victims and survivors/ One author
defines domestic violence as “ongoing abuse and control of a woman by her relationship
partner,” characterized by such behaviors as confinement, physical violence, sexual
violence, threats, psychological abuse, economic exploitation, and control of the social
life and work life of the victim / In this characterization, ‘abuse’ and ‘control’ are the
core concepts, which are manifested through a fairly broad range of individual behaviors.
Also notable about this definition is that it explicitly engenders victimhood as
experienced by women, a question I discuss further below.
Several authors point to the importance of distinguishing domestic violence as
typified by such coercive control from what has been referred to as ‘common couple
violence.’^ Common couple violence tends to emerge in large research samples, whereas
coercive control is more common among clinical and shelter samples.*** Unlike coercive
control, incidents of common couple violence may not be part of an ongoing pattern, are
unlikely to escalate, are perpetrated equally by men and women, and tend to have little
impact on those involved.** To be clear, this thesis identifies domestic violence as that
which falls under the coercive control model. Broadly speaking, however, much of the
literature does not explicitly differentiate between the two phenomena, making it difficult
at times to know whether that which is being measured and discussed operationally
includes common couple violence as well.
The empirical analysis of social and behavioral phenomena usually poses a host of
methodological challenges, and measuring domestic violence is no exception. In addition
to complications introduced by the definitional ambiguities discussed above, violence
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between intimates can easily be underestimated due to a range of factors. Such factors
include the failure to report incidents of violence through formal channels,*^ fear of
disclosure among victims and perpetrators, and the sweeping silence that can result from
general social stigma. As one report sums it up, “Domestic violence generally is a
phenomenon associated with profound attempts to conceal its occurrence, even by
victims.”*^ It is within the context of the methodological concerns and caveats touched
on above that I now turn to examining what the research says about the scope of this
problem in the United States
Quantitative claims about prevalence range from 693,000 incidents of violence
against a current or former spouse, boyfriend, or girlfriend per year*"* to 4,000,000
women who experience serious assault by an intimate partner annually.*^ A 1997
National Institute of Justice report estimates that, of 2 million women who are physically
assaulted in the United States each year, 76 percent are assaulted by a current or former
husband, cohabiting partner, or date.*^ According to another study, 1.8 million women
are severely beaten by intimate partners each year in the United States, and one quarter of
all American women can expect to experience intimate violence at some time in their
lives. *^ A 1996 tracking survey conducted for the Advertising Council and the Family
Violence Prevention Fund found that thirty percent of Americans say they know a
woman who has been physically abused by her husband or boyfriend during the past
year.*® More recently, a June 2003 study published by the Center for the Advancement
of Women found that 92 percent of American women rank reducing domestic and sexual
violence as one of their top priorities.*^
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On what is perhaps a more encouraging note, a 2003 United States Department of
Justice report claims that rates of intimate partner violence declined significantly between
1993 and 2001/** During the two decades prior to this decline, from the mid-1970s to the
early-1990s, domestic violence rates had been on the rise. Today, rates of assault and
murder committed against women by intimate partners appear to be about what they were
in the 1970s.^’ Despite more recent trends, numerous studies suggest that intimate
partner violence continues to occur at alarmingly high rates. Moreover, since 1994 the
decrease in domestic violence assaults (15 percent) is considerably less than the overall
reduction in violent crime (31 percent).
Domestic violence crosses socioeconomic strata and the demographic boundaries of
age, ethnicity, race, geographic origin, religion and sexual orientation. While domestic
violence is prevalent at all income levels, rates measure higher among those with lower
incomes.^^ This raises questions as to how the violence relates to economic factors in
victim’s lives. A woman living in poverty faces multiple barriers to escaping abusive
partners, and the violence itself impedes her ability to earn a living.^"* While women of
any age can experience intimate violence, young women, between the ages of 16-24 in
dating relationships experience the highest r a t e s . T h i s suggests that factors associated
with age, such as life experience and the ability to support oneself, may correlate with
violence rates. Concomitantly, the prevalence of domestic violence is consistent across
different racial and ethnic g r o u p s . H o w e v e r , cultural and material factors have a great
deal of bearing on the manner and degree to which such violence is experienced,
sanctioned and resisted. Immigrant women, for example, may suffer higher rates of
battering than United States citizens because cultural factors may prevent them from
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leaving their husbands, or because they have less access to legal and social services than
c i t i z e n s . A s a second exampie,'while violence occturing’ih same-sex partnerships
mirrors its prevalence in heterosexual relationships, victims who are lesbian, gay,
bisexual or transgender face multiple barriers to accessing crisis intervention and support
services, and the legal system.^®
Within heterosexual relationships, men comprise the overwhelming majority of
domestic violence perpetrators, women the overwhelming majority of victims and
survivors. The United States Department of Justice estimates that women were victims in
85 percent of intimate violence incidents in 2001/^ an earlier report sets this estimate at
as high as 95 percent.^** The same report states that intimate partner violence comprised
20 percent of violent crime against women in 2001, while intimate partners committed
only 3 percent of violent crimes against men.^* While intimate violence by women
against men has been documented, there is no evidence that such violence leads to the
type and extent of suffering caused by intimate violence against women.^^ For example,
women are seven to fourteen times more likely to report suffering severe assaults from an
intimate,^^ and male perpetrators are four times more likely to use lethal force than
females.^"* There is also “no evidence that men become trapped in abusive relationships
in the manner that has been observed in the lives of battered women.”^^
As with many (if not all) social issues, domestic violence is characterized by
systemic, gendered power relations,^^ although precisely how this is so remains a point of
controversy that is a critical to domestic violence policymaking. Many theorists argue
that United States domestic violence is rooted in the social construction of the Western
nuclear family, which places the husband in an authoritarian position at its head.
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Although this violence was explicitly, socially and legally sanctioned for centuries,
evidence suggests that countless women have resisted it. Insofar as gender is concerned,
women’s resistance to violence—which can culminate in the assault and sometimes
killing of her attacker in self-defense—is sometimes framed as ‘women’s violence
against men.’ While this label is perhaps not technically inaccurate, it can serve to
obscure the self-defense context, with problematic implications. As historian David
Peterson del Mar reminds us, “The moral texture of a violent act is contingent on its
context. Larger patterns of dominance and abuse must always be considered.”^’
Although the myth that ‘she would leave if it were really that bad’ persists, it can be
extremely difficult, in some cases impossible, for victims to escape violent relationships.
A prominent reason for this difficulty stems from the lack of needed resources. One study
cited by the National Research Council finds that 56 percent of working battered women
had lost a job as a direct result of the violence, while another estimates as many as 63
percent of all homeless women have been victims of domestic violence.^® The effects of
the violence itself can also diminish a person’s capacity to get away. As one author
points out, “Intimate partner violence is a causal factor in the development of mental
health problems like depression, alcoholism and suicidality.”^^ Moreover, violence is
likely to escalate when a victim attempts to leave— and sometimes this escalation can be
lethal."*** In a study that examines court processing of domestic violence cases, 47 percent
of victims who escaped the violence by seeking assistance from the criminal legal system
said that their partners threatened them with murder during the six months prior to the
arrest."** All too often, such threats are carried out: more than one third of all women
murdered are killed by an intimate partner,"*^ and 65 percent of them were physically
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separated from the perpetrator prior to their death/^ Some scholars have argued that
research emphases ought to shift away from addressing why victims remain in abusive
relationships, and focus instead on determining why perpetrators commit violence.
While they make a cogent point, efforts to understand domestic violence as victims
experience and respond to the problem remains key to developing effective policy
remedies.
A number of scholars have compared domestic violence to the kinds of torture that
political prisoners encounter:
The purpose and methods of domestic violence . . . and [those of] traditional
forms of torture are similar in many ways. Perpetrators of domestic violence
often use violence and control to dominate the victim in much the same way
as the traditional perpetrator o f torture, who represents the state. These
perpetrators may use torture to elicit information, punish the victims, or
diminish their capacity."*"*
International human rights organizations have drawn similar comparisons. For example,
the World Organization Against Torture, an international coalition of nongovernmental
organizations, has detailed the similarities between torture perpetrated by agents of the
state and the more ‘private’ torture that women endure in their families and
communities."*^ In the words of one researcher, “There is effectively nothing to
differentiate the position of a man locked in a torture cell and a woman who is repeatedly
abused in the confines of her home.”"*^ According to another scholar, however, “it may
also be correct that state sponsored violence is qualitatively different from private
violence.”"*’ W hile the comparison can serve to underscore the severity o f dom estic

violence and couch it in terms that may gamer greater attention among policymakers, I
maintain that the perpetration of violence among intimates makes domestic violence
unique. As Norman Denzin states, “The terror of [domestic] abuse arises from the fact
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that the subject is violently attacked by an other she had previously defined as safe.”"*® I
have characterized domestic violence as a complex social problem. This complexity
stems in large part from the fact that victims often share lives, homes and children with
their assailants—and many continue to harbor feelings of love and loyalty toward them.
Moreover, much of the violence occurring between intimates take place behind closed
doors, in the home, a place which is often culturally regarded as a haven from public life.
For the victim of domestic violence, however, the home may more resemble that prison
cell of the tortured inmate; there are often no safe places to which she can retreat.
While a majority of intimate partner violence does take place within the home, such
violence extends well beyond the household, a fact that has been obscured in some of the
domestic violence discourse. According to the National Institute of Justice, more than
one third of all incidents of intimate partner violence from 1993 to 1998 in the United
States occurred outside the victim’s home."*^ Another study found that 75 percent of
battered women employed in the labor force experienced harassment by their partners
while they were at work.^** The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that homicide is the
leading cause of death for women on the job, and that 20 percent of these deaths result
from women being murdered by their partners while at the workplace.^* Recognition that
domestic violence extends beyond the so-called private sphere of family home life and
into such domains as paid workplaces has grown in recent years. This growth is marked
by the emergence of organizations like the Corporate Alliance to End Partner Violence,
which puts forth that “partner violence is not just a domestic matter” and aims to
“reduc[e] the costs and consequences of partner violence at work.”^^

10
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The costs and consequences of intimate partner violence indeed warrant such efforts.
The Bureau of National Affairs estimates that domestic violence costs employers $3
billion to $5 billion annually in reduced productivity and missed w o r k d a y s . T h e
material consequences of domestic violence are also reflected in a congressional report
which asserts, “[G]ender-based violence bars . . . women . . . from full participation in the
national economy. Even the fear of gender-based violence affects tbe economy[.]”^"* The
health care costs associated with domestic violence contribute to this picture, as do other
service-related costs arising from the need for shelters and other prevention and
intervention services. Social costs become manifest as a drain on law enforcement
resources. According to one estimate, approximately one third of all police time is spent
on domestic disturbance calls.^^ Significant costs are also associated witb the devastating
effects of intimate partner violence on children, an estimated 3.3 million of whom
witness such violence against their mothers or female caretakers each year.^^ The
American Psychological Association claims that 40-60 percent of men who abuse women
also abuse children, and that fathers who batter mothers are twice as likely as non-violent
fathers to seek sole physical custody of their children.^’ Yet with all of these, harm to
victims remains a most critical social cost. Victims experience human costs— such as
unused potential and sometimes their very lives—as well as monetary costs, such as those
associated with property replacement and relocation. As one author sums it up, “Victims
of violence suffer physical, emotional, and psychological trauma that exhausts their
energies and finally ends up depleting society’s financial, legal, and moral resources.”^®
Intimate partner violence is a serious, prevalent, complex problem tbat persists in tbe
United States despite various remedial laws and policies. While there are many

II
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theoretical points of departure from which to further develop empirical understandings of
the problem, as well as normative assertions toward its amelioration and ultimate
elimination, the public/private distinction has figured centrally in both regards. The
pursuit of a more explicit and refined articulation of how various conceptions of ‘public’
and ‘private’ can and do influence domestic violence policymaking is of critical
importance. The following section builds an argument in support of this claim.

Domestic Violence Policy and the Public/Private Distinction:
Why Further Examination Is Warranted
In the previous section, I provided a descriptive overview of domestic violence as a
social problem. An understanding of what intimate violence is fundamentally shapes
prescriptive recommendations about the issue. In this section, I turn the discussion to a
concept that is central to both empirical and normative claims about domestic violence:
the public/private distinction. Throughout the history of United States domestic violence
policymaking (and the lack thereof), shifting conceptions of ‘public’ and ‘private’ have
pivotally informed perceptions about the problem and the sociopolitical contexts in which
it occurs. I will argue that the function of the public/private distinction is primarily, in
these regards, one of obfuscation—and that this has significant implications and
consequences for domestic violence policy. Problems impel solutions, and obfuscation
suggests the need for clarification. Thus, my overarching argument makes the case that
further examination of how renderings of ‘public’ and ‘private’ serve to frame domestic
violence is critical to improving policy remedies.

12
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Although I have not yet discussed the paradigm explicitly in such terms, in the
previous section I began to illustrate some of the ways that the public/private distinction
frames intimate partner violence as a social problem. For one, the majority of domestic
violence incidents occurs in victims’ homes, hidden behind closed doors. This type of
interpersonal violence is very much bound to the institutions of marriage and family,
which are strongly associated with conceptions of the so-called private sphere.
Moreover, the very term ‘domestic violence’ locates the problem within this realm. That
intimate violence did not emerge as a ‘workplace issue’ until fairly recently—and the
related assertion by corporate interests that it ‘is not just a domestic matter’—underscore
this point. However, this is just the tip of the proverbial iceberg.
Social values and institutional norms surrounding conceptions of ‘public’ and
‘private’ have resided near the core of domestic violence prevention and intervention
policy efforts since the late nineteenth century. Until this time United States law, largely
rooted in British common law, granted husbands the right of ‘chastisement’—that is,
legal sanction to coerce their wives’ obedience by use of corporal punishment. This right
was inherently tied up in the institution of marriage, an arrangement in which the wife,
whose legal status was subsumed under her husband’s, in certain formal regards became
the property—and thus also the legal responsibility— of her husband. Although many
would argue that the patriarchal underpinnings of chastisement doctrine persist today

a

number of factors contributed to its widespread repudiation in the late 1800s. With this
transformation, “a new body of marital violence policies . . . asserted that the legal
system should not interfere . . . in order to protect the privacy of the marriage relationship
and to promote domestic harmony.”®** This legal emphasis on marital privacy was (and in
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many ways, still is) also reflected in social norms. In addition to their impact on judicial
decision-making, for several decades privacy claims served as justification for a largely
non-existent policy response to domestic violence. In the 1970s, grassroots battered
women’s movements began to effectively challenge the classification of domestic
violence as a ‘private matter’ by working to move the issue into the realm of public
awareness and public policy. So, the public/private distinction has played major
historical roles in shaping policy responses to domestic violence, in this example by its
relegation to the so-called private sphere of the family, as well as the more recent
emergence o f the problem as a matter of public concern.
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that locating intimate violence on either side of
the public/private distinction serves as the only explanation noninterventionist policies
that held during most of the twentieth century. I would argue that a range of other
factors, including corporate capitalism and the persistence of traditional authoritative
roles within the family, contributes to these tendencies as well. What makes the
public/private distinction particularly interesting is the extent to which it may function to
obscure these other factors. As we have seen, the distinction can substantially restrict the
contexts in which one might typically understand domestic violence to occur. In
actuality, the violence transcends whatever conceptual barriers we might place around the
home, the family—the ‘private.’ The effects of the violence do not stop when a battered
woman steps outside the door of her residence. On the contrary, she is far more likely to
be living in a state of perpetual anxiety and fear. Granted, she is also probably isolated,
such that she does not communicate much with others about the violence. I would argue.
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however, that such silence and isolation do not equate to ‘privacy’—at least in part
because ‘privacy’ connotes a degree of sovereignty.®*
In addition to skewing our understanding of the contexts in which domestic violence
occurs, its relegation to the ‘private’ has served to obfuscate underlying power relations,
such as those acted out through gendered social norms. Various conceptions of ‘public’
and ‘private’ offer up frameworks for discussing the issue in seemingly power-neutral,
gender-neutral rhetoric. The effect is one of depoliticization. As Nancy Fraser puts it,
“The limits of ‘the political’ is a political question.”®^ Relegation of an issue to the socalled private sphere tends to mask its sociopolitical functions and consequences. This
obfuscation calls for further examination of how the public/private distinction informs the
framing of domestic violence as a policy issue.
The scope of the public/private distinction’s impact on domestic violence
policymaking, however, extends far beyond relegation of the problem to the so-called
private sphere. The distinction strongly informs the very social and political contexts in
which domestic violence occurs. Notions of ‘private’ and ‘public’ are inherently tied up
with our most cherished and celebrated cultural values. In the United States, cultural and
legal renderings of the public/private distinction, as with much of modem liberalism, are
well reflected in the classical writings of John Locke. Locke maintains that individuals
require a legal barrier from threats to self-preservation, including those that might come
from a mling power.®^ Moreover, he broadens this notion to include not only a person’s
life, but also that which “he hath mixed his labour with.”®"* What emerges is the depiction
o f the private as a sphere, free from that which intrudes. This sets up a dualistic
framework in which ‘private’ thus becomes regarded as that which is not public. The
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ultimate effect is to construct these concepts as rigidly distinct, mutually exclusive, and
dichotomously oppositional.
In the United States, this conception of separate public and private domains has been
imbedded in law and doctrines concerning government’s relationship to the family.
The claim that there ought to be restrictions on state powers, especially into domains
socially constructed (and thus commonly regarded) as ‘private’ has a strong tradition in
this country. Perhaps this tradition is most strongly supported by the claim that privacy is
an essential value—many would argue, an inherent human right. The importance of
privacy has been championed from opposing positions on the political spectrum in the
United States. Some, for example, have argued its basis for condemning governmental
interference in personal decisions regarding reproduction, while others have claimed it as
justification for entitling parents with more control in the discipline of children.^^
Furthermore, questions regarding privacy have emerged in recent discourse concerning
the appropriate reach of state power in this ‘post-September-11 era.’ The recent passage
of the federal Homeland Security Act, for example, has triggered a heated national debate
concerning privacy rights, and the circumstances under which such rights can be
justifiably violated in the name of national security. Philosopher James Rachels links the
importance of privacy to being necessary for the development of basic human relations,
claiming that “the right to privacy [is] a distinctive sort of right in virtue of the special
kind of interest it protects.”^^ With regard to domestic violence, victims’ advocates have
noted that privacy is often an affirmative factor during recovery from violent
relationships.^* Widespread attitudes also reflect the valuing of privacy: most Americans
seem to believe that privacy is an important right worth upholding and defending.
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Conceptions of ‘public’ have also been central to liberal democratic traditions, an
idea that is reflected in the work of John Dewey, who developed principles of discussion
and debate as an approach to solving social problems.^^ Dewey’s work builds on the
claim that “informed argument is a prerequisite of democracy and that self-government
will flourish to the extent the public can communicate its own critically tested
concerns.”’*^ This idea carries significant implications for shaping the normative role of
‘citizen’ in liberal democratic societies, as well as for how political decisions may be
legitimized in such contexts. In encapsulating a common, major theme among five
political philosophers, Kent Greenawalt states, “the grounds of [political] decision should
have an interpersonal validity that extends to all, or almost all, members of [a liberal
democratic] society.”^' Thus, ideas about ‘the public’ would appear to strongly undergird
social values, as well as processes of political legitimation in the United States.
Much has been written about the liberalist public/private distinction, and critics have
challenged that it presents an oversimplified, dualistic model of social and political life
that is inherently mutable. One author, for example, suggests that we “take a look at the
belief that there is still an intelligible distinction between the public and the private.
Another argues, “[T]he public sphere is ubiquitous;. . . arms o f ‘public’ government
define and mediate complex relations . . . in the context o f ‘private’ life.’’^^ Such
perspectives tend to characterize ‘public’ and ‘private’ as “contingent, transformable
conceptions of how power ought to be allocated among individuals, social groups, and
government.”^"* In other words, the conceptual barriers between ‘public’ and ‘private’ are
fluid rather than rigid and are delineated differently in different social and legal
contexts—with the results depending largely on whose interests are at stake. With such
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mutability, the distinction can function to obscure power relations. Along such lines, for
example, Sandra Marshall claims that the public/private distinction is really “an
ideological camouflage for the state’s actual interventions into the private realm.”^^
Marshall maintains that the state has a significant political interest in families, but seeks
to underplay its actual reach into this domain. While all of this suggests a good deal of
ambiguity with regard to the state’s actual and normative relations to the family, the
public/private distinction also surfaces in other arenas, such as those involving religion
and the market. How ‘public’ and ‘private’ function to obfuscate power relations has
important implications for better understanding broader political forces and evolving
social mores.
I have argued that the costs and consequences of domestic violence, in conjunction
with the history of policy response to the issue, warrant further specification of these
ambiguities, particularly in light of the political functions of ‘public’ and ‘private.’ I
suspect that the public/private distinction continues to influence domestic violence
policymaking so as to restrict policy remedies and contribute to the perpetuation of
resultant social harms. While the distinction between the two concepts may indeed
reflect an oversimplified dualism, these terms carry enormous rhetorical potential, largely
because they are so tied up with social values. Moreover, their different meanings can
vary significantly with the specific and historical contexts with which they are used. The
various applications o f ‘public’ and ‘private’ readily reflect this ambiguity, while
potentially bringing into conflict some of our deepest held values and norms. In
scholarly contexts, there have been calls to move beyond the public/private distinction, as
well as calls for its revival in feminist theorizing.^^ So, in addition to meaningfully
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informing prescriptions for domestic violence policy, an analysis of its relation to the
public/private distinction may also serve to further inform critical social t h e o r y T h e
following section outlines how this thesis will carry out such an analysis.

Applied Method
Having described domestic violence as a complex and prevalent social problem with
serious consequences, and having argued that the public/private distinction warrants
further examination vis-à-vis United States domestic violence policymaking, 1 conclude
this chapter by sketching how the remainder of this thesis undertakes such an
examination.
In Chapter 2 , 1 aim to establish theoretical foundations for the analysis by interpreting
Jürgen Habermas’s Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere (Strukturwandel der
Offentlichkeit) as a point of departure.^* In this early work, Habermas charts the rise,
transformation and decline of the bourgeois public sphere of eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury Europe and analyzes the social and political ramifications of its deterioration in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.’® First published in German in 1962 and
translated into English in 1989, this book has had considerable influence on scholarship
in a range of disciplines, including sociology, political and moral philosophy, law,
communications, and feminist theory. I first came to Strukturwandel hy way of feminist
social theory addressing the categories of ‘public’ and ‘private’ as they relate to
gendered, systemic patterns of dominance. With a specific interest in domestic violence
as a policy issue that has been hugely shaped by contested claims about ‘public’ and
‘private’ as well as patterns of dominance, I began my investigation by looking into the
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wide body of feminist literature that critically analyzes the public/private distinction. 1
soon found abundant reference to Jürgen Habermas, who is both heralded and critiqued
for his historical/sociological account of the public sphere.
In the second part of Chapter 2 , 1 evaluate Strukturwandel in light of the contributions
of other thinkers who have written about the public/private distinction, especially those of
Habermas’s feminist critics. Here, I present various critiques of the claims Habermas
puts forth, and further examine the work’s usefulness for clarifying the ambiguities
surrounding the public/private distinction. Namely, I set out to critically examine the role
institutions play in mediating power relations and exchanges between so-called public
and private spheres. In so doing, I seek to develop a synthesized theoretical framework
for discussions of the public/private distinction in the chapters that follow.
In Chapter 3 ,1 overview the history of United States domestic violence policymaking
in order to provide social/historical context and to further explicate how, as a policy
issue, domestic violence can and does shift between contested renderings of ‘public’ and
‘private.’ Here, I outline the social roots and major historical shifts of United States
domestic violence law and policy. I also attempt to identify how ‘public’ and ‘private’
have related to various policy formulations and outcomes. This discussion culminates
with an account of the passage and enactment of the Violence Against Women Act
(YAWA) of 1994, the first comprehensive federal legislation to address the problem of
intimate violence. This law enacted measures and allocated federal resources toward the
prevention and intervention of such crimes as rape, stalking and domestic violence. One
provision—Title III, commonly referred to as YAWA’s civil rights remedy— granted
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victims of gender-motivated violent crimes*® the right to sue their assailants for
compensatory and punitive damages in state or federal court.
In May 2000, the Supreme Court’s decision in United States vs. Morrison rendered
Title III unconstitutional—and thus a fundamental piece of VAWA was overturned. In
Chapter 4 , 1 examine how this case played out, with particular attention to how
conceptions of ‘public’ and ‘private’ come into play in the Court’s arguments. The
chapter begins with a review of this landmark civil rights remedy for gender-based
violence. I describe its legislative journey from introduction to enactment, and present
the major arguments that arise in Morrison. I conclude the chapter with a critical
evaluation of these arguments. In so doing, I make the case that the discursive and
(otherwise) political functions o f ‘public’ and ‘private’ continue to have considerable
bearing on United States domestic violence law and policy.
In the final chapter. Chapter 5 ,1 attempt to synthesize meaningful connections based
on the analyses presented in the preceding chapters. It is my hope that out of this
synthesis will emerge a set of well-founded normative claims about the role of ‘public’
and ‘private’ in domestic violence policy formulation, as well as a set of sound policy
prescriptions toward ameliorating, and ultimately eradicating, this social problem.
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CHAPTER 2

JÜRGEN HABERMAS AND CRITICAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
ON THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION
In the previous chapter, I argued that the public/private distinction has played an
integral role in shaping United States domestic violence policy. I also claimed that its
scope extends to the much broader function of framing the larger social and political
contexts in which domestic violence occurs. Indeed, competing conceptions of ‘public’
and ‘private’ centrally impact a wide range of policy issues and underlie critical tensions
among the very principles of liberal democracy. The meanings of ‘public’ and ‘private’
and the distinctions drawn between these concepts are fundamental to the body of moral
and political theory that puts forth models of public discourse and normative claims about
democratic citizenship. Yet, while evoking an illusory straightforwardness on the surface
of much liberalist discourse, ‘public’ and ‘private’ are broad, value-laden, mutable
categories with vast rhetorical potential.
How ‘public’ and ‘private’ are rendered meaningful in Western social and historical
contexts frames the general scope of my inquiry in this chapter. My aim here is to
examine these terms and their meanings in the structural-political sense, by which I mean
the sense that they pertain to institutionalized power and power relations, especially
relations of domination. Toward this end, I undertake an interpretation and critical
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evaluation of Jürgen Habermas’s The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere
(Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit)} This book, originally published in German in 1962
and translated into English in 1989, analyzes the rise, transformation and decline of a
‘bourgeois public sphere’ occurring in Europe’ during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. In the four decades since its original publication, Strukturwandel has come to
be regarded as paradigmatic among sociologists, legal scholars, political and moral
philosophers, media critics, and cultural theorists. As such, the book has spurred
numerous points of departure among scholars. Given that its reach has been so
expansive, I will briefly reiterate the particular interests that frame my reading and my
discussion of the work in the sections that follow.’
The feminist social theory by which I first discovered Strukturwandel has a tradition
o f deconstructing and challenging the public/private distinction insofar as it obscures
systemic relations of gender domination."* With a specific interest in domestic violence as
a policy issue that is greatly influenced by contested claims about ‘public’ and ‘private,’ I
approached this book with the following argument in mind:
(A)The various meanings rendered by ‘public’ and ‘private’ are transformable, and
shift greatly according to social and historical context.
(B) Such renderings carry vast implications and consequences for moral and political
life.
(C) Given (A) and (B): Morally and politically, we ought to better understand the
contexts that gave rise to our understandings of these concepts, as well as the
mechanisms by which such shifts occur.
In examining the bourgeois public sphere structurally, Hahermas pivotally contributes to
this ‘better understanding’—both by “inviting concrete investigations of specific forms of
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political and cultural life”“ and by establishing groundbreaking directions for the situation
of ‘public’ and ‘private’ in moral and political philosophy.
So, while many points of departure may be taken from Strukturwandel, the following
questions frame this chapter: What, precisely, are the various meanings of ‘public’ and
‘private’ and how are these meanings rendered in different social and historical contexts?
How might delineations among public/private conceptual boundaries serve to elucidate or
obscure systemic power relations in contemporary American life? How do they shape
political agendas in a heterogeneous society, and how do they serve to extend or
constrain the domain of state intervention? How does Habermas’s account inform
contemporary cultural values and normative claims surrounding privacy rights and
democratic citizenship? And, central to my overarching purpose here, how might his
work contribute to our understanding of domestic violence and its remedies? 1 maintain
that these questions are essentially bound up with one another. While they have
important bearing on questions of social and political context, they also have direct
relevance to a host of specific social issues. How, for example, are victims of domestic
violence restricted from shaping the public agenda, and to what extent are they
differentially affected by the boundaries of privacy rights? How have movements to
increase public awareness of domestic violence served to politicize the issue, and why
does such violence persist in the face of these efforts? While I cannot hope to
conclusively answer these questions, I raise them here as a means of framing the
interpretation and evaluation of Strukturwandel that follows.
This chapter has two main parts. In the first, I interpret the major points of
Habermas’s historical/sociological account of the emergence and transformation of the
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bourgeois public sphere. In the second, I critically evaluate some of Strukturwandel’s
major claims and ideas. As a work of major influence, this book has drawn numerous
critics, and my evaluation considers the insights of such critics, with an emphasis on
feminist scholars who address the issue of a ‘gender-blindness’ in Habermas’s work.“ To
assess Strukturwandel’s usefulness in making sense of the public/private distinction, I
present and consider some of these criticisms, and attempt to reconcile them with
Habermas’s account. In concluding I argue that, while Habermas’s analysis has some
serious limitations, it is nonetheless an excellent point of departure for scholarly inquiry
into matters of ‘public’ and ‘private’— and sets out both a model and a direction that is
worthy of ‘dialectical alliance’ among scholars concerned with the questions posed
above.’

An Interpretive Summary of Habermas’s
Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit
At the outset of Strukturwandel, Habermas characterizes the bourgeois public sphere
as “a category typical of an epoch” that must be investigated broadly, drawing on the
tools and perspectives of several disciplines. He grounds his analysis in the social
structural interdependencies that contributed to the emergence and transformation of the
bourgeois public sphere over time, at the level of society as a whole. Such a historical
understanding, he posits, along with the sociological clarification of the concept of
‘public sphere’ will result in “a systematic comprehension of our own society from the
perspective of one of its central categories.”*
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To understand the context with which Habermas discusses the bourgeois public
sphere, it helps to note a couple of linguistic complications that arise within its translation
to English.® First, the German term Offentlichkeit may be rendered variously as ‘(the)
public,’ ‘public sphere,’ or ‘publicity.’ Habermas further distinguishes between the
‘political public sphere,’ the ‘literary public sphere,’ and ‘representative publicness’—
concepts that I discuss further in the sections that follow. Second, biirger may be
translated as both ‘bourgeois’ and ‘citizen.’ As translator Thomas Burger notes, the
German word bürgerlich means ‘civil,’ ‘civic,’ and ‘bourgeois’— and also ‘middle class.’
Importantly, the public sphere with which Habermas is primarily concerned pertains to
the rise of liberalism and to a specific social stratum.*® While ‘bourgeois’ and ‘citizen’
carry unique connotations in contemporary American English, that they are represented
by the same word in German fits well with the author’s analysis.
Habermas acknowledges early on that the terms ‘public’ and ‘public sphere’
encompass many socially and temporally based meanings that can cause a good deal of
confusion. In ancient Greece, for example, the public sphere represented a realm of
freedom and permanence where citizens discussed issues in the polis and competed for
excellence in visible arenas with one another.** (3) Centuries later in eighteenth-century
Europe, as we shall see, a reversal occurs in that freedom and pursuit of the good life
became associated with the private rather than the public realm.
Preconditions and Origins o f the
Bourgeois Public Sphere
According to Habermas, an opposition between ‘public’ and ‘private’ did not exist
during the early Middle Ages. While the contrast in Roman law betweenpublicus and
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privatus was familiar during this time, it had no standard usage. Although a certain
parallelism existed between these concepts and the ‘common’ and the ‘particular,’ this
was reversed with feudalism when the ‘common man’ became in a sense the ‘private
man.’ During this time, ‘lordly’ and ‘publicus’ were used synonymously, not in the sense
of a social realm but as a status attribute— an ‘aura’ of status that was represented
publicly. Thus the feudal lords “represented their lordship not for but ‘before’ the
people.” (8) That this ‘representative publicness’ started to diminish with early
capitalism and the rise of national and territorial power states marks an important initial
separation of public and private domains;
The final form of the representative publicness, reduced to the monarch’s court and at
the same time receiving greater emphasis, was already an enclave within a society
separating itself from the state. Now for the first time private and public spheres
became separate in a specifically modem sense. (11)
The German word privât emerged in the middle of the sixteenth century with the
meaning “not holding public office or official position.” (11) ‘Private’ then came to
designate exclusion from the realm of the state. By the end of the eighteenth century, the
carriers of representative publicness—the remaining feudal powers, the Church and the
nobility—polarized and split into public and private elements. (11) Religion, Habermas
asserts, became a private matter, and civil society emerged as a private autonomy
opposed to the state, while bureaucracy and the military developed into public
functions.”
Habermas directly links the origins of the bourgeois public sphere with aspects of
early finance and trade capitalism.*’ The new commerce developed according to mles
that were determined by existing power structures. However, a network of new
horizontal economic dependencies also materialized. These relationships could no longer
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be accommodated by an estate system based on household economies, and the market
came to replace many household functions. Yet, so long as members of the old ruling
stratum participated as consumers, the political order remained largely unthreatened. (15)
The reduction in representative publicness, along with other transformations resulting
from the emergence of early capitalism, made way for a public sphere in the modem
sense: the sphere of public authority—that is, the state, with its monopoly over the
legitimate use of coercion and its various jurisdictions. (18) According to Habermas,
activities o f the state became continuous and were increasingly oriented toward capitalist
aims. These aims also gave rise to new communications.*"* The emerging press
developed as a unique power that, while bom of the needs of commerce, soon became a
commodity itself.*’ This power, a central thread in Habermas’s narrative, soon became
both an instmment of the state, as well as of civil society.
Emergence and Rise o f the Bourgeois Public Sphere
Certain activities that had once been relegated to the domain of the household
emerged into the new public sphere.*® Official promulgations constituted new state
interventions into household activities. A scarcity of wheat, for example, would propel
officially decreed restrictions on bread consumption. (24) This type of state regulation,
according to Habermas, spurred the critical judgment of a public using reasoned
discourse. (24) Thus, civil society arose in opposition to the state, and “came into
existence as the corollary of a depersonalized state authority.” (19) Habermas conceives
of the bourgeois public sphere as private people who come together to form a public, and
integral to this conception is that the individuals participating made use of critical
reasoning in a political confrontation with state authority.*’ (27)
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While state officials addressed their decrees to ‘the public,’ they usually did not reach
the com m on person in this way. Rather, they reached the educated classes that were
comprised of a new stratum of bourgeois people who came to occupy a central position
within society. Habermas describes this stratum as the abstract counterpart of state
authority, an emergent ‘public sphere of civil society. ’ (23) Here again, the press came to
play a key role—both as a vehicle for communicating decrees of the state, and as a means
of engaging critical, reasoned discourse among the emerging bourgeois public.**
Habermas regards this new function of the press as a momentous shift, whereby private
people “readied themselves to compel public authority to legitimate itself before public
opinion.” (25) Although the idea of public opinion was to emerge later, this shift was
the genesis of the principle that the state could only legitimate its authority vis-à-vis ‘the
will of the people.’
While Habermas connects the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere to the press,
he also links it to the development of other institutions that organized public discussion,
where private individuals could come together and freely debate with one another. The
coffee houses in Great Britain, the salons in France and Tischgesellschaften (table
societies) in Germany all shared certain criteria in common.*® For one, Habermas
maintains, they tended to disregard social status in favor of the parity brought about by
‘the better argument’ and notions of ‘common humanity.’’® Although he acknowledges
that such ideals were rarely achieved, the author points out that their ideas had become
prevalent and would come to have far-reaching implications.’* Moreover, the bourgeois
public’s emphases on critical reasoning and common concern contributed to the notion
that the ‘public’ was inclusive, at least in principle. “The issues discussed became
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‘general’ not merely in their significance, but also in their accessibility: everyone had to
be able to participate.” (37) Consistent with his emphasis on communications, Habermas
discusses how each of these institutions was also a potential publicist body that generated
written discourse whereby “the public held up a mirror to itself.” (43) Thus, although the
public sphere participating in these institutions was still in fact quite small, a new social
category of bourgeois representation arose. (38)
Directly related to the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere was the patriarchal
conjugal family, which became characterized as an intimate domain differentiated from
the sphere of social reproduction. The conjugal family fundamentally shaped the
political self-understanding of the bourgeois public sphere:
For the experiences about which a public passionately concerned with itself sought
agreement and enlightenment through the rational-critical public debate . . . flowed
from the wellspring of a specific subjectivity. The latter had its home, literally, in the
sphere of the patriarchal conjugal family. (43)
Habermas connects the emergence of this dominant family type with centuries of
transformation toward capitalism. (44) He discusses how the role of commodity owner
combined with that of head of the family, and how ‘property owner’ merged with the idea
of ‘human being’ per se. (28) He also points out an important conflict between the
family’s self-image and its socioeconomic function:
Although there may have been a desire to perceive the sphere of the family circle as
one independent, as cut off from all connection with society, and as the domain of
pure humanity, it was, of course, dependent on the sphere of labor and of commodity
exchange.. . . Thus it was a private autonomy denying its economic origins that
provided the bourgeois family with its consciousness of itself. It seemed to be
established voluntarily and by free individuals and to be maintained without coercion;
it seemed to rest on the lasting community of love on the part of two spouses;. . .
[T]he independence of the property owner in the market. . . was complemented by
the dependence of the wife and children on the male head of the family; private
autonomy in the former realm was transformed into authority in the latter and made
any pretended freedom of individuals illusory.” (46-7)
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Thus the self-concept of the family erroneously projected a distinct separation from not
only the state but also the market. At the same time, this intimate sphere was also
subjectively oriented to an audience. Habermas connects this subjective orientation of
the family with the literary forms of the letter and the diary, which grew in popularity at
the time, as did book groups and reading circles. Like the critical public that had grown
out of the early coffee houses, salons, and Tischgesellschaften, these later institutions,
also held together through the press and its criticism, formed a public sphere of critical
reasoning in the world of letters.”
Politicization and Codification o f the
Bourgeois Public Sphere
The literary public sphere gave rise to what Habermas calls the ‘public sphere in the
political realm.’ In other words, the process by which private people came together to
form a critically reasoning public—one that both confronted absolutist state authority and
assumed the role of the public sphere governed by that authority—had its origins in
forums for discussion. In his account of the mechanisms by which the public sphere in
the world of letters was politicized, Habermas traces the political philosophy of Hobbes,
Locke and Montesquieu. He reveals that normative claims about rationality developed as
a basis for confronting monarchal authority. In opposition to claims of absolute
sovereignty, a political consciousness arose that demanded general and abstract laws, and
which asserted public opinion as the only legitimate justification for such laws. (54)
Habermas contends that the idea of ‘universalist’ rules was integral to the
politicization of the bourgeois public sphere, at least to the degree that such rules created
a space for subjectivity while at the same time allowing for challenges to absolutist rule.
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Institutions of the public sphere in the literary realm, together with the concept of the
legal norm, brought about the emergence of the public sphere in the political realm.
Notably, women and dependents were institutionally excluded from the political public
sphere, both factually and legally. (56) At the same time, those private individuals who
participated in the different forms of the public sphere did not make distinctions between
these forms, for “in the self-understanding of public opinion the public sphere appeared
as one and indivisible.” (56) This viewpoint had its roots in the ‘fictitious identity’
shared among those who came together to form a public: the role of property-owner
combined with the role of human being. The notion of this one public, albeit false, was
facilitated by positive consequences for the bourgeois stratum: the emancipation from
absolutist rule.
In examining the development of the political functions of the public sphere,
Habermas provides a comprehensive discussion on how related events unfolded in Great
Britain, France and Germany, specifically with regard to the “interrelationship of public,
press, parties and parliament.”’"*(73) However, the author argues that such relationships
only offer a partial understanding of the rise of the political public sphere. For a more
complete picture, one must grasp the broader context of the historical phase during which
commodity exchange and social labor were largely freed from state regulation. (74) The
privatization of the market was, according to Habermas, a necessary precondition for a
public sphere that normatively functioned as “the self articulation of civil society with a
state authority corresponding to its needs.” (74) The liberalized market—along with the
ideological notion that ‘free’ exchange would enable justice to prevail over force—
marked off a realm of social reproduction that granted property (and commodity) owners
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‘private’ autonomy free from state intrusion.” Habermas connects the very origins of the
positive meaning of ‘private’ to the capitalist idea of the ‘free’ market. (74)
Thus, this liberalist model of the public and private spheres, which was to become
constitutionally institutionalized, took shape within decisive economic and social
contexts. The model was codified as civil law and a system of norms, according to which
private citizens and institutions were guaranteed certain basic rights. These rights
constituted: the political function of private persons publicly engaged in rational-critical
debate; the private citizen’s status as an autonomous human being within the patriarchal
conjugal family; and the transactions of property owners in the realm of civil society.
The basic rights guaranteed: the spheres of the public realm and of the private (with
the intimate sphere at its core); the institutions and instruments of the public sphere,
on the one hand (press, parties) and the foundations of private autonomy (family and
property), on the other; finally, the functions of the private people, both their political
ones as citizens and their economic ones as owners of commodities. (83)
In Habermas’s account, the new legal codes underwent the critical scrutiny of the
bourgeois public sphere, providing the context in which this sphere attained its full
political development as the ‘very organizational principle’ of the bourgeois
constitutional state. (74) In addition to securing a ‘free’ private sphere, laws spelled out
the functions of the public sphere, thereby linking state activity to legal, general norms
that were legitimized through reasoned public opinion. Thus purportedly, “a legislation
that had recourse to public opinion thus could not be explicitly considered as
domination.” (82)
As within the market, laws within the constitutional state were supposed to be equally
binding for all citizens and thereby, in principle, prescribe a just set of rules for civil
society. Within this context, “the character of executive power, domination itself, was
supposed to change.” (82) However, the liberal model of clearly defined public and
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private spheres obscured the exclusive domain of ‘citizen’ and the arguably rigid
boundaries of civil society. The bourgeois public sphere was but a fraction of the overall
‘public’ that it purportedly represented. Habermas makes clear that these constitutional
models were predicated on an unrealistic view of civil society. (84) As such, while laws
legitimated through public debate upheld the idea that, in the liberal model, reason would
triumph over domination, the model did not render domination irrelevant after all. (88)
Rather, existing power relations were upheld as the bourgeois class promoted its interests
by assuming the guise of the common interest.
Ideological Underpinnings o f the
Bourgeois Public Sphere
To launch an analysis of the ideas and ideologies that informed the bourgeois public
sphere, Habermas traces the emergence of ‘public opinion’ and its movement toward
serving as the liberal justification for the legal n o r m s . H e r e , he discusses how ‘opinion’
and ‘public opinion,’ and the relations of these concepts to state power, develop in the
political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Jeremy
Bentham. Specifically, he describes how Locke’s ‘Law of Opinion,’ which tended to
regard ‘common sense’ as unerring came to dominate by way of Rousseau’s social
contract theory. (97) In this context, the idea of public opinion as formed from public use
of reason promotes the emerging political fimctions of the bourgeois public sphere.
Bentham drew connections between public opinion and the principle of publicity, which
put forth that with the latter “sound opinion will be more common and prejudices will
have less dominion.” (99)
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Habermas also discusses the considerable impact of Immanuel Kant’s political
philosophy with regard to publicity as a critical link between politics and morality. (102)
He writes:
Kant’s publicity held good as the one principle that could guarantee the convergence
of politics and morality. He conceived of ‘the public sphere’ at once as the principle
of the legal order and as the method of enlightenment. (104)
According to Kant, reason needed to be ‘authorized to speak publicly’ in order to bring
truth to light and promote autonomy among the citizenry. He held that the public use of a
citizen’s reason must be free, for “it alone can bring about enlightenment among men.”
(106) The political authority giving rise to legislation thus had its roots in “the will of the
entire people” where “all men decided for all men and each decided for himself.” (107)
A premise of ‘public agreement’ in turn supported the claim of such an authority, for
Kant believed that all public reason, autonomously formed, would lead each citizen to the
same conclusions, toward the formation of a ‘perfectly just order.’
In the framework of a comprehensively norm-governed state of affairs . . . domination
as a law of nature was replaced by the rule of legal norms—politics could in principle
be transformed into morality.. . . This progress [toward a ‘perfectly just order’] was
postulated to result from nothing but the constraints of nature, without having to take
into account the efforts that the laws of freedom obligated men to undertake
themselves. Naturally, this progress did not consist in an ever growing quantity of
morality but exclusively in an increase of the products of legality. (108)
Kant also developed sociological criteria for inclusion in the critical public sphere: only
property owners were allowed to participate “for their autonomy was rooted in the sphere
of commodity exchange and hence was joined to the interest in its preservation as a
private sphere.” (I ID) Thus, only the property owners were seen by Kant as truly
autonomous individuals fit for participation in the realm of critical public debate— and
this was morally condoned on the grounds that, in a free market, everyone had an equal
chance to become a property owner.^* Here again, Habermas discusses the economic
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underpinnings of ideology/^ He also discusses the relationships between morality and
legality in two versions of Kant’s political philosophy. The first equates moral politics
with legal conduct from duty, whereas the second claimed that legality was to spring
forth from morality. In any case, Kantian political philosophy was well suited toward a
bourgeois public sphere that regarded itself as 'the public,’ as well as for providing an
effective rationale for reliance on legal norms.^° As it was thought to achieve the
ultimate subjection of domination to reason, the liberal model was regarded at the time as
‘unpolitical.’^* (117)
As Habermas continues his account of the ideological underpinnings that shaped this
model, he turns the discussion to the critical writings of Georg W. F. Hegel and Karl
Marx. Like Kant, Hegel also had strong expectations for public opinion. Importantly
however, Hegel distinguished knowledge from its mere appearance and placed science
outside the realm of public opinion.^^ This idea challenged the liberal pretense that
public opinion was grounded in unity and truth and “took the teeth out of the idea of the
public sphere of civil society.” (122)
If Hegel removed teeth, then it would probably be fair to say that Marx performed a
decapitation. “Marx denounced public opinion as false consciousness: it hid before itself
its own true character as a mask of bourgeois class interests.” (124) A socialist, Marx
critically analyzed the individual’s relation to the state as a whole, and critiqued
capitalism concluding that it “could not without crises reproduce itself as a ‘natural
order.’” (124) According to Marx, critical public reason did not triumph over
domination: for one, the public sphere was by no means universally accessible, and two,
‘property owner’ does not equal ‘human being.’ On the contrary, he claimed, new power
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relationships had emerged/^ Habermas claims that this socialist critique “demolished all
fictions to which the idea of the public sphere of civil society appealed.” (124) He
argues:
As long as power relationships were not effectively neutralized in the reproduction of
social life and as long as civil society itself still rested on force, no juridical condition
which replaced political authority with rational authority could be erected on its basis.
Consequently, the dissolution of feudal relations of domination in the medium of the
public engaged in rational-critical debate did not amount to the purported dissolution
of political domination in general but only to its perpetuation in different guise. (125)
Marx also predicted that to the degree that the non-bourgeois penetrated the public sphere
of eivil society, the “weapons of publicity forged by the bourgeoisie [would be] pointed
against itself.” (126)
As a result of Marxist eritique, many liberalists adopted what Habermas calls an
“ambivalent conception of the public sphere”— denying its organizational principle even
as it was celebrated. (130) However, Habermas takes the position that the liberalist
apologetic was better than the socialist critique because the former successfully
ehallenged the very notion of rationalizing political domination. It held up the eoncept of
‘soeial preconditions’ to the question of a ‘natural order,’ resulting in a more realistie
construction of the public sphere. As Marx had predicted, the bourgeois public sphere
started to expand, marking the beginning its decline.
Decline o f the Bourgeois Public Sphere
At this point in his narrative, Habermas turns to the work of John Stuart Mill and
Alexis de Tocqueville. Mill discusses how workers, women, and African Americans
pushed for the right to vote. (132) The public sphere lost its universalist basis and
became characterized by compromise between competing interests. “Group needs that
could not expect to be satisfied by a self-regulating market tended to favor regulation by
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the state.” (132) Both Mill and Tocqueville were disappointed: the public opinion that
had once been thought to trump coercion with the ‘compulsion of reason’ had become a
mediocre yet coercive force itself, in the form of dominant public opinion. (133)
Tocqueville, for one, bemoaned public opinion as ‘compulsion toward conformity’ rather
than a critical force. (133)^'* Mill advocated tolerance over criticism, given that public
reason did not reveal universal interests. Both thinkers understood public opinion as a
dangerous force, and they each developed theories of ‘representative government’ to
address the problem. Habermas sums up:
In the hundred years following the heyday of liberalism during which capitalism
became ‘organized’. .. the contours of the bourgeois public sphere eroded.. . . While
it penetrates more spheres of society, it simultaneously lost its political function,
namely: that of subjecting the affairs that it had made public to the control of a critical
public. (140)
The remainder of Strukturwandel examines the transformation of the public sphere as it
deteriorated, with an emphasis on the social structures that replaced it and their political
ramifications.^^
‘Post-Bourgeois Public Sphere ’
As bourgeois constitutional states transformed into social welfare states, Habermas
notes a blurring between ‘public’ and ‘private,’ or the “tendency toward a mutual
infiltration of the public and private spheres.” (142) Increased state interventionism and
the transfer of certain public functions to private corporate bodies characterized this
change. Classical principles o f ‘fi’ee’ trade were abandoned for a new protectionism, and
the state’s regulation of markets came to prevail internationally. According to Habermas,
the boundary between ‘public’ and ‘private’ thus blurred.^^ Further, contrary to earlier
moral claims about the inherent justice of the ‘fi-ee’ market, social stratification
intensified and political power remained concentrated among the relatively few. (144)
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Citing Franz Neumann, Habermas notes, “[The state’s] role had always been as
strong as the interests of the bourgeoisie required it to be in a given political and social
situation.” He suggests that the state’s role expanded because the market alone was no
longer able to secure a stability that favored existing social privilege. The state, for
example, took on increased roles of aiding groups in financial need, preventing changes
to the broader social strucmre, and perhaps most notably, influencing private and
regulating public investments. (147) Thus, the state merged with societal institutions
such that they could no longer be demarcated along distinctions of ‘public’ and ‘private,’
which gave rise to a new realm of social legislation. (147)
As the public sphere disintegrated and gave rise to a ‘repoliticized social sphere,’ the
conjugal family became dissociated from its connection with processes of social
reproduction and drew back upon itself. (154) “With the loss of its basis and the
replacement of family property by individual incomes the family lost, beyond its fimction
in production (which it had already shed to a great extent), those fo r production.” (155)
The family also lost some of its authority in bringing up, educating and protecting its
members. Here, Habermas points out the emergence of a different kind of public/private
distinction, stating, “[0]ne can say that the family became ever more private and the
world of work and organization ever more ‘public.’” (152) Thus the occupationally
defined ‘world of work’ became a sphere in its own right. Time not spent ‘on the job’
became ‘private time’ and human relationships within large organizations became more
depersonalized. This ‘polarization of the social sphere and the intimate sphere’ marked
the transformation of the family into a unit of consumption.^^
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With the demise of the bourgeois public sphere, consumption increasingly supplanted
critical public debate, and “the web of public communication unraveled into acts of
individuated reception.” (161) The earlier institutions weakened and the family lost its
connection to the world of letters. Social activities tended to exclude literary and
political debate. Folks started watching a good deal of television. Yet concurrently,
critical public discourse persisted, albeit in one fundamentally different regard; the
discussion itself became commodified. (163) Consequently, political persuasion became
tied up in “certain prearranged rules of the game,” thereby directly shaping how public
opinion was formed. (164) Granting the mass media a central role in this
commodification of debate, Habermas bemoans the result, which offers a ‘tranquilizing
substitute’ for social action, loses its function of critical publicity, and renders public
consensus as largely unnecessary. (164) Watered down, depoliticized news accounts
increased sales with a predigested product for which “the rigorous distinction between
fact and fiction is ever more frequently abandoned.”^* (170) As such, the no-longercritical public sphere is reduced to a m a r k e t . A s the public sphere increasingly assumes
advertising functions it loses its critical public functions:
The process of the politically relevant exercise and equilibration of power now takes
place directly between private bureaucracies, special-interest associations, parties and
public administration. The public as such is included only sporadically in this circuit
of power, and even then it is brought in only to contribute to its acclamation. (176)
Habermas characterizes this kind of publicity as staged and deceptive, as it fosters a
“peculiar ambivalence of a domination exercised through the domination of nonpublic
opinion: it serves the manipulation o f the public as much as [or instead of] legitimation
before it. Critical publicity is supplanted by manipulative publicity.” (178) Thus, real
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publicity loses it critical function, and our laws can no longer simply be validated as
representing ‘the will of the people.’
Habermas contrasts this staged and manipulative publicity with a critical process of
communication, describing them as two competing tendencies of the political public
sphere in the social welfare state. He indicates that the upshot of this tension remains
unclear and lays out two conditions for an effectively critical political public sphere:
minimizing bureaucratization and ‘relativizing structural conflicts of interest’ so as to
arrive at a standard of authentic universalism. (235) He argues against disqualifying
these conditions as utopian and suggests that it is indeed possible to successfully
democratize industrialized social welfare states. (235) He claims that critical publicity, as
a constitutionally institutionalized norm, underlies many of the premises and ideas on
which the balance and exercise of political power are faetually based. (237) Finally,
holding that such democratization is “not limited from the outset by an impenetrability
and indissolubility . . . of irrational relations of social power and political domination,”
Habermas somewhat optimistically concludes that “the outcome remains . . . open.” (235)

A Critical Evaluation of Habermas’s
Strukturwandel der Ojfentlichkeit
The comprehensive, interdisciplinary analysis that Habermas presents in
Strukturwandel is regarded as landmark among many social theorists—and with good
reason. This work presents a sophisticated, interdisciplinary account of the emergence,
ascent and deterioration of the bourgeois public sphere, a discursive realm of rationalcritical publicity that has fundamentally shaped liberalist p h i l o s o p h y T h e account has
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significant normative implications, and, for Habermas, was propelled by an overarching
aim toward the affirmative reconstruction of the normative framework that undergirds
liberal democracy/* As Pauline Johnson states, “Habermas wants to identify the social
conditions which allowed reasoned discourse about public issues conducted by private
persons willing to let arguments, not status or the authority of tradition, to be decisive.”"*^
So, Strukturwandel may be evaluated broadly in two regards: one, by examining the
strength of Habermas’s empirical account of the bourgeois public sphere and its structural
transformation; two, by inquiry into the normative argument in which this analysis is
situated. This argument claims that, with the decline of the bourgeois public sphere and
other facets of late welfare state capitalism, we ought to build new democratizing
institutions that will enable politically effective rational-critical public discourse."*^
Among the most interesting of Habermas’s critics are feminist social theorists, who
themselves have a discursive history of challenging the ‘public/private distinction’"*"*that
is fundamental to liberalist ideology. Such challenges have often gone hand-in-hand with
the assertion that ‘the personal is political’—which, along with an emphasis on valuing
women’s experiences, is a central tenet of many contemporary feminisms."*^ Among
contemporary Western feminisms, eoncems abound that a pervasive and flawed
‘public/private distinction’ wrongly depoliticizes familial and household matters—by
relegating them to an ‘intimate sphere’ that systemically excludes them from
consideration as ‘political.’ This claim represents a challenge to certain liberalist
conceptions of ‘public’ and ‘private’ insofar as it calls for shifting much of what had
‘traditionally’ been considered ‘private’ into the realm of public reasoning and debate.
Virginia Held speaks to this idea:
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Part of what feminists have criticized has been the way the distinction has been
accompanied by a supposition that what occurs in the household occurs as if on an
island beyond politics, whereas the personal is highly affected by the political power
beyond, from . . . the interconnected division of labor within and beyond the
household, to the lack of adequate social protection for women against domestic
violence."*^
Feminist scholars have argued that the public/private distinction has served to reinforce
gendered social divisions whereby women have been relegated to the domain of the
household and excluded from full participation in public life.
From a range of disciplines and perspectives, feminist theorists have contested
various aspects of the public/private distinction."*^ Despite their differences, such
arguments tend to commonly rely on a conception of ‘political’ that is inextricably tied to
the notion of power, usually with a specific interest in the power that is evident in
systemic, gendered relations of domination. Along these lines, Nancy Fraser discusses
Michel Foucault’s account of the ‘capillary’ nature of modem power, which expands our
sense of the scope of ‘political.’"*^ Moreover, she characterizes her analyses of the
politics of knowledge as involving disputes over the boundaries between such categories
as philosophical/political, politics/culture, and public/private."*^ Fraser correctly
interprets these as “stmggles for cultural hegemony, that is, for the power to constmct
authoritative definitions of social situations and legitimate interpretations of social
needs.
Upon the 1989 translation of Strukturwandel, many English-speaking feminist
theorists were engaged in criticisms of the public/private distinction. Like Flabermas’s
analysis, this critique aimed at “unmasking the distorting images that conceal and
legitimate the realities of power.”^* While Habermas and his feminist critics tend to
share this objective, as well as his agenda to democratize, a critical normative tension
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underpins Habermas’s work in relation to much of feminist social theory/^ That is, while
many feminists have sought to dismantle the liberalist public/private distinction,
Habermas amounts to the normative defense of separating ‘public’ and ‘private.
Moreover, while Strukturwandel offers a complex analysis that sheds light on the
renderings of ‘public’ and ‘private’ in various Western historical contexts, feminist
theorists have consistently critiqued Habermas for a ‘gender blindness’ that runs
throughout. They claim, for example, that he misjudges the inclusiveness of the
bourgeois public sphere, which institutionally excluded women and others.
These factors alone suggest a need for further examination of, and if possible some
reconciliation between, Habermas and his feminist critics. That the evaluation here
centrally incorporates feminist critique is all the more fitting given the overarching aim of
this thesis.^"* After all, battered women’s movements have emerged from those broader
social movements to which feminist social theory has been intrinsically connected. As a
means to articulate my own evaluative claims, in the following sections I discuss the
overlap and agreements, criticisms and contentions that surface in feminist critical
evaluation of Habermas’s account of the bourgeois public sphere. Following two paths
of evaluative inquiry discussed above, I address empirical questions concerning the
accuracy and comprehensiveness of his account, as well as critiques of his normative
argument for actualizing democratic principles through rational-critical public discourse.
I aim to identify critical weaknesses in Habermas’s argument and work toward some
reconciliation between his account and those of his critics, and conclude the chapter with
some reflections about the normative separation between ‘public’ and ‘private.’
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Recognizing Harmony: How Habermas and
Feminist Theorists Overlap
Important and politically relevant truths emerge from Strukturwandel. Most
fundamentally, Habermas “offers [an] important corrective to the standard dualistic
approaches to the separation of public and private in capitalist societies.”^^ His account
demonstrates that the meanings rendered by ‘public’ and ‘private’ are determined within
socioeconomic and historical context, and that these concepts are both changeable and
mutably connected with one another/^ As such, he sheds light on the historical
underpinnings that give rise to the ambiguous dichotomy of these concepts as they arise
in contemporary liberal-democratic societies. Moreover, Habermas’s account of the
bourgeois public sphere incorporates roles of the state, the market and the conjugal
nuclear family—all institutions having strong associations with social conceptions of
‘public’ and ‘private.’ Such specifications are politically relevant inasmuch as these
institutions mediate power relations, and insofar as an ambiguous, oversimplified
public/private dualism may be exploited for political ends.
Early on in Strukturwandel, Habermas makes clear a distinction between ‘the public’
and ‘the state as the public authority.’ (7) That he distinguishes between these concepts
is worth noting, as the concepts are frequently conflated in contemporary United States
contexts and such conflation has profound implications for legitimating the bounds of
state power.^^ Further, this confusion allows for the perpetuation of a dangerous kind of
‘pseudo- democracy’ that may be characterized by cultural misconceptions that the
interests of the state in effect equate to the interests of citizens, and thus that the state
wields its power in the interest of the citizenry. In stratified social contexts (such as those
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that exist within the United States and at a global level), each of these notions is dubious.
Arguably, to the extent that such distortion is widely propagated, individuals are at
greater risk of harm, and the egalitarian principles of democracy are further undermined.
By modeling a bourgeois public sphere that arose in opposition to state authority,
Habermas conceives of an actual democratic institution, albeit one that he relegates to
history and that is heavily criticized for some significant omissions. In any case, his
model represents what may be a viable starting point for scholars who theorize toward the
development of actual, functioning democracies.
Habermas’s account also exposes certain conflations within renderings o f ‘the public
sphere’ that surface in feminist challenges to the ‘public/private distinction’ as discussed
above. Such renderings collapse ‘the public sphere’ to include everything that falls
outside the domestic realm or ‘intimate sphere’—that is, the domain from which women
have been historically and systemically excluded on various l e v e l s . T h e problem with
this less precise usage, as Fraser points out, is that it conflates at least three distinct
things: the state, the official economy, and arenas of public discourse.^^ As with
confusions between ‘the public’ and ‘the state,’ this conflation has political relevance.
For example, the mechanisms that account for, say, how women have been historically
restricted from participation in civic life (for example in voting, running for office,
shaping movements for social change) may differ from those which constrain their
participation in the official economy (that is, paid workplaces, markets, credit systems).^**
Collapsing ‘civic life’ and ‘official economy’ under the one oversimplified rubric of
‘public sphere’ tends to obscure such differences. The collapse also contributes to other
misunderstandings. For instance, exchanges in the official economy may thus be labeled
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as both public (in the sense of being outside the domestic) and private (in the sense of
being ‘free’ from incursions of the state). The language becomes counterintuitive: while
these characterizations are not mutually exclusive, ‘public’ and ‘private’ are commonly
regarded as binary opposites.
Fraser also specifies how the consequences of such a collapse extend beyond
theoretical concerns, into very practical matters:
. . . when, for example, agitational campaigns against misogynist cultural
representations are confounded with programs for state censorship or when struggles
to deprivatize housework and child care are equated with their commodification. In
both these cases the result is to occlude the question of whether to subject gender
issues to the logic of the market or of the administrative state is to promote the
liberation of women.^*
One can raise similar questions about the actual effects of calling for increased state
intervention in domestic violence cases.^^ The terms of Habermas’s account of the
bourgeois public sphere as an arena for critical public discourse— situated in specific
relation to the state, the conjugal family, and the overarching socioeconomic context of
classical capitalism—offers a helpful resource for overcoming the conflations of ‘the
public sphere’ that arise in contemporary feminisms.
Habermas’s analysis consistently points out the economic underpinnings of specific
institutional relations and ideological claims, which is another way that his contribution is
both insightful and politically relevant. His account illuminates how traditional liberalist
models tend to support bourgeois interests, largely because he makes explicit from the
outset of Strukturwandel that his analysis centers on this specific social stratum. The
ideological equivalency o f ‘bourgeois’ and ‘homme’ parallels assertions of the bourgeois
public sphere to be 'the public.’ Both equations serve political functions.Habermas
acknowledges a corollary function of the ideology surrounding the patriarchal conjugal
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nuclear family that emerged with classical capitalism. That is, “the representation of the
conjugal family as the site o f . . . autonomous human subjectivity cloaks the deep
entwinement of the bourgeois family with specific class interests.”^"* A related legacy of
these functions in the contemporary United States has been their obfuscation of the classbased roots of our so-called ‘democratic’ institutions. Habermas exposes these roots,
largely by situating his account of the bourgeois public sphere within the larger
socioeconomic contexts of classical and welfare state capitalism. That his account has
such a strong material basis also suggests it may be well suited toward the further
analysis of structural power relations.
Understanding the historical origins of contextual meanings o f ‘public’ and ‘private’
and how such renderings shift over time informs us as to how the rhetorical legacies of
these terms can play out in contemporary contexts. Habermas’s account is especially
useful in this regard because it facilitates a greater-specified discussion of the social
values that are inherently tied up with the terms. That ‘public’ and ‘private’ are
categories with vast rhetorical potential is not only due to the definitional and contextual
ambiguities surrounding the words; they are also incredibly value-laden. This
combination of factors construes the terms as potentially exploitable toward a wide range
of social/political ends. Insofar as Habermas’s approach succeeds in its precision and
comprehensiveness of defining ‘public’ and ‘private,’ his analysis potentially lends
further clarity to questions concerning why and how these are such culturally important
concepts. Many would agree, for example, that ‘privacy’ is a fundamental value and that
the ‘right to privacy’ is a basic principle of our political s y s t e m . T o understand such a
concurrence requires a thorough examination of what ‘privacy’ can mean. In discussing
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Habermas’s model, Seyla Benhabib summarizes three distinct meanings of ‘privacy’: “a
sphere of moral and religious conscience,” “non-interference by the political state in the
free flow of commodity relations,” and “the ‘intimate sphere’ . . . of the household, of
meeting the daily needs of life, of sexuality, and reproduction, of care for the young, the
sick and the elderly.”^^ Social values associated with ‘privacy’ reference each of these
understandings (and likely others), and an analytical reliance on the more specific
definitions potentially serves to better refine shared values for the purpose of improved
decision-making. For instance, one can remain attuned to the importance of maintaining
a certain scope of privacy rights, while effectively arguing that matters in the ‘intimate
sphere’ ought not to be separated or removed from the realm of social justice.^’
In addition to the insights Strukturwandel offers concerning the various possible
meanings of ‘public’ and ‘private,’ it provides an account of how delineations between
the terms can blur over time. As such, Habermas provides a framework for interpreting
the emergence of new social movements, as well as the social transformations that have
taken place as a result of these movements. In a sense, he locates these movements at the
boundary between ‘public’ and ‘private.’ Thus, while Habermas may have set out to
identify the set of social conditions that allowed for reasoned political discourse within
the bourgeois public sphere, social movement theorists may find his analysis most useful
in that it describes a set of social conditions which enabled “new participants [to]
increasingly [enter] the public sphere as claimants[,] as the bearers of unmet private
needs.”^*
Included, of course, among these social movements are contemporary feminisms.
Feminist theorists tend to champion Strukturwandel for its vast improvements over a
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simple, dualistic public/private model. Especially helpful is its analysis of how specific
‘public’ and ‘private’ institutions are situated within broader socioeconomic contexts.
Habermas’s rigorous empirical account elucidates many of the ambiguities inherent in
‘public’ and ‘private’ and illuminates political discourse by explicating some of the ways
these terms can obscure power relations. As I have indicated, this account also has direct
bearing on his larger normative argument.
Many scholars share Habermas’s emancipatory aims of developing new democratic
institutions in this era of late welfare state capitalism. Such thinkers also rightly tend to
share his concerns about mass media’s role in perpetuating consumerist manipulation.
Giving voice to what seems like growing concern over the loss of a shared sense of civic
duty within our social morality, such scholars have written about the disintegration of
certain, once-common conceptions of critical publicity. John Durham Peters, for
example, points out that the meaning of ‘publicity’ has changed over time:
In writings by theorists such as Jeremy Bentham . . . and John Stuart M ill. . .
‘publicity’ meant openness of discussion and commerce as well as popular access to
government. Today publicity only suggests public relations. The semantic change of
publicity thus mirrors Habermas’s thesis about a structural transformation from
critical participation to consumerist manipulation.^^
Acknowledging the role o f mass media, Johnson also addresses this shift in the meaning
of ‘publicity’:
Nowhere was the effect of the transformation of the idea of publicity more evident
than in the workings of the modem mass media. Here, publicity constracts its
audience not as private individuals capable of rational argumentation, but as passive
consumers of messages which, utilizing strategies of repetition, seduction and
disavowal, rely upon and reproduce relations of power.^**
With this shift—and, as we have seen, with the deterioriation/expansion of the bourgeois
public sphere by Habermas’s account—a discourse of competition among rival private
interests has increasingly supplanted critical public discourse toward the ‘common good.’
57
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Benhabib maintains that Strukturwandel is decidedly useful for feminist thinkers
because we urgently need to develop better models of critical public discourse/* She
points out that as the public agenda has expanded in recent years to include social issues
previously cordoned off as ‘private,’ “more often than not a ‘patriarchal-capitalistdisciplinary bureaucracy’ has resulted [that has] frequently disempowered women and
. . . set the agenda for public debate and participation.”^^ Benhabib argues that new types
of public discourse are needed to transcend the bureaucratization and ‘juridification’^^ of
social problems, and to thereby help bring about the emancipatory aims of feminist
inquiry.^"* I shall revisit her claims in Chapter 5.
So, as Johanna Meehan summarizes, Habermas’s work has been useful to feminist
theorists “[b]ecause it offers a normative political framework for analyzing the structures
of modem life and of assessing the emancipatory potential of modemity in view of
simultaneous increases in political repression, market manipulation, and domination.”’^
However, as I discuss in the following section, many scholars dispute Habermas’s
representation of the bourgeois public sphere and contest his reliance on universalistic
(Kantian) norms. On these grounds, critics take on his normative argument for a
stmctural separation between public and private spheres.’^
Articulating Dissonance: Toward a Reconciliation
o f Habermas and His Critics
While Habermas’s account of the bourgeois public sphere has eamed widespread
regard, critics claim that it fails to consider women’s discourse, and thus “misses the
masquerade through which the (male) particular [is] able to posture behind the veil of the
universal.”” More specifically, they argue that Habermas misconstmes the bourgeois
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public sphere as more accessible than in fact it was, that in actuality this sphere of
political participation was quite exclusionary. These thinkers tend to agree that
“inasmuch as Habermas's account suffers from a gender blindness that occludes the
differential social and political status of men and women, his model. . . falls short and
needs revision and reconceptualization.”’*
Some charge that in failing to examine other public spheres, Habermas’s analysis is
theoretically problematic, especially insofar as it shapes the basis for his broader
normative argument. Others maintain that he does not sufficiently address the gendered
foundations of the equation of ‘bourgeois’ and ‘homme,’ and that he is insufficiently
critical of certain values inherent in his conception of the conjugal nuclear family.’^
Furthermore, evaluating Strukturwandel in light of the feminist deconstruction of the
public/private distinction has led some scholars criticize Habermas’s failure to account
for fluidity between public and private spheres.*** While I tend to agree with many of his
critics’ charges, I suggest that the analysis laid out in Strukturwandel remains a useful
point of departure for feminist projects that theorize about ‘public’ and ‘private’—and
that a feminist reconceptualization of Habermas’s broader normative argument is indeed
possible.**
Exclusionarv Nature of the Bourgeois Public Sphere
Habermas largely portrays the institutions of critical public discourse that gave rise to
the bourgeois public sphere—the coffee houses, salons, and Tischgesellschaften—as
disregarding the roles of social status and instead favoring ideas of common humanity
and rational argumentation. He puts forth that the bourgeois public sphere emerged in
conjunction with the principles of inclusivity, accessibility and open participation. A
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number of scholars have challenged this aspect of Habermas’s account, and have sought
to expose the “fraudulent character of the professed openness of this idea of the public
sphere.”*^
Joan Landes, for example, argues that “the ethos of a new republican public sphere in
France was constructed in deliberate opposition to that of a more woman-friendly salon
culture that the republicans stigmatized as ‘artificial,’ ‘effeminate,’ and ‘aristocratic.’”*^
Landes claims that these efforts resulted in a different style of public speech promoted as
‘rational,’ ‘virtuous,’ and ‘manly’— and ultimately led to the formal exclusion of women
from political life.*"* She criticizes Habermas’s account for “effac[ing] the way in which
the bourgeois public sphere from the outset worked to rule out all interests that would not
or could not lay claim to their own universality.”*^
Geoff Eley is another historian who holds that the bourgeois publie sphere was rooted
in exclusionary practices. He argues that in France, England, and Germany exclusions
based on gender were inherently connected to exclusions based on class formation,
whereby a bourgeois echelon of men asserted their suitability to govern by representing
themselves as a universal class.*^ As Eley notes, “It is perhaps unclear how far Habermas
believes his ideal of rational communication, with its concomitant of free and equal
participation, to have been actually realized in the classical liberal model of
OffentlichkeitP^^ On the one hand, Habermas makes clear from the outset that he is
speaking about a specific stratum of society, and his analysis does acknowledge the
property-based requirements for participation in the bourgeois public sphere. Indeed, he
links the decline of the bourgeois public sphere at least in part to its expansion beyond
these class boundaries. However, Habermas also stresses that the professed ideals of
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open access and participation were central to the way this sphere actually and
deliberatively functioned.
Pointing out an irony that Habermas’s account ‘fails to fully appreciate,’** Fraser
suggests a sound inroad for making sense of this ambiguity:
A discourse of publicity touting accessibility, rationality, and the suspension of status
hierarchies [was] itself deployed as a strategy of distinction. O f course, in and of
itself this irony does not fatally compromise the discourse of publicity; that discourse
can be, indeed has been, differently deployed in different circumstances and contexts.
Nevertheless, it does suggest that the relationship between publieity and status is
more eomplex than Habermas intimates, that declaring a deliberative arena to be a
space where extant status distinctions are bracketed and neutralized is not sufficient to
make it so.*^
Habermas’s formulation requires revision insofar as it rests on an assumption that
bourgeois men were aetually able to engage in the liberal public sphere as though they
were the social equals of excluded constituencies.^**
Bourgeois Public As the Public
Despite its universalistie self-representation as the public, the bourgeois public sphere
ultimately did not suceeed in serving the interests of a ‘common humanity’—both by
Habermas’s own account and by those of his feminist eritics. However, because
Habermas selectively fails to consider other public spheres—more specifically, non
liberal, non-bourgeois, non-male or otherwise competing public spheres—he ends up
idealizing the bourgeois public sphere nonetheless.^' In support of this claim, Fraser cites
(among others) historian Mary Ryan, whose work examines a range of mechanisms
developed by nineteenth-century North American women to gain access to public
political life. Habermas notes that women were (faetually and legally) excluded from
participation in the politieal public sphere. (57) As Fraser points out, however, this view
“rests on a class- and gender-biased notion of publicity, one which accepts at face value
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the bourgeois public’s claim to be the publie.”^^ In other words, Habermas’s analysis
does not adequately account for other competing publics or, to use Fraser’s term,
‘counterpublics’ that emerged at virtually the same time as the bourgeois public/^ He
addresses competing, non-bourgeois interests, but marginalizes these interests, setting
them up in opposition to bourgeois ‘universalism.’ As Jean Cohen argues, Habermas
mischaracterizes “most contemporary social movements (including feminism in many of
its moments) as purely particularistic and defensive and thus not furthering the
universalistic emancipatory goals of modernity.”^"*
Thus Habermas consistently casts the bourgeois public sphere as the central public by
which all other publics must then be referenced. This may not be wholly inappropriate
inasmuch as the bourgeois public was a dominant social and political force. The
normative universalism on which Habermas’s formulation rests, however, is premised
largely on conditions of open participation and a conception of the public. Revisionist
historiography suggests that the bourgeois public sphere was (and is) in many ways
exclusionary, and that bourgeois publics have always conflicted with other, competing
publics. This calls for further examination of Habermas’s treatment of the universalistic
norms of the bourgeois public.
Universalism and the Bourgeois Public Sphere
Habermas associates the decline of the bourgeois public sphere with the loss of its
universalism. What remains unclear is how much of this decline represents the loss an
ideal, that is, a set of moral principles concerning rational argumentation, open
participation and the common good of humanity on the one hand, versus how much it
represents a change in how the bourgeois public sphere actually fimctioned.^^
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Nevertheless, I maintain that Habermas articulates both distinct claims—that is, he argues
that the bourgeois public sphere lost both its universalistic ideals as well as its
universalistic function. As Johnson states:
[0]nce the idea of a common abstract humanity which had underpinned the bourgeois
public sphere was exposed to reveal the bourgeois character of ‘homme,’ it seemed
that the foundation for a relatively homogenous public composed of private citizens
engaged in rational-critical debate was also shaken.^^
Concomitantly, the revisionists cast doubt on each claim of loss, calling into question the
degree to which the bourgeois public sphere ever had truly universalistic aspirations, as
well as whether it ever succeeded in achieving such aims. As Fraser cogently points out,
the revisionist historiography suggests a much ‘darker view’ of the bourgeois public
sphere than Habermas implies:
The exclusions and conflicts that appeared as accidental trappings from his
perspeetive become constitutive in the revisionists’ view. The result is a gestalt
switch that alters the very meaning of the public sphere. We can no longer assume
that the bourgeois conception of the public sphere was simply an unrealized utopian
ideal; it was also a masculinist ideological notion that functioned to legitimate an
emergent form of class rule . . . [and] the institutional vehicle for a major historical
transformation in the nature of political domination . . . [that] secure[d] the ability of
one stratum of society to rule the rest.^’
Whether we interpret Habermas’s account of the bourgeois public sphere as the utopian
ideal he suggests, or as the instrument of domination suggested by revisionist historians,
would tend to lead us down different paths of normative reasoning.***
I am inclined to concur with the revisionists’ account and thus tend to regard the
bourgeois public sphere more as an instrument of domination and less as a utopian ideal.
I share Landes’ concern that “goals of generalizability and appeals to the common good
may conceal rather than expose forms of domination, suppress rather than release
concrete differences among persons or groups.”**** Moreover, I suggest that the expansion
of the bourgeois public sphere that first took place in the late nineteenth and early
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twentieth centuries was itself another ‘historical transformation in the nature of political
domination.’ Arguably, non-bourgeois constituencies did gain sufficient access to power
to effect some significant social and political changes. I do not want to underemphasize
or oversimplify the relevance of such changes. However, also arguable is that the
discursive balkanization from purported universalism toward explicitly competing
interests has not done much to change the hegemonic order of things. I suggest that these
competing interests may not so much rival each other as challenge the said order. That
they are sold and reified as rival, particularistic interests in mass media (and elsewhere)
functions to uphold a hegemonic order by which such interests ‘compete for the crumbs’
and thus leave major power relations unchallenged.
Retaining Habermasian Ideals: Critical Reasoning.
Open Participation and the Common Good
All that said, we ought not wholly to discard any notion of the public, or for that
matter some of Habermas’s other democratizing principles. Regardless of whether the
liberalist public sphere ever achieved them, with some qualification they remain good
normative ideals. Further specifying three related components of Habermas’s normative
model allows us to discuss each in turn; they are: critical reasoning, open participation in
deliberative processes, and pursuit of the common good. Upon briefly discussing each of
these aspects, I shall revisit the question of a critical public in the context of normative
public/private distinctions.
Engaged, critical reasoning is an important and noble human practice. This practice
takes on increased relevance in the context of the vast consumerist manipulation
occurring in late welfare state capitalism. We live in a world in which wealthy, corporate
interests exert much power over the range of decisions affecting peoples’ everyday
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lives—including bureaucratic and juridical decisions made by agents of the state. These
interests are profit-driven and have direct ties to the consumerist manipulation of which
Habermas and others speak. Their influence is far-reaching, extending into processes of
human identity formation and our very perceptions of the global contexts in which we
find ourselves. Many of these realities of late welfare state capitalism suggest that
engaging our rational-critical faculties is evermore important. At the same time, this
environment fosters the lack of institutional mechanisms for critical engagement. Critical
reasoning is a human faculty that contributes to the realization of individual potential, to
the building of common ground, and to the perpetuation of social good; as a widespread
practice, we ought to cultivate it. That is, we ought to build social mechanisms for
developing skills in logic and argumentation. We ought to become better practiced at
evaluating evidence in the rendering of normative judgments.
It may sound like I am making a rationalist argument. I am not. Let us not seek to
reduce our humanity to eertain functions of our oversized cerebrums. Let us not be
fooled into thinking that the practice of argumentation is ‘beyond the play of power’’****or
that what we assess to be careful logic always leads us to ‘the truth.’ Commercials on
television do not tend to draw so much upon our rational faculties, yet they seem to be
rather effective. Perhaps to be sufficiently critically engaged in this late capitalist era, we
need to look beyond the fundamental tools of language and argumentation. Landes, for
example, raises a good point in her critique of Habermas’s possible “prejudice toward
‘linguisticality’” as opposed to visuality or theatricality. She argues:
[A] singular emphasis on language may be misleading from both a methodological
and an empirical perspective.. . . Political arguments, we may want to allow, may be
communicated in discursive and non-discursive forms, and the two may interact in
unanticipated ways.’**’
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Habermas does heavily emphasize the importance of discourse, arguably with good
reason, for language (in some form) is generally the medium of argumentation.
However, given the increasingly mediatized society is which we find ourselves, which
Habermas himself decries, we would do well to acknowledge the power and effectiveness
of non-textual communications and to develop more effective habits of critical
listening/viewing of such forms. Nevertheless, I suggest that Habermas’s emphasis on
the need for critical reasoning— despite critical objections to his overly rationalistic
approach—is largely on the mark and necessary to developing the new discursive models
that Benhabib advocates. Benhabib states, “[I]t is only the unconstrained process of
discourse and not some moral calculus which will allow us to re-establish these
[public/private] boundaries once their traditional meaning has been contested.”’®^ She is
also on target in arguing such a critical public function to be necessary to effectively
address the various problems inherent in the liberalist model of the public/private
distinction.
The second of the three components identified above, open participation in
deliberative processes is an aspect of Habermas’s formulation that provides a context in
which engaged, critical argumentation ought to take place. Though usually not realized,
this is an ideal that has characterized much of liberalist theory, and it is an ideal worth
retaining. I would argue that such a claim supports Fraser’s conception of and normative
preference for ‘a multiplicity of competing publics’ versus ‘a single, comprehensive
public sphere,’

especially given the current realities of social and economic

globalization. Moreover, as Fraser suggests, societal equality is a corollary of open
participation. As such, it is an ideal with many challenges that may rarely (or never
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really) be achieved—but an ideal we ought to uphold nonetheless. Like Habermas and
Landes, I see this as very much a radical project. “[T]o arrive at a process of deliberation
and opinion formation from which no subject or person is barred”

would require

monumental social and political change. As Landes does, however, I too must support
aims to democratize and feminize critical public spheres, for “these are utopian but not
impossible goals.
Finally, while we must reject any conception of the common good that is professed to
be ‘universal’ and articulated only by a powerful few, pursuit of the common good
nevertheless persists as a profoundly useful normative idea—one with direct practical ties
to the principle of open participation. Like widespread critical reasoning, promotion of
the common good does not seem to be a major objective of many powerful interests.
Indeed, in some ways, the very notion of ‘common interest’ has become tainted by false,
solipsistic claims of universalism. Some very real differences exist among people and
their needs and aspirations, differences which are typically exacerbated in a stratified
society, a stratified world. Like open participation, pursuit of the common good carries
with it a host of problems and challenges, not the least of which is coming to some
consensus about what the common good might look like.**^^ Still, it too remains a vital
objective, at various social levels of ‘common’ ranging from families to more worldly
contexts.
Normative Implications for the Structural
Separation of ‘Public’ and ‘Private’
Having laid out the considerations addressed above, I conclude this chapter with a
return to the question of Habermas’s normative defense of a public/private split. As I
mentioned above, while there is a good deal of overlap between Habermas’s normative
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aims and those of certain feminist theorists, this question remains a critical tension
between them. To recap, Habermas links a “tendency toward a mutual infiltration of the
public and private spheres” (142) to the decline of the bourgeois public sphere and the
emergence of social welfare states. Prior to this, in liberal constitutional states, a more
rigid public/private distinction was upheld. Further, Habermas asserts that such a
distinction ought to upheld. Several of his feminist critics, however, argue that a good
degree of fluidity has always existed between ‘public’ and ‘private’ in ways that
Habermas’s account leaves unrecognized. Moreover, critics maintain that the very
principle of separation between public and private domains confirms the exclusionary
character of the bourgeois public sphere. Johnson nicely summarizes this position:
[T]he supposition that the idea of the critical public sphere requires a separation
between private and public rests upon a repressive attempt to render some human
attributes and modes of interaction foundational - beyond the realm of public
discussion. This process of essentialization happens in both directions. If the
procedural norms that govern interaction in the public domain are never tested against
the claims of private dissatisfactions, then these norms can only finally entrench and
absolutize certain forms and styles of intercourse as foundational, expressive of
supposedly essential human attributes. At the time same, by quarantining ‘private’
concerns, Habermas’s early efforts to cement a division between public and private
are seen to require a repressive essentialization of sets of power relations generated
out of, and legitimated by, the conjugal family.
While Habermas addresses some of the class-related implications concerning the
liberalist equation o f ‘bourgeois’ and ‘homme,’ he decidedly neglects the gendered
dimensions of its meaning—as in, ‘citizen’ equals ‘property-owner’ equals ‘male.’ His
critics demonstrate that Habermas’s aim to reconstruct the separation between public and
private spheres “still bears the marks of a gendered and class equation between
‘bourgeois’ and ‘homme.’”*®*
If Habermas’s formulation is thus flawed then, to what extent and in what ways is his
normative argument about the separation of public and private undermined? Jean Bethke
68
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Elshtain asserts, “The complete collapse of a distinction between public and private is
anathema to democratic thinking, which holds that the differences between public and
private identities, commitments, and activities are of vital importance.”'®® Is there not
some truth to this? Elshtain goes on to argue against the feminist catchphrase ‘the
personal is political.’ Although I share many of her concerns over what she labels a
‘politics of displacement’— such as the lack of civic institutions to focus shared dissent
and concern"®—I disagree with much of her reasoning.'" Central to my point here is
that she decries a landscape in which “all is defined as ‘political’ and watered down to the
lowest common denominator.”"^ Yet absent from Elshtain’s analysis is a definition of
‘politics’ that incorporates power relations. She uses the term to refer to “that which is,
in principle, held in common and what is, in principle, open to public scrutiny and
judgment.”"^ Using such as a working definition, I too would decry the landscape
Elshtain paints. However, in interpreting ‘the personal is political’ and evaluating
beyond this slogan the rigorous feminist deconstructions of the public/private distinction,
I opt for a usage o f ‘political’ that elucidates power relations rather than obscures them.
None of the feminist scholarship that I have considered here calls for the complete
collapse the public/private distinction that Elshtain argues against. As Benhabib states:
Any theory of the public, public sphere, and publicity presupposes a distinction
between the public and the private. These are the terms of a binary opposition. What
the women’s movement and feminist theorists in the last two decades have shown,
however, is that traditional modes of drawing this distinction have been part of a
discourse of domination that legitimizes women’s oppression and exploitation in the
private realm."''
I maintain that workable models of the public can be refined so as to account for multiple
public spheres o f critical discourse. Further, I suggest that theorists can and will continue
to develop conceptions of public and private that transcend rigid dualism, account for the
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mutability and ‘mutual infiltration’ of the terms, and effectively challenge rather than
reproduce unjust power relations.
The feminist critiques of the Habermasian interpretation effectively make the case
that such projects ought to recognize that many issues traditionally framed as ‘private’
according to the liberalist model are fair game for normative judgment in deliberating
matters of social and political justice. History reveals that the social construction of socalled ‘private’ matters can and does serve to reinforce systemic power relations,
including those characterized by patterns of gender domination. When this happens, such
matters become appropriate topics for public deliberation, and the normative boundaries
between public interests and private needs are further clarified. Such projects also ought
to recognize that the principles of critical reasoning, open participation, and pursuit of the
common good that underpin Habermas’s model are ideals that have application in
families and workplaces, as well as in discursive publics. This opens a door for
articulating a much-needed set of normative claims aimed at democratizing the family."^
This aim has strong relevance not only for ameliorating systemic patterns of violence that
occur in families, but also, to the extent that “democracy begins in the intimacy of love
and of the home,”"® for cultivating functional critical publics.
Strukturwandel, in conjunction with the invaluable responses it has elicited within
feminist discourse, remains an indispensable theoretical resource for those “still
committed to the project of radical democracy.”' " Habermas contends that critical
publicity can potentially democratize social welfare states. 1 am not sure that 1 share his
optimism. Unlike Habermas, 1 fear that such democratization is indeed “limited from the
outset by an impenetrability and indissolubility . . . of irrational relations of social power
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and political domination.” (235) That said, I can see no alternative but to retain the
radical democratic commitment.
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Notes
' Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into
Category o f Bourgeois Society [original German publication 1962], trans. Thomas Burger
with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA; MIT Press, 1989).
^Throughout his analysis, Habermas is particularly concerned with Germany, France and
Great Britain, while occasionally referencing the United States.
*While I shall do my best to offer as balanced a portrayal of the work as possible, the
interests with which I approached the book inevitably have bearing on my reading of it.
Moreover, making such intentions clear will, I hope, better serve to disentangle the
threads of this analysis.
‘'l further discuss this tradition at the beginning of the evaluative section of this chapter.
^ Joan B. Landes, “The Public and Private Sphere: A Feminist Reconsideration,” in
Feminism, the Public and the Private, ed. Joan B. Landes (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 136.
®Among the critics 1 discuss, some draw on Strukturwandel as well as Habermas’s later
work including, Jürgen Habermas, The Theory o f Communicative Action, vol. 2,
Lifeworld and System: A Critique o f Functionalist Reason, trans. Thomas McCarthy
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1987). To contextualize my inclusion of their critique, 1 will
briefly discuss how Strukturwandel fits in with Habermas’s broader project at the
beginning of the evaluative portion of this chapter.
^1 borrow the phrase ‘dialectical alliance’ as used in this context from Seyla Benhabib,
“Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jürgen Habermas,”
in Feminism, the Public and the Private, ed. Joan B. Landes (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998), 65-99.
*Habermas, 5. This work is hereafter referenced parenthetically in the text with page
numbers only, e.g., (5).
®These issues are discussed in greater depth in Thomas Burger’s Translator’s Note.
'®These are points that the author makes clear in his preface: “Thus [the bourgeois public
sphere in the liberal model] refers to those features of a historical constellation that
attained dominance and leaves aside the plebian public sphere as a variant that in a sense
was suppressed in the historical process” (Habermas, xviii).
"The polis can be contrasted with the oikos, the private sphere of the house where non
citizens such as slaves and women performed productive and reproductive labor under
the master’s dominion. So, as Habermas points out, participation in the polis was “based
upon status as the unlimited master of an oikos. ^ (4) For a comprehensive account of
‘public’ and ‘private’ in Aristotle’s philosophy, see Judith A. Swanson, The Public and
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the Private in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).
Habermas also charts the development of res publicus in Roman law.
"Habermas goes into other examples here as well, as he attempts to provide a thorough
account of this breakdown.
" “On the one hand,” he states, “this capitalism stabilized the power structure of a society
organized in estates, and on the other hand it unleashed the very elements within which
this power strucmre would one day dissolve.” (15)
"Habermas states, “Almost simultaneously with the origin of stock markets, postal
services and the press institutionalized regular contacts and regular communications.”
(16) These communications, which soon became explosive, have their origins with
merchants creating the first mail routes. Notably, at this time, readers were not interested
in ‘public’ information.
"A s a commodity, the press was “subject to the laws of the same market to whose rise it
owed its existence in the first place.” (21)
"A s Habermas notes (19), Hannah Arendt refers to this private sphere o f society that has
become publicly relevant. Arendt is another scholar whose work on models of public and
private realms is well known. In one of her best-known theoretical works—Hannah
Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958)— she argues
for an agonistic public-sphere model similar to that of ancient Greece.
"Habermas points out that such power claims against the state did not assert that official
command ought to be divided or shared. Rather, the public debate among private persons
“undercut the principle on which existing rule was based.” (28)
"Habermas describes in detail how these developments transpired in Great Britain,
France and Germany.
"w hile I focus here on the similarities between the three institutions, it is important to
note that they were each distinct in several ways. For example, women were prohibited
from the coffee houses in Great Britain, whereas they had an active role in shaping the
salons. Habermas discusses such differences in some detail.
^®In theory, “laws of the market were suspended as were laws of the state.” (37)
^'The three institutions also “presupposed a domain of ‘common concern’ via the
problematization of areas that until then had not been questioned.” (37)
22

Emphasis added.

sphen the “subjectivity originating in the interiority of the conjugal family.
Within this sphere,
by communicating with itself, attained clarity about itself.” (51)
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"w h ile this discussion offers much insight into the concrete events that structure
Habermas’s analysis, I will not attempt to summarize them here.
^^Habermas discusses the ideological premises of the ‘free’ market, pointing out that such
a model was viewed as inherently just: “According to civil society’s idea of itself, the
system of free competition was self-regulating . . . in a fashion that ensured everyone’s
welfare and justice in accord with the standard of the individual’s capacity to perform”
(79).
^®He begins with the Latin opinion, meaning both “uncertain, not fully demonstrated
judgment” and “regard; what one represents on the opinion of others.” (89)
^^Habermas states, “The opinion of the public that put its reason to use was no longer just
opinion; it did not arise from mere inclination but from private reflection upon public
affairs and from their public discussion . . . ” (94) Rousseau opposed institutionalizing
widespread critical public debate.
"T o be clear, while Kant supports this claim as grounds for his larger argument,
Habermas does not buy into this equal access argument.
^®He states, “The fiction of a justice immanent in free commerce was what rendered
plausible the conflation of bourgeois and homme, of self-interest, property-owing private
people and autonomous individuals per se.” ( I l l )
^®Habermas writes, “A series of fictions in which the self-understanding of the bourgeois
consciousness as ‘public opinion’ was articulated extended right into the Kantian system,
and therefore it was possible to derive from it in turn the idea of the bourgeois public
sphere precisely in its connection with the presupposition of a natural basis of the
juridical condition.” (117)
^'That is, the liberal model that treats public opinion (involving a bourgeois public sphere
engaged in critical debate) as authoritative.
[Hegel’s] insight into the at once anarchic and antagonistic character of this system of
needs decisively destroyed the liberal pretenses on which the se lf interpretation of public
opinion as nothing but plain reason rested.” (118)
^^Marx, of course, is primarily concerned with those between owners and wage earners.
^''According to Habermas, “The right to the free expression of opinion was no longer
called to protect the public’s rational-critical debate against the reach of the police but to
protect the nonconformists from the grip of the public itself.” (134)
®®While 1 will outline his major points, 1 will cover this deterioration in less detail than
that which is reflected in the interpretive sections above.
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®®Here, Habermas claims that “a repoliticized social sphere emerged to which the
distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ could not be usefully applied.” (142)
Along these lines, Habermas states, “[TJhere arose an illusion of intensified privacy in
an interior domain whose scope had shrunk to comprise the conjugal family only insofar
as it constituted a community of consumers.” (156)
^*In Habermas’s account, the mass media are more likely to “give rise to an impersonal
indulgence . . . than to a public use of reason.” (170)
^®In Habermas’s words, “[The media] draw the eyes and ears of the public under its spell
but at the same time . . . deprive it of the opportunity to say something and to disagree.”
(171)
''^To contextualize the account, Habermas’s work stems from the Critical Theory of the
Frankfurt School, which is rooted in Western Marxism and shares the “aim of developing
a theory of society that is critical in a number o f . . . intimately related respects.” (Barry
Hindess, “Marxism,” in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, eds. Robert
E. Goodin and Phillip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 319.) This author
classifies these respects into four major components: first, as critique “involving an
overriding concern with the conditions of possibility of knowledge and of reason”;
second, as “a reflection on the development of Reason, now conceived as the subject of
history”; third, as “the critique of ideology as unmasking the distorting images that
conceal and legitimate the realities of power in modem societies”; and, finally, as “a
moral critique of political power based on the ideal of a society of rational and
autonomous individuals.” (Hindess, 319.) Nancy Fraser, moreover, characterizes Critical
Theory as involving the stance that “politics requires a genre of critical theorizing that
blends normative argument and empirical sociocultural analysis in a ‘diagnosis of the
times.’” (Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in
Contemporary Social Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 6.)
What notably distinguishes Habermas fi’om many of the early members of the Frankfurt
School—who include Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse—is
his adherence to a specific (Kantian) normative conception of rationality. As Johanna
Meehan states, “He embraces the Enlightenment convictions that rationality—
reconceptualized as communicative rationality—is potentially liberatory and that the
promises of democracy remain unfulfilled as long as the Enlightenment project remains
unfinished.” (Johanna Meehan, “Communicative Ethics,” in A Companion to Feminist
Philosophy, eds. Allison M. Jaggar and Iris Marion Young (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers, 2000), 414.) In his later work, especially in volume two of The Theory o f
Communicative Action, Habermas further situates the concepts o f ‘public sphere’ and
‘private sphere’ in his development of a critical social theory that incorporates the
concepts of ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ as well as the normative role of conununicative
power. (Jürgen Habermas, The Theory o f Communicative Action, vol. 2, Lifeworld and
System: A Critique o f Functionalist Reason, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1987).)
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Pauline Johnson, “Habermas’s Search for the Public Sphere,” European Journal o f
Social Theory 4, no. 2 (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001), 216.
‘'^Johnson, 218.
''^Interestingly, as Habermas himself states in Jürgen Habermas, concluding remarks to
Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT
Press, 1992), 462-3, “The book was criticized when it appeared in Germany for confusing
descriptive and normative aspects. The concept of the public sphere, Offentlichkeit, is
meant as an analytic tool for ordering certain phenomena and placing them in a particular
context as part of a categorical frame. This concept also has inevitable normative
implications, of course, and is related (and this is the confusing part) to certain positions
in normative political theory. These are connotations that link the historical analysis with
our value-laden and future oriented enterprise of making some sort of diagnosis of our
present situation, particularly for those who are still committed to the project of radical
democracy.”
''''in addition to ‘public/private distinction’, the phrase ‘public/private dichotomy’ and
similar variations have also been used to label this concept in feminist discourse. I do not
go so far as to speak to the difference between them.
''^As a tenet, ‘the personal is political’ is certainly not uncontested, as I shall discuss
fiirther below. For one interpretation concerning that which essentially characterizes
‘feminism’, see Jane Mansbridge and Susan Moller Okin, “Feminism,” in ^ Companion
to Contemporary Political Philosophy, eds. Robert E. Goodin and Phillip Pettit (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, 1993): 269-290.
''®Virginia Held, “Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory,” in Ethics: History, Theory
and Contemporary Issues, eds. Steven M. Cahn and Peter Markie (NewYork: Oxford
University Press, 1998), 690.
''^Mansbridge and Okin describe what it can mean to challenge the public/private
distinction on feminist grounds. “Challenging the dichotomy of public and private does
not mean denying any distinction between the meanings of the words, demeaning the
value of privacy, or making all behavior similarly subject to state action.. . . The
challenge does, however, mean seeing every action as potentially infused with public
meaning. It means . . . that the reason which constitutes much of public persuasion is not
so universal as to be untouched by assumptions, emotional connotations and linguistic
patterns formed in the most private of relations. [It] means insisting on the non-triviality,
the non-exclusion from central public debate, of intimate, domestic concerns.”
(Mansbridge and Okin, 274.)
''*Fraser, Unruly Practices, 4. Notably, Habermas and Foucault disagreed about power,
as summed up by Micheal Kelly in his introduction to Critique and Power: Recasting the
Foucault/Habermas Debate, ed. Michael Kelly (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT
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Press, 1994), 1: “Foucault introduces power while analyzing the genealogy of various
forms of knowledge and nondiscursive practices; he claims that power is, in fact,
productive of both knowledge and practice. While acknowledging power, Habermas
insists that it be tempered by a critical theory able to make normative distinctions
between legitimate and illegitimate uses of power.”
''^Fraser, Unruly Practices, 4.
^®Fraser, Unruly Practices, 6.
^'Hindess, 319.
^^Of course, these objectives are shared among scholars engaged in a range of disciplines
and theoretical perspectives. For example, cultural historian John L. Brooke states, “The
Habermasian public sphere . . . serve[s] the critical function of helping historians to
organize, discuss, and assess the dimension of ‘culture’ with an eye toward the power
relations in society usually bundled together simply as ‘politics.’” (John L. Brooke,
“Reason and Passion in the Public Sphere: Habermas and the Cultural Historians,”
Journal o f Interdisciplinary History 29, no. 1 (1998), 48.)
^^Fraser, Unruly Practices, 122.
Again, my overarching aim is to better understand how various renderings of ‘public’
and ‘private’ shape and prescriptively inform United States domestic violence
policymaking.
^^Fraser, Unruly Practices, 123.
^®The sophistication of his analysis is made possible by the interdisciplinary method
Habermas used. As Habermas himself notes, in Jürgen Habermas, “Further Reflections
on the Public Sphere,” trans. Thomas Burger in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed.
Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), 421, “[T]he original study
emerged from the synthesis of contributions based in several disciplines, whose number
even at that time almost exceeded what one author could hope to master.”
^^A simple example of such a conflation would be the common practice of referring to
state-controlled funds as ‘public funds.’
®*This is not to say that such exclusions have not changed over time. For example, recent
decades have seen expanded opportunity for women in the paid labor force; however,
certain inequities persist (e.g., salary differentials, lack of opportunity within certain
fields, etc.).
^®Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of
Actually Existing Democracy,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992), 110.
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®®I employ the term ‘official economy’ as Fraser does “so as to avoid the androcentric
implication that domestic institutions are not also economic.” (Fraser, Rethinking the
Public Sphere, 138.) See also Nancy Fraser, “What’s Critical About Critical Theory?
The Case of Habermas and Gender,” in Unruly Practices, 113-143.
®'Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere, 110.
®^Indeed, many scholars and advocates have already raised such questions, as I shall
discuss substantially in chapter 5.
shall further discuss some of these functions in the section that follows.
^''Johnson, 222.
^^Interestingly, “prior to the twentieth century, only a handful of essayists, lawyers,
philosopher and social scientists wrote about privacy,” according to Anita Allen,
“Privacy,” in ^ Companion to Feminist Philosophy, eds. Allison M. Jaggar and Iris
Marion Young (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 456.
®®Benhabib, 86. For another specification of different conceptions of privacy, see Allen.
®^I further develop these ideas in chapter 5.
®*Johnson, 224.
®®John Durham Peters, “Distrust of Representation: Habermas on the Public Sphere,”
Media, Culture and Society (SAGE, London, Newbury Park and New Delhi) Vol. 15
(1993), 543.
^®Johnson, 224.
Benhabib, 91.
^^Benhabib, 91.
^^Benhabib specifies that by ‘juridification’ she means what Habermas calls
Verrechtlichung.
"Habermas raises concerns about bureaucratization as a response to social problems in
volume 2 of The Theory o f Communicative Action, in which he discusses the client role in
late welfare state capitalism. In her evaluation of this work, Fraser notes that the client
role is a feminine role representing “a change in the character of male dominance, a shift,
in Carol Brown's phrase, ‘from private patriarchy to public patriarchy.’” Fraser goes on to
argue that “that this [client] role, qua feminine role, perpetuates in a new, let us say
‘modernized’ and ‘rationalized’ form, women's subordination. (Fraser, Unruly Practices,
132, citing Carol Brown, “Mothers, Fathers and Children: From Private to Public
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Patriarchy” in Women and Revolution: A Discussion o f the Unhappy Marriage Between
Marxism and Feminism, ed. Lydia Sargent (Boston, 1981).)
^^Meehan, 412.
’®As one author specifies, Habermas supports a separation “that can support the
conditions under which the principle of reasonable communication might practically be
defended against the tide of an irrational conformism.” (Johnson, 225.)
^^Landes, Public and Private Sphere, 143.
’*Meehan, 415.
Johnson, 228.
*®Meehan, 415.
*'T o be clear, Habermas likely considered what are today considered feminist

considerations. For example, he likely knew about John Stuart Mill’s analysis in “The
Subjection of Women.”
Johnson, 221.
*^Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere, 114, citing Joan Landes, Women and the Public
Sphere in the Age o f the French Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
^''Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere, 114.
*^Landes, Public and Private Sphere, 142.
*®Geoff Eley, “Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the
Nineteenth Century,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), 289-319.
*’Eley, 293.
**Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere, 115.
*®Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere, 115.
®®Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere, 115 also makes this point.
®'My discussion here continues to draw heavily from Fraser, Rethinking the Public
Sphere, 112-118.
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®^Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere, 116. In this context, Fraser is speaking to the
more general notion of women’s exclusion from public life, rather than to a specific
claim made by Habermas.
®^Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere, 116. According to Fraser, these competing
publics included “nationalist publics, popular peasant publics, elite women’s publics, and
working-class publics.” Notably, as Calhoun points out in the introduction to Habermas
and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992),
37, it “seems a loss simply to say that there are many public spheres . . . for that will
leave us groping for a new term to describe the communicative relationships among
them.” For now, I shall leave the task of such groping to others.
^''Meehan, 415, citing Jean Cohen, “The public and private: a feminist reconsideration,”
in Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject o f Discourse, ed. Johanna Meehan
(New York: Routledge), 57-90.
®^This of course echoes the ambiguity Eley discusses, referenced above. However, I am
concerned here about how this plays out in Habermas’s argument specifically at the stage
of the bourgeois public’s decline.
®®Johnson, 222.
®^Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere, 116-7. This legitmation of class rule was, of
course, also grounded in other ‘ideological notions’— such as institutionalized racism and
heterosexism.
^^Nevertheless, his framework in still valuable.
®®Landes, Public and Private Sphere, 144.
"®Meehan, 411, citing Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the subversion of
identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), 39. The larger context of the citation follows:
“No theory is benign because ‘the recourse to a position - hypothetical, counterfactual, or
imaginary - that places itself beyond the play of power, and which seeks to establish the
metapolitical basis for the negotiation of power relations, is perhaps the most insidious
ruse of power.”
Landes, Public and Private Sphere, 153-4. While I share Landes’s concern, I disagree
with any assessment that discourse is Habermas’s “singular emphasis.” Habermas is not
merely concerned with language for its own sake, but rather for its application in critical
public reasoning.
"^Benhabib, 89.
"*Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere, 117.
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"''Landes, Public and Private Sphere, 156.
"^Landes, Public and Private Sphere, 156.
"®This includes questions about sharing what is common, as well as how to share and
still be different.
Johnson, 228.
"*Johnson, 230.
"®Jean Bethke Elshtain, Democracy on Trial (New York: BasicBooks, 1995), 39.
'"Elshtain, 40.
'" l do not elaborate on all of these contentions here.
"^Elshtain, 41.
"^Elshtain, 40.
""Benhabib, 93.
"^The same can be said for democratizing workplaces.
"®Luce Irigaray, Democracy Begins Between Two, trans. Kirsteen Anderson (New York:
Routledge, 2001), 108.
117%

Habermas, Concluding Remarks, 463.
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CHAPTER 3

A SOCIAL HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF UNITED STATES
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW AND POLICY
At the outset of this thesis, I described domestic violence as a complex and
consequential contemporary social problem. I also put forth that contested conceptions
of ‘public’ and ‘private’ have had significant bearing on policy responses to the issue. In
Chapter 2 ,1 interpreted and evaluated Jürgen Habermas’s Structural Transformation o f
the Public Sphere {Strukturwandel der Ojfentlichkeiif as a means to analytically frame
such conceptions, their meanings and their histories in the development of Western
political thought and practice. In this chapter, I develop a social/historical account of
domestic violence law and policy in the United States.^ What cultural, economic and
political processes have shaped these laws and policies over time? How have different
ideologies and social moralities come into play? In what ways have religious, scientific
and legal authorities— and various challenges to these authorities—informed legal and
policy responses to the problem? These are some of the fundamental questions with
which I proceed.
While intimate violence has always existed in the United States, research suggests
that its frequency and severity have changed across time and place; so too has the degree
to which women have effectively resisted such violence through legal and social means.
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Legislative policy responses to domestic violence have also changed over time, though
until the mid-1970s they were scant and largely nonexistent.^ Despite this policy
vacuum, domestic violence cases have been adjudicated in the United States court system
(and its colonial predecessors) for hundreds of years. As such, historians concerned with
domestic violence in the United States regard the records of these cases as an
indispensable yet inherently limited resource. For one, an array of factors has resulted in
vast underreporting and underrecording of matters concerning domestic violence. Larry
Eldridge, for example, who researched spousal violence during colonial America, found
that court records from that era often left punishment unrecorded." Omissions such as
these present considerable challenges in studying the history of the issue. Moreover,
while history reveals that violence between intimates has been both hidden and socially
sanctioned, many influential historical renderings have tended to ignore women’s
experiences and discourse.® This presents a further methodological challenge in
disentangling the roots of the problem.
The account presented here begins by examining the social and legal norms
surrounding marriage and violence against women that were predominant in Europe
before European settlers colonized what was to become the United States.® Here, the
scope of my analysis extends beyond violence perpetrated against women in the domestic
realm, as I examine different forms of violence as means by which women are socially
controlled. For example, in addition to domestic violence, I examine the European witch
hunts. While as manifestations of violence against women each is distinct, I maintain
that important connections may be drawn between them—and that in many ways they
have served the same purpose: to keep women in ‘their p lace.M o reo v er, the histories
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of both forms importantly reflect the broader social and legal contexts that give rise to
contemporary attitudes and laws about domestic violence.
Following this discussion, I trace, from colonial America through the late twentieth
century, the major trends informing domestic violence law and policy in the United
States. In doing so, I attempt to situate these trends within the larger historical contexts
in which they unfolded, with an emphasis on broader social patterns of male dominance
and female subjugation. This account closes with a focus on the federal legislative
response to domestic violence in the late 1900s, which began as legislative rumblings in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. These stirrings culminated largely with the 1994
enactment of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), the first comprehensive federal
legislation that aimed to remedy the problem.* In my discussion of VAWA, I consider
policy process questions related to its emergence and passage. How and why did it arise
on the congressional agenda when it did? What were the key factors that brought
attention to domestic violence in these policy-making arenas, especially after so many
years of dormancy? In what ways did the social visibility of the issue, or lack thereof,
contribute to problem recognition?
In many ways, VAWA was well received among policymakers and the general
public. However, a part of the legislation—Title III, VAWA’s civil rights remedy®—
generated a great deal of controversy, and was ultimately overturned by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison}'^ In Chapter 4 , 1 discuss the Morrison case
and further address the controversies surrounding Title III.
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Agrarian Patriarchy and Chastisement Doctrine
European Roots
Domestic violence in the United States is historically rooted in patriarchal norms,
laws, values, and practices that together served to explicitly sanction wife beating in
Europe. Dating to 1750 B.C.E., laws governing marriage and sexuality in the Code of
Hammurabi “emphasized that women of various classes were relegated to an inferior
status vis-à-vis their fathers, brothers, and husbands.”" Anthropologists suggest that this
status, largely involving women as property, had its origins in the exchange of women in
early tribal societies." In the Judeo-Christian creation myth of Adam and Eve, Eve
caves to evil forces, and they both disobey divine authority." Among God’s
punishments for the transgression are increased pain for women during childbirth and
husbands’ dominion over wives.'" As Linda L. Ammons points out, “While many
persons of faith find God’s love and liberation unifying themes of the Bible, examples of
misogyny abound.”'® Ammons expounds on this claim;
[I]n biblical stories where women are central characters, rape, incest, murder, battery,
or some other brutality are often common themes. Sanctions for female misconduct
were severe. For example, a woman unable to prove her virginity could be stoned to
death. A wife could be mutilated if, in coming to the rescue of her husband, she
touched the genitals of her husband’s assailant. Old and New Testament prophets
relied on the metaphor of the adulterous women to describe the misconduct of
religious leaders. The prophets used this image to shock the consciences of the
people so that they would return to the worship of Yahweh.'®
Judeo-Christian theologies have, over time, blended with other ideologies and
philosophies to fundamentally shape dominant Western social and legal n o rm s .A m o n g
these norms are those which place husbands (and fathers) in supreme, authoritative roles
within the family.'* Concomitantly, wives (and mothers), regarded as inherently weak
and evil, have been rendered subservient, oftentimes as chattel. While particular
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ideological threads and mechanisms of social control that ascribe to women this inferior
status have emerged and changed over centuries, Biblical renderings of gender have
consistently played a fundamental part in shaping these processes."
Within early Christian sects, asceticism grew in popularity, and the practice of sexual
abstinence gained widespread acceptance. Some women, especially rich women,
embraced celibacy as a means toward greater independence.^® However, misogyny had a
strong foothold in these communities. Women were abhorred for the sexual desire they
aroused in men, thought to imperil men’s souls to eternal danmation, and referred to as
“the devil’s gateway” among church leadership.^' Women were also regarded as
fundamentally different from men, who mirrored the image of (a male) God. Over time,
these factors contributed to a moral culture in which women were both feared and
coercively controlled. Citing prescriptions for the use of such coercion within the marital
relationship, Angela Browne writes:
In the late 1400’s, Friar Cherubino of Siena, in his Rules o f Marriage, operationalized
the process by which a husband was to rule his wife, recommending: “when you see
your wife commit an offense, don’t rush at her with insults and violent blows . . .
Scold her sharply, bully and terrify her. And if this still doesn’t work . . . take up a
stick and beat her soundly, for it is better to punish the body and correct the soul than
to damage the soul and spare the body . . . then readily beat her, not in rage but out of
charity and concern for her soul, so that the beating will redound to your merit and
her good.”"
Not surprisingly, some women resisted this moral climate. Medieval writer Christine de
Pizan, for example, questions what were popular conceptions about women’s inherent
qualities:
Men, especially writing in books, vociferously and unanimously claim that women in
particular are fickle and inconstant, changeable and flighty, weak-hearted, compliant
like children and lacking all stamina.. . .
. . . Let me ask you where there was ever a woman’s heart so frail, so fearfiil, so
utterly vulgar, and so inconstant as that of Emperor Claudius?^®
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This author also refutes the claim that chaste women want to be raped and imagines a law
“whereby a man would be executed for raping a woman, a law which is fitting, just, and
holy.”" While a certain cause for execution was to become prominent throughout
Europe, as I shall discuss below, it was far from that which de Pizan envisaged.
The Roman Emperor, Constantine—who had his wife, Fausta, killed when she was
“no longer of use to him”—joined the early Christian church around 300 C.E., beginning
a process whereby, over centuries, church rules grew inexorably entwined with state
laws.^® Established in 664, the English church adopted early Roman canon law, which
became the legal authority on domestic matters.^® Such church-state entwinement
persisted into the Middle Ages, during which time:
Popes amassed considerable power and set up ecclesiastical courts which
administered canon law (jus commune). The Pope was the supreme legislator and
judge. Canon law set the general principles for all of Europe on issues concerning
women and marriage.^^
While in many regards church law and secular law were indistinguishable, “secular
courts had no doctrine of marriage.”^* Together with the church, however, the state came
to take on a different (though systemically related) role in the domination of women—in
publicly and brutally executing thousands upon thousands of them.
The European witch craze spanned several centuries, fi-om the 1300s to the 1700s,
though historian Anne Llewellyn Barstow characterizes 1560 to 1760 as “the major
period of witch-hunts.”^® As “an ‘invisible’ crime that provides no witnesses,” witchcraft
was widely recognized as a major crime during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.®®
During this major period, on average, 80 percent of those accused of the crime— and 85
percent of those executed for it—were women.®' Older women and uppity women were
especially targeted.®^ Published estimates range from 110,000 accusations and 60,000

87

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

executions to figures in the millions. Barstow, whose analysis keeps a count of arrests
and killings that took place across Europe, puts forth 200,000 accused and 100,000 dead
as reasonable estimates that are “sufficient to document an intentional mass murder of
women.”®®
Historically, the European witch-hunts overlapped with the rise of commerce, of
nation-states, and with religious reformations. The invention of the printing press and
increased literacy rates are among the factors that contributed to the craze.®" According
to Barstow, “The witch-hunts took place at the same time as colonial expansion and the
Atlantic slave trade, and they were made possible by some of the same ecclesiastical
policies and legal changes.”®® The craze also coincided with overpopulation, increased
social stratification, and general economic upheaval in Europe; the ruling class looked for
scapegoats, and found them. Those targeted for the crime of witchcraft were usually
among the very poor, although women of all economic means were accused. Barstow
states:
That the accused persons, mostly poor themselves, were not responsible for this
economic suffering was beside the point; they were perceived as the cause, and that
perception served to justify scapegoating them.®®
At the other end of the economic spectrum, upon executing wealthy women (usually
widows) for witchcraft, the state would seize their assets. Those whose means fell
between the rich and the very poor “used witch accusations to establish their social
position” and “took out their frustrations over crop failure and the high death rate of
infants on those who were least able to fight back.”®’
While their options were limited and varied with economic class, women performed a
range of work in medieval Europe. “[TJheir contribution to Europe’s economic life was
impressive and essential.”®* Healer, midwife, and pharmacist were among the
88
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occupations they held, as “healing had traditionally been the prerogative of vyomen.”®®
However, the expansion of capitalism across much of Europe during the 1500s
“markedly affected women’s work and was a direct factor in the spread of witch
accusations.”"® Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English write:
The charges leveled against the “witches” included every misogynist fantasy harbored
by the monks and priests who officiated over the witch hunts: witches copulated with
the devil, rendered men impotent,. . . devoured newborn babies, poisoned livestock,
etc. But again and again the ‘crimes’ included what would now be recognized as
legitimate medical acts—providing contraceptive measures, performing abortions,
offering drugs to ease the pain of labor."*
The witch-hunts especially targeted healers and midwives. The Malleus Maleficarum—
which was written by two German monks and was “the Catholic Church’s official text on
witch-hunting for three centuries”"^—specifies that “witch midwives . . . surpass all
others in their crimes.”"® It states:
We must add that in all these matters witch midwives cause yet greater injuries, as
penitent witches have often told to us and to others, saying: No one does more harm
to the Catholic Faith than midwives. For when they do not kill children, then, as if for
some other purpose, they take them out of the room and, raising them up in the air,
offer them to devils.""
According to Barstow, alleged witches were “both scorned and considered essential to
the community.”"® Ehrenreich and English make the case that the witch-hunts served to
eliminate female lay healers, so that male medical professionals would no longer need to
compete with them for business."®
That midwives were in particular targeted followed also from the belief that women’s
sexuality was the conduit of witchcraft. Barstow writes, “It is the high level of sadistic
sexual torture that tells us most about how power functioned in early modem European
society and about how men and women related to each other.”"’ According to the
Malleus Maleficarum, “All witchcraft comes from carnal lust, which is in women
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insatiable.”"* Women in general were hypersexualized, and thought to be, in their
inherent weakness, readily seducible by the devil. Charges brought against women
accused of witchcraft reflected these beliefs: “flying to the sabbat on phallic broomsticks,
being seduced by demon lovers, joining in orgiastic dances, kissing the devil’s ass,
copulating indiscriminately with men, other women, relatives, demons, or the devil
himself, and giving birth to demon children.”"®
The witch-hunts reinforced increasingly patriarchal family structures. Outspoken
wives were suspected of witchcraft,®® and a “surprising number of husbands . . . joined
others in accusing their wives.”®* Protestantism played a role in this regard: Martin
Luther put forth that the disobedient wife, rather than the over-sexed woman, was the
conduit of sorcery.®® Connections between the (public) witch-hunts and women’s social
and legal status within the (private) patriarchal family yield important insights about how
systems of power can ftmction.
Public executions and family status operated in conjunction with one another, within
the same normative frameworks constructed about women, to systemically subjugate
women in all areas of life. The church and the state insisted that wives submit to their
husbands in virtually every regard. A sixteenth-century church homily advised wives,
“[If] thou canst suffer an extreme husband, thou shaft have a great reward therefore: but if
thou lovest him only because he is gentle and courteous, what reward will God give thee
therefore?”®® This echoes a prescription for virtuous women cited in the Malleus
Maleficarum'. “If a woman hath a husband that believeth not, let her not leave him. For
the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the believing wife.”®" The Malleus goes on to
contrast this image of the good wife with that of the wicked wife:
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0 evil worse than all evil, a wicked woman, whether she be poor or rich. For if she be
the wife of a rich man, she does not cease night and day to excite her husband with
hot words, to use evil blandishments and violent importunations. And if she have a
poor husband she does not cease to stir him also to anger and strife. And if she be a
widow, she takes it upon herself everywhere to look down on everybody, and is
inflamed to all boldness by the spirit of pride.^^
The punishments doled out for such wickedness were brutal and sexualized. Confessions
of witchcraft were elicited via sexual torture, and a convicted woman’s breasts were
commonly mutilated—at times cut off and placed in her mouth—prior to her execution.^^
Typically, she was killed publicly, impaled on a stake, as she burned alive.
With the transfer of jurisdiction of witchcraft from the ecclesiastical courts to secular
courts in the sixteenth century, witchcraft was, over time, “transformed from being solely
spiritual apostasy into treason.”^^ Barstow points out that the witch-hunts transformed
the legal status of women in Europe. Although unable to give legal testimony in their
own defense,^^ women were no longer perceived as too dependent to stand trial. She
writes:
That European women first emerged into full legal adulthood as witches, that they
were first afforded independent legal status in order to be prosecuted for witchcraft,
indicates . . . their vulnerability.^^
In England, although new splits arose between the church and state,^’ both systems
agreed on principles of male supremacy and authority—and both effectively controlled
women through the public display of execution and through the enforcement of
patriarchal family structures.
In seventeenth-century England, soeial norms around marriage changed, refleeting a
shift from arranged, nonconsensual unions to marriage as a mutual contract.^^ Marriage
was idealized in conjunction with emerging attitudes about the home and domestic
virtue.^^ Women were still, however, portrayed as weak and in need of guidance and
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punishment. British law “held that men were responsible for the actions of their wives
and therefore authorized to control them.”^"^ Corollary to this responsibility was a
husband’s duty to protect his wife. This paternalism built on the legacy of ‘the wicked
woman’ and served to promote the belief that women who are beaten by their husbands
provoke— and therefore must somehow deserve—this violent treatment. These are
among the attimdes and beliefs that came to take root in British America.
Chastisement Doctrine in British America
and the Early United States
As British emigrants colonized the so-called ‘new world,’ they brought their
patriarchal beliefs and family structures across the ocean—and here again, religious
authority played an especially strong role in determining the social norms of the day.
Ammons states:
Protestantism was so fundamental to the English identity that the law of the new land
often mirrored the religious beliefs of the settlers. In 1665 the General Court of
Connecticut decided that it would apply the word of God when no other law existed.
Because the church and government were so intertwined, it was possible for any
perceived moral violation to be sanctioned by law.^^
Puritanism was a powerful force in shaping patriarchal laws and customs in the
Massachusetts Bay Colony. What had been a traditional version of the Fifth Amendment
to honor both parents was replaced with “Honor thy f a t h e r . T h e new version was
“recited to women to remind them of their obligation to male authority.’’^’ Ehrenreich
and English characterize this morality as follows:
Religion projects the rule of the father into the firmament where it becomes the
supreme law of nature—and then reflects this majesty back on each earthly father in
his household.
He was her superior, the head of the family, and she owed him an obedience
founded on reverence. He stood before her in the place of God: he exercised the
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authority of God over her, and he furnished her with the fruits of he earth that
God had provided.^*
“Under the rule of the father,” these authors point out, “women have no complex choices
to make, no questions as to their nature or destiny: the rule is simply obedience.”^^
Punishment for breaking this one rule was harsh. As I stated in the previous section,
the European witch-hunts overlapped with colonial expansion in America. As was the
case in Europe, the arrest and public execution of women on charges of sorcery was used
to socially control women in colonial New England.’^ The private subjugation of women
also persisted: husbands used violence against their wives as a tool for maintaining
patriarchal authority within the family. Such violence was overtly condoned, and at
times prescribed as being good for women, as something needed to improve their
character and keep them (often sexually) in line.’' “The subordination of women in law,
custom and practice was as natural to the colonists as breathing.””
Nonetheless, among colonial women whose husbands abused this power, some
sought relief in the courts. Ammons describes a 1681 case that sought to impose some
limits on a husband’s behavior:
In a 1681 case, the court sent an order to the sheriff of Charles County, Maryland,
requiring that the sheriff bring John Bread before him to accept the penalty for
threatening the life of his wife Jane and for the ‘mutilation of her members.’ In the
same order the court instructed the sheriff that he was to tell John Bread that he could
not do any damage or evil to his wife’s body ‘otherwise than what to a husband, by
cause of government and chastisement of his own wife, lawfully and reasonably
belongeth.’’^
This leaves one wondering what penalty John Bread might have ended up having to
accept. As I noted earlier in the chapter, Eldridge found that most colonial cases of
spousal abuse left punishment unrecorded. He was, however, able to determine that the
most common official response during the 1600s was the court’s attempt to reconcile the
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couple ” This is not surprising, given that divorce was not a legal option during that
time.” “[PJatriarchy . . . was reinforced at every level of social organization and belief.
For women, it was total, inescapable.”’^
The patriarchal order of families and churches was also mirrored in the governing
structures of towns, colonies, and the emerging federation of states. Women were
excluded from formal participation in these structures. Of course, colonial women’s lives
varied with geography, and the settlement era spanned hundreds of years. However,
these differences amounted to what Ammons calls “varying degrees of limited
autonomy.”” Throughout the new world, “government heavily regulated the lives of
white women, African slaves, and native inhabitants.”’* Paula Gunn Allen documents
the patriarchal form such regulation took in British dealings with the Cherokee people.
Prior to colonization, Cherokee women held strong, decision-making roles in governance;
however, this changed:
During the longtime colonization of the Cherokee along the Atlantic seaboard, the
British worked hard to lessen the power of women in everyday affairs. They took
Cherokee men to England and educated them in English ways . ..
In the ensuing struggle, women endured rape and murder, but they had no voice in
the future direction of the Cherokee Nation.’^
Women, of course, were also denied a voice in setting the future direction of the United
States, largely because their legal status was severely restricted.
The exclusion of women from formal participation in civic affairs was directly linked
to her legal status as a wife, and was reinforced with church doctrine. A seventeenthcentury English legal text illuminates some origins of this system of control:
Eve, because she had helped to seduce her husband, hath inflicted on her, as espciall
bane.. . .
See here the reason of that which I touched before, that Women have no vo[i]ce in
Parliament. They make no Lawes, they consent to none, they abrogate none. All of
them [women] are understood either [as] married or to be married and their desires
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are subject to their husband[s]. . . . The common Law here shaketh hand with
Divintie.*''
Women in early America, as we saw in Europe, continued to hold a virmally non-existent
independent legal status. In promoting the husband’s authoritative role in the family.
Western law has a strong tradition of merging the wife’s legal status with that of her
husband, especially with regard to the management and ownership of property.*'
Ideological roots of this tradition are reflected in Puritan beliefs, which justified male
supremacy within the family by citing biblical passages that “described the
metamorphosis of two persons into one flesh through marriage.”*’ The resulting marital
entity, though purportedly representing both persons, translated as the ruling husband.*’
Legally, this came to be expressed as unity doctrine. The eighteenth-century English
jurist and law professor William Blackstone was pivotal in shaping early American law.
“Because few legal texts existed when America was founded, Blackstone’s
Commentaries were the Bible for the American lawyer, and Blackstone’s words became
law.”*"' “Populariz[ing] the legal fiction of marital unity known as coveture,”*’ he states:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection,
and cover, she performs every thing;. . . and her condition during her marriage is
called her coverture.*^
So, a married woman’s legal status—what is more, her ‘very being’— essentially
disappeared with marriage. She was not permitted to represent herself in court, and her
husband was legally liable for her behavior. Thus, as the argument went, he would be
required to beat her, to chastise her, in order to control her behavior. Blackstone specifies
bounds for the degree of violence husbands could legally use to coerce their wives’
obedience:
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The husband also, by the old law, might give his wife moderate correction. For, as he
is to answer for her misbehaviour, the law thought it reasonable to entrust him with
this power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the same moderation that a
man is allowed to correct his apprentices or children . . . . But this power of correction
was confined within reasonable bounds, and the husband was prohibited from using
any violence to with wife . . . [otherwise than lawfully and reasonably] belongs to the
husband for the due government and correction of his wife]. The civil law gave the
husband the same, or a larger, authority over his wife: allowing him, for some
misdemeanors . . . [to beat his wife severely with scourges and sticks]; for others,
[only moderate chastisement].*’
Reflecting changes in social norms of the family discussed above, Blackstone’s words
placed legal limits on the husband’s ‘power of correction.’
In fact, into the nineteenth century, a coalescence of social forces would increasingly
call the patriarchal chastisement prerogative into question. In 1829, England abolished
the husband’s absolute power of chastisement.** Norms coneeming corporal punishment
in general became a popular topie of social debate in antebellum America.*^ Still,
spousal violence persisted. During most of the nineteenth century, courts provided
limited avenues for remedying domestic violence, and judges continued to give husbands
dominion over w iv es.M o reo v er, divorces were rarely granted. In an 1836 case in
which a battered wife sued for divorce on the grounds of cmelty, a New Hampshire court
advised:
Let her return to the path of duty . . . she will join that meekness, patience and
kindness which the religion she professes inculcates, and temper all conduct towards
her husband . . . we think she will have no reasonable grounds to apprehend any
further injury to her person.^'
These statements embody the malignant side of what some might call ‘reconciliation.’
An 1824 Mississippi case, Bradley v. State, cites Blackstone and sets limits on
acceptable degrees of ‘correction.’ It also articulates another rationale for chastisement:
Family broils and dissensions cannot be investigated before the tribunals of the
country, without casting a shade over the character of those who are unfortunately
engaged in the controversy.. . . [L]et the husband be permitted to exercise the right of
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moderate chastisement. . . without being subjected to vexatious prosecutions,
resulting in the mutual discredit and shame of all parties concerned.^’
As I shall discuss in the following section, this kind of justification—grounded more in
privacy discourse and less in explicit patriarchal roles—would come to supplant the
preexisting legal and social prescriptions addressing violence between spouses.

‘Preservation through Transformation’
and the Industrial Revolution
Emergence o f the Feminine Household/
Masculine Market Dichotomy
As ubiquitous as American patriarchy was during the colonial and early national eras,
“the skills and work of women [were] integral to survival.”^’ The domestic economy of
the household required their productive labor. Women:
kept house, tended gardens, raised poultry and cattle, churned milk into butter and
cream, butchered livestock, tanned skins, pickled and preserved food, made candles,
buttons, soap, beer, and eider, gathered and processed medicinal herbs, and spun and
wove wool and cotton for family clothes . . . [and] often helped in their husbands’
businesses as well.^"'
Granted, women held a subordinate status in all spheres of life—but there was really,
essentially only one sphere of life. And within this sphere women were, of course,
fundamental. Ehrenreich and English characterize this pre-industrial state of affairs:
[L]ife, for the great majority of people has a unity and simplicity that will never cease
to fascinate the ‘industrial man’ who comes later. This life is not marked off into
different ‘spheres’ or ‘realms’ of experience: ‘work’ and ‘home,’ ‘public’ and
‘private,’ ‘sacred’ and ‘secular.’ Production (of food, clothing, tools) takes place in
the same rooms or outdoor spaces where children grow up, babies are bom, couples
come together. The family relation is not secluded in the realm of emotion; it is a
working relation.®’
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From an early-twenty-first-century feminist perspeetive, one must take pause to begin to
comprehend how women from these earlier eras experienced daily life. Issues such as
‘balancing work and family’ and ‘finding childcare’ and ‘equal pay’ simply did not
exist—not because women were relegated to the home per se, but beeause households
(and villages) were the centers of human interaction. “There [was] not yet an external
‘economy’ connecting the fortunes of the peasant with the deeisions of a merchant in a
remote city.”®^ Commerce developed slowly, over centuries, largely in cities. Prior to
industrialization, more than 95 percent of people lived agrarian lives. When people went
hungry, it was “not because the priee of their crops fell, but because the rain did not.”®’
The nineteenth century saw a “fundamental social transformation, of which even
industrialization was a correlate and not a cause,. . . the triumph of the Market
economy.”®* With industrialization, “the Market [came] to replace nature as the
controlling force in the lives of ordinary people.”®® One eannot overstate the significance
of this revolutionary transformation and its social ramifications.
This shift, momentous, though it took place over the course of many years, brought
about massive changes in how individuals went about their lives. The family came apart
along gendered divisions of the household and the market. Family size shrunk, as did the
domestic economy that had productive household labor as its core. Loci of production
moved to factories, to the public (male) world of (private) industry.
[W]hole villages were emptied to feed the factory system with human labor. People
were wrested from the land suddenly, by force; or more subtly, by the pressure of
hunger and debt—uprooted from the ancient seeurity of family, clan, parish. A
settled, agrarian life which had persisted more or less for cenmries was destroyed in
one tenth the time it had taken for the Roman Empire to fall, and the old ways of
thinking, the old myths and old rules, began to lift like the morning fog.'®®
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In addition to supplying the emerging market with labor, the household took on the
consumer function, in varying degrees. “[PJrosperous families, urban dwellers, and those
living in the older settled areas of the East led the way in the substimtion of store-bought
goods for homemade ones.”'®' The market, in turn, supplied families with goods and the
earnings with which these goods were purchased. The household and the market were
(and are) in these fundamental ways integrally connected, and males held a dominant
status in both domains. Nonetheless, a split emerged that had not before existed—
between men in the market and women in the home.'®’ “Life would now be experienced
as divided into two distinct spheres: a ‘public’ sphere of endeavor governed ultimately by
the Market; and a ‘private’ sphere of intimate relationships and individual biological
existence.”'®’ This ‘public/private distinction’ would later surface as a recurrent theme in
twentieth-century feminist discourse.
Old Patriarchy Declines; New Masculinism Rises
With the massive changes that came about during the nineteenth century, “there a
appeared a glimmer, however remote to most women, of something like a choice.”'®"'
The old patriarchal ideology—what had reflected an entrenched way of life for
centuries—was publicly coming into question. The religious authority that underpinned
this ideology was challenged by new, critical ways of thinking. “[Women of the middle
class] learned how to challenge male supremacy within the anti-slavery movement. They
discovered that sexism, which seemed unalterable inside their marriages, could be
questioned and fought in the arena of political struggle.”'®’ During the 1850s, “woman’s
rights advocates organized . . . conventions,. . . published newspapers, and conducted
petition campaigns seeking for women the right to vote and demanding various reforms

99

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of marriage law.”'®® At the Seneca Falls women’s rights convention, the first gathering
of its kind, attendees signed the Declaration of Sentiments, which states:
The history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of
man toward woman, having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny
over her.
He has made her, if married, in the eye of the law, civilly dead.
He has taken from her all right in property, even to the wages she earns.
. . . In the covenant of marriage, she is compelled to promise obedience to her
husband, he becoming, to all intents and purposes, her master - the law giving him
power to deprive her of her liberty, and to administer chastisement.
He has so framed the laws of divorce, as to what shall be the proper causes of
divorce, in case of separation, to whom the guardianship of the children shall be
given; as to be wholly regardless of the happiness of the women - the law, in all
cases, going upon a false supposition of the supremacy of man, and giving all power
into his hands.'®’
Importantly, the document locates issues concerning legal status, property rights, marital
relations, and wife-beating within a broader system of male power. “For woman’s rights
advocates, a structural diagnosis of male violence required a structural remedy.”'®* Their
efforts yielded some results in the 1850s, “first giving wives the right to hold property in
marriage, and then the right to their earnings and the rudiments of legal agency.”'®®
However, the doctrine of interspousal immunity prohibited wives from taking legal action
against their husbands."® Analyses of power relations between men and women
continued to be developed and articulated.'" John Stuart Mill in 1861 argued:
That the principle which regulates the existing social relations between the two
sexes— the legal subordination of one sex to the other is wrong in itself, and now one
of the chief hindrances to human improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a
principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor
disability on the other."’
Perhaps it is because those with power have an interest in maintaining it—and perhaps
because of basic human greed and rapacity—that Mill’s prescription never actualized.

100

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

From man’s perspective in the market, the realm of the family, the intimate, private
sphere occupied by women “look[ed] like a pre-industrial backwater, or a looking-glass
land that inverts all that is normal in the ‘real’ world.”" ’ The domain their wives
occupied—and in new ways, the women themselves—took on the role of the ‘other.’ As
other, woman was idealized and romanticized, pathologized and controlled, from a
position that failed to consider her experiences, knowledge, and opinions. As Erhenreich
and English point out, this masculinist standpoint “reflects not some innate male bias but
the logic and the assumptions o f . . . the capitalist market.”""' With this new logic,
prescriptions grounded in religious justifications were increasingly supplanted with those
legitimized by scientific authority:
Science grew with the Market. It took the most revolutionary aspects of the business
mentality—its loyalty to empirical fact, its hard-headed pragmatism, its penchant for
numerical abstraction—and hammered them into a precision tool for understanding
and mastery of the material w orld."’
Rooted in liberalist rationalism, a “cultural fi-amework [emerged] which equated science
with goodness and morality,” and heralded science as the approach to solving social
problems and injustices."® Scientific ‘experts’ provided ‘the answers’ to both empirical
and moral questions. Some saw science as a liberating force, insofar as it challenged the
authority of the old order. However, history reveals that the emerging role of science did
not embody “the inevitable triumph of right over wrong, fact over myth.”" ’ In many
ways, it came to paint an authoritatively inaccurate portrait of women as it sought to
“ ‘define’ her natural physical and mental constitution,” the “sources of her frailty,” and
“the biological limits of her social role.”"* This can be illustrated with the rise of the
eugenics movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
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Eugenics has roots in late-nineteenth century misinterpretations of Darwin’s theory of
evolution, which is based on the ideas of natural selection and ‘survival of the fit.’
Darwin proposed that humans evolved over time fi-om less complex forms of life."®
What came to be known as Social Darwinism'’®was a school of thought that applied this
theory to group competition within human society. Upon the rediscovery of Gregor
Mendel’s breeding experiments around the turn of the century, ‘genetics’ was coined as a
new field of study. With evolutionary theory in mind, scientists studied in earnest the
transmittal of inherited traits from one generation to the next. Many traits that were then
thought to be genetically inherited—criminality and pauperism, for example—have since
widely been acknowledged as stemming from social roots. Such genetic determinism,
however, became a strong premise for eugenic rationale during this time and for decades
to follow.'’ ' Adopting this deterministic framework, eugenicists concluded that humans
could effectively control the processes of natural selection within human populations.
Certain groups of people—poor folks, non-white folks, for example—were deemed
inherently less ‘fit’ and as such, eugenicists argued, did not have the right to bear
children. By contrast, wealthy and powerful white folks, concerned with maintaining the
‘purity’ of their own genetic stock, were socially encouraged to breed with each other in
droves. Moreover, as evolutionary theory was used to explain social hierarchies, women
were cast as less a evolved group. Darwin states:
Woman seems to differ from man in mental disposition, chiefly in her greater
tenderness and less selfistmess; It is generally admitted that with woman the powers
of intuition, of rapid perception, and perhaps of imitation, are more strongly marked
than in man; but some, at least, of these faculties are characteristic of the lower races,
and therefore of a past and lower state of civilisation.'”
Because women were understood to be more primitive, they were also seen as “non
varying and identical in evolutionary function, and that function was to reproduce.”' ”
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Prescriptive writings of the day that were geared to the middle class emphasized and
romanticized (white) women as mothers, the mother/child dyad, and a host of domestic
and reproductive duties that applied to woman’s role in the home. Historians refer to this
phenomenon variously as the cult of domesticity, the cult of motherhood, and the cult of
true womanhood.'” “Magazines and books stressed the four cardinal virtues of true
womanhood—piety, purity, submissiveness and domesticity.”' ” Reva Siegel
summarizes the phenomenon:
With a growing number of men working outside the household, norms and practices
of parenting began to focus on the relationship between mother and child rather than
father and child. As idealized in the prescriptive literature of the middle class, the
family emerged as a site of specialized domestic activities.'”
Maxine L. Margolis reminds us that this emerging emphasis on the mother/child dyad
“would have been almost inconceivable” during the period preceding the nineteenth
century because “the conditions allowing women to devote themselves exclusively to
child care simply did not exist [then].”'”
What had previously been characterized as the explicit authority of husbands was
increasingly couched in terms of wives’ selflessness and altruism. In the 1850s, for
example, William Alcott prescribed, “However elevated the character of woman—
however influential she may be, and however great the duties she owes to herself to
qualify herself for fulfilling her mission—she will do most for herself while laboring
most for others.”'’* Rationales grounded in such prescriptions for women’s ‘natural’
domestic duties are also reflected in court cases of the day. In Bradwell v. State, for
example, the Supreme Court decided the women did not have a constitutional right to
practice law, finding:
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The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.. . . The paramount destiny
and mission of women are to fulfill the noble role of wife and mother.'”
This is but one example of how changes in family structures coincided with shifts in the
ideological and practical underpinnings of male authority.
Women’s selflessness and submission were increasingly instilled through the
prescriptive discourse of biological and medical ‘science,’ which described women’s
‘natural’ roles as mothers and housewives, intrinsically linking the very ‘nature of
woman’ with reproductive and domestic duties. “A new science—gynecology—arose
. .. and concluded that the female body is not only primitive, but deeply pathological.”' ’®
The ovaries were said to be responsible for ailments ranging from headaches to
tuberculosis— and for controlling women’s personalities.'’' As a universal remedy for
this range of afflictions, thousands of ovary removals were performed in the United
States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The uterus was understood to
directly oppose and compete with the brain, a claim that ‘expertly’ supported arguments
against granting women access to educational opportunities.'” Reading, studying,
anything that taxed the mind, would take away from the organ that fulfilled woman’s
‘true’ function of reproduction.'” In addition to surgery, nineteenth-century doctors used
leeches, cauterization, uterine injections, sensory deprivation and social isolation to
‘cure’ the host of female dysfunctions. “Patients were often brought in by their husbands,
who complained of their unruly behavior.. . . [Treatments were] judged successful if the
woman was restored to a placid contentment with her domestic functions.”' ’"'
In previous centuries, the social control of women was maintained through such
mechanisms as the doctrine o f marital unity and, earlier, the public execution of
‘witches.’ During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, visits to the physician and
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psychologist performed a similar function. For some (white, middle and upper class)
women, however, ‘sickness’ was an escape from the socially prescribed and enforced
roles of wife and mother. As Ehrenreich and English point out, “[T]he experts could not
have triumphed had not so many women welcomed them, sought them out, and even (in
the early twentieth century) organized to promote their influence.”' ”

Still, “The experts’

rise to power over the lives of women was neither swift nor easy.. . . The authority of
science had to be promoted as if science were not a critical method, but a new religion.
Many women resisted,. . . organizing new networks of mutual support and study.”' ’®
Privacy Rationale Supplants Chastisement Doctrine
The social transformation of women’s role in the family, along with feminist reform
efforts of the nineteenth century, challenged the old patriarchal order of things. Women’s
organized opposition succeeded in changing juridical practice largely insofar as it was
able to exploit tensions between the old laws and the new social norms of the family.'”
“As early as 1816, Tapping Reeve, author of the first American treatise on family law,
observed that there was a tension between the chastisement prerogative and prevailing
mores of the family.”' ’* The decline of chastisement rationale is reflected in nineteenthcentury court cases. For example. Commonwealth v. McAfee ruled, “Beating or striking a
wife violently with the open hand is not one of the rights conferred on a husband.”' ’®
The spatial, gendered, household/market split that was experienced in the everyday lives
of husbands and wives came into conflict with the principles of marital unity on which
the legal chastisement prerogative was largely based. Siegel states, “[T]he demise of
chastisement was linked to wider changes in the law of marital status—in particular, to
statutory reform of the doctrine of marital unity and the rule of gender hierarehy that it
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embodied.”'"'® Moreover, the romanticized image of the (white) altruistic mother and
wife was psychologically at odds with chastisement prerogative. “As conversation about
marital relations shifted from the framework of obedience and submission to that of
asking and giving, the domestic relation began to take its character, not from the
husband's ability to compel his wife's obedience, but instead from the wife's magnanimity
in yielding to his desires.”'"" Concerns about this shift away from explicit patriarchal
authority were heavily reflected in the sociological discourse of the early twentieth
century.'"'’ The ideological shift was also reflected in judicial decision-making.
Ammons writes:
To maintain a homosocial public sphere and a male-dominated private sphere, courts
relied on protectionist ideology as a pretext to maintain separate spheres for men and
women. Privacy instead of obedience became the mantra of the courts and others
who did not want to challenge or correct the imbalance of power in the home.'"'’
With challenges to and ultimately the abandonment of legal chastisement rights of the
husband, the language of ‘privacy’ and the noninterference in matters concerning the
‘sanctity of the home’ supplanted the older reasoning. However, this shift served to
reinforce rather than challenge ideological and social aspects of male authority. “Once
translated from an antiquated to a more contemporary gender idiom, the state’s
justification for treating wife beating differently from other kinds of assault seemed
reasonable in ways the law of chastisement did not.”'"'"'
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, “many lawyers and judges still followed
old court decisions that said a husband, as the superior moral and legal creature in the
family, had the responsibility to discipline, control and chastise his wife.”'"'’ Still,
judicial decision-makers increasingly justified spousal violence “in the language of
privacy and love associated with . . . marriage in the industrial era”'"'®— especially when
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considering cases involving middle- and upper-class men.'” An 1864 North Carolina
case, State v. Black, found that unless the cruelty was extreme, “the law will not invade
the domestic forum, or go behind the curtain.”'"'* Four years later, in another North
Carolina case. State v. Rhodes, the judge “mentioned the Blackstonian rule of the
husband’s enforcement powers” and then “articulated a justification for ignoring certain
kinds of domestic violence based on a privacy theory.”'"'®
The ideological and discursive shift from patriarchal prerogative to privacy rationales
involved the defense of existing structures of male power, and the creation of new ones.
Furthermore, power relations embodied in such factors as race and class found new
means of expression and control. Underlying social power relations were largely
maintained. Jurists who condemned chastisement doctrine found new rationales to
condone violence in marriage—and to inconsistently try and punish male perpetrators.'’®
Siegel characterizes this “modernization dynamic” as “preservation through
transformation”:
Efforts to reform a status regime do bring about change—but not always the kind of
change that advocates seek. When the legitimacy of a status regime is suceessfully
contested, lawmakers and jurists will both cede and defend status privileges—
gradually relinquishing the original rules and justificatory rhetoric of the contested
regime and finding new rules and reasons to protect such stams privileges as they
choose to defend.'’'
With the shift to privacy doctrine as a response to spousal abuse, social relations of male
dominance persisted, albeit by employing different language and with a logic that better
aligned with the social norms and discourses of the day. The shift reflected not only the
social norms and prescriptions framed in terms of gender, but also class and race biases in
the prosecution of men who beat their wives. Wife beaters were selectively prosecuted,
and privacy doctrine was most often used in cases where middle and upper class white

107

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

men were accused. “[W]hen the legal system did prosecute wife beating, it treated the
crime as a deviant social act rather than as conduct recently condoned by law, selecting
men for prosecution in ways that suggest that concerns other than protecting women
animated the punishment of wife beaters.”' ”
The courts used “the prevalence of domestic violence among the ‘coarser’ classes . . .
as a reason for intensifying the criminal prosecution of poor men who beat their
wives.”' ” According to Siegel, another kind of change occurred as wife beating in the
late nineteenth century “began to shift in political complexion from a ‘woman’s’ issue to
a ‘law and order’ issue.”' ” With this shift, groups such as the Ku Klux Klan developed a
new interest in wife beating, and “began to invoke [it] as an excuse for assaults on black
men.”' ” Siegel also discusses two spousal violence cases, Fulgham v. State and Harris v.
State, that “repudiate chastisement doctrine, but [with] opinions [that] seem more
interested in controlling African-American men than in protecting their wives.”'’®
Around the turn of the century, a number of states considered ‘whipping post’ laws that
would specify punishments for wife-beaters; three states enacted such laws.'” While this
remedy was advocated under the guise of protecting women, “the appeal of the whipping
post lay in its capacity to break men . . . [and] articulated class and racial conflict among
men.”' ’* The ideals of equality between men and women that were espoused by some
during the nineteenth-century may have contributed to chastisement’s demise. However,
“chastisement law was supplanted by a new body of marital violence policies that were
premised on a variety of gender-, raee-, and class-based assumptions.”' ’®
The whipping post laws were fairly short-lived and spousal violence was again
decriminalized in the 1920s. Local municipalities established a system of domestic
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relations courts that channeled intimate violence cases to social workers who pushed for
reconciliation and aimed to “preserve the relationship wherever possible.”'®® Supported
by justifications couched in privacy language, law enforcement offieials practiced
nonintervention and mediation in domestie violence matters, and direeted cases out of the
criminal justice system and into counseling. This amounted to a sort of “‘therapeutic’
regulation” of intimate violence, in whieh physieal assault was treated not as eriminal
behavior but as reflective of emotional problems requiring attention within the marital
relationship. This approach reflects how domestic violence cases were handled in the
United States for much of the twentieth century. Feminist organizing, however, also
persisted throughout the twentieth eentury, and continued to challenge systems of male
domination, including the privacy rationale that allowed spousal violence to go
unchecked for over a hundred years. With an emphasis on federal developments in
domestic violence law and policy, I now turn to further discussion of these movements.

Battered Women Organize; Federal Lawmakers Respond
Battered Women’s Movement Emerges in 1970s
The 1960s and 1970s brought new challenges to the social and legal mechanisms that
uphold male power. Women’s rapidly increasing employment rates and growing
expectations for self-fulfillment “fueled a feminist revolution both inside and outside the
home.”'®' The civil rights movement provided a template for emerging equality
legislation. Birth control advances and legal gains around abortion rights granted women
unprecedented sexual and reproductive freedoms. Books questioning women’s domestic
roles as wives and mothers were widely read and discussed. By 1972 in the United States,
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more than half of mothers of school-aged children were employed in the paid labor
market.'” “The inherent contradiction between the ideology of full-time motherhood and
the economic fact of women’s large-scale employment was simply too great.”'®’ The
developing feminisms manifested in a variety of ways, including the push for equal labor
market opportunities and challenges to ‘traditional’ male domination within the family.'®"'
Activists organized anti-rape campaigns, and promoted women’s self-defense.'®’
Networks of women’s eommunity centers and feminist bookstores emerged, as did
women’s health clinics that challenged the authority of the male medical professional.'®®
Women sought legal changes in matters of divorce and credit, entered the legal
profession in record numbers, organized around childcare concerns, and proclaimed such
slogans as ‘fuck housework’ and ‘sisterhood is powerful.’
As women’s independence grew, so too did the violence perpetrated against them.'®’
In an unprecedented response to this escalation of violence, and in connection with the
broader feminist movements of that era, a grassroots battered women’s movement
developed in the mid-1970s.'®* Women throughout the country organized to create
networks of crisis lines and safe houses, and started to push for a federal policy response
to the issue. Feminist analyses, such as Del Martin’s Battered W i v e s situated domestic
violence within broader structures of male power. Such analyses challenged the privacy
justifications of noninterventionist policies that created a policy vacuum around the issue
and effectively granted violent husbands informal immunity.
In 1977, at the National Women’s Conference in Houston, delegates approved a
National Plan for Action that called upon Congress and the President to improve services
for battered women.'’® During the late-1970s, the terms ‘domestic violence’ and
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‘battered woman’ surfaced in the legislative lexicon,*’* and the issue continued to gain
public visibility. In a case that became the basis for Faith McNulty’s The Burning Bed}^^
Francine Hughes was acquitted on grounds of ‘temporary insanity’ for the murder of her
violent husband.*” Organizations such as the National Communication Network for the
Elimination of Violence Against Women publicized accounts of women murdered by
their husbands and women who killed in self-defense.*’"* Bom from a consultation on
battered women held by the United States Commission on Civil Rights—as well as the
years-long organizing efforts of activists across the country—the National Coalition
Against Domestic Violence was founded in 1978. Lenore Walker’s groundbreaking The
Battered Woman describing the ‘cycle theory of violence’ was published the following
year.*”
The battered women’s movement came after an era of silence in which violence
systematieally perpetrated against women was not addressed in public discourse.*’®
Thus, the movement played a critical role in increasing the visibility of intimate violence
as a policy problem: it brought the issue back into the realm of public debate and served
as an important impetus to get domestic violence onto the Congressional agenda.
Domestic Violence Emerges on the
Federal Legislative Agenda
Given the long history of the state’s sanction of intimate violence against women, that
attitudinal and politieal constraints initially blocked domestic violence issues from
gaining much legislative headway is not surprising. In the courts, domestic violence
incidents were still largely written off as ‘private matters’ or ‘family squabbles’ and
commonly treated as natural expressions of male authority best handled within the
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family.*” Nevertheless, juridical decision-makers were changing their stance that family
violence matters were off limits for the state.*’*
In 1977, two federal domestic violence bills were defeated, and in 1978 another piece
of legislation, the Domestic Violence Assistance Act, failed to pass.*’® In 1979, President
Carter established an Office of Domestic Violence with an annual budget of $900,000;
however, the Reagan administration closed the office in 1981.**® The Senate blocked
passage of the Domestic Violence Prevention and Services Act in 1980.*** During the
same year. Senator Jesse Helms criticized providing any federal support to domestic
violence programs, claiming that they constitute “social engineering” and challenge the
husband’s rightful position as “head of the family.”**’ Despite the attention sympathetic
legislators gave the issue, right-wing opposition prevented federal assistance until 1984,
when Congress passed two pieces of legislation that provided some funding for domestic
violence intervention programs.**’ The Family Violence Prevention Services Act
provided small-scale grants to support shelters, counseling and related services for
victims of domestic violence.**"* Also, the Victims of Crime Aet, which earmarked $150
million in grants to aid survivors of various crimes, included domestic violence among its
priority areas. Although the 1980s saw limited success in federal legislative reform, by
that time most states had enacted laws to remedy domestic violence. These and other
developments helped to set the stage for the more comprehensive federal response that
followed.
For instance, due to legal liability concerns, law enforcement administrations were
increasingly revising their nonintervention policies with regard to domestic violence.
These concerns arose largely as a result of a much-publicized 1984 case, Tracey
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Thurman, et.al. v. City ofTorrington, C o n n e c tic u t,which Eve S. Buzawa and Cari G.
Buzawa summarize:
Ms. Thurman and other relatives had repeatedly called the police, pleading for help to
protect her from her estranged husband, but had received virtually no assistance, even
after he was convicted and placed on probation for damage to her property. When
she asked the police to arrest him for making threats to shoot her and her so n ,. . . they
told her to return three weeks later and get a restraining order in the interim .. . .
[S]he did obtain the court order but the police then refused to arrest her husband,
citing a holiday weekend. After the weekend, police continued to refuse to assist
based on the fact that the only officer who could arrest him was on vacation.. . .
[F] oliowing a delayed response to a call for emergency police assistance, Thurman
was attacked and suffered multiple stab wounds to the chest and neck, resulting in
paralysis . . . and permanent disfigurement.**®
Thurman’s attorneys argued two theories of police liability that were upheld in many
subsequent cases.**’ The first put forth that the police failed in their duty to take
reasonable action to prevent victim injury from a known offender. Second, her lawyers
argued that the police violated Ms. Thurman’s Constitutional rights of equal protection
under the law, based on differential treatment accorded to a man who batters his spouse
versus an assault by a stranger. Thurman and similar cases motivated police departments
to develop requirements for stronger justification of police actions and, in some cases, to
adopt policies of mandatory or presumptive arrest.*** These trends also served to
politically align the interests of law enforcement agencies with those of domestic
violence victims, survivors and their advocates.**®
The Violence Against Women Act: 1990-1994
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., introduced the first version of VAWA on June 19, 1990,
and the Senate Judiciary Committee began hearings the following day.*®® “In America,
in 1990, ‘domestic’ violence was a term associated with ‘natural’ violence .. . [and] was
perceived as a product of victims’ ‘choice.’”*®* During the hearings, survivors of
domestic violence testified as to their experiences of judicial insensitivity, especially as
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related to attempts to prosecute their attackers.*®’ They documented the systemic nature
of gender violence, its impact on the national economy and the failure of state court
systems to provide equal protection under the law. The Senate Judiciary Committee
unanimously passed the bill in October. However, the full Senate did not vote on the bill,
and Senator Biden reintroduced it in 1991. He worked closely with Representative
Barbara Boxer, who introduced House versions of VAWA in 1990 and 1991. Aetion by
Congress on the bill was slow throughout 1991.*®’ Due to crowded agendas and shifting
priorities among members of Congress, the bill did not eome up for vote during that year.
Throughout 1992, the bills in both the House and the Senate continued to generate
attention and attraet cosponsors. Despite a press eonference held by Senator Biden in a
likely attempt to move the bill through Congress more swiftly, there was a lack of action
by the Senate in 1992. In the House, the bill underwent a line-by-line mark-up in 1992.
By the end of 1992, Barbara Boxer had been elected to the Senate and the Congressional
Caucus for Women’s Issues had made preparations to push the measure in 1993. In
January 1993, Senator Boxer, working elosely with Senator Biden, introduced the bill in
the Senate. One month later, four Representatives introduced the bill in the House. By
the end of 1993 both the House and the Senate had approved some version of the act.*®"*
However, it was deeided that VAWA should be ineorporated into a broader crime bill in
1994, which again delayed the proeess.*®’ On August 21, 1994, the House approved a
version of the bill by a vote of 235-195. That same week, the Senate voted 61-38 to pass
the bill exaetly as it eame out of eommittee, thus readying VAWA for the President’s
signature. A few weeks later. President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforeement Aet of 1994, in which VAWA was enacted as Title IV.'®®
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The enactment of VAWA, which allocated $1.62 billion to be spent over six years,
promised an unprecedented federal commitment to addressing domestie violence, as well
as other forms of violence against women and children. The “Safe Homes for Women”
section of the act—Title IV, Subtitle B—included several provisions for preventing
domestic violence and providing support for its victims.'®’ This section of the act
included: establishing a national domestic violence hotline, improving interstate
enforcement of orders of protection, strengthening protections for victims, and directing
various federal agencies to eollect data and conduct research on domestic violence.'®* It
also allocated funds to state and local governments to: improve the tracking of victims;
increase coordination among police, prosecutors, and the judieiary; strengthen local
advocacy, service and prevention programs; educate judges about the issue; and
implement mandatory arrest policies.'®®
Concomitantly, VAWA’s Title III provided a landmark civil rights remedy for
gender-based violence, “entitling] victims to compensatory and punitive damages
through the [state or] federal courts for a crime of violence if it is motivated, at least in
part, by animus toward the victim’s gender.”’®® Title III, the was significant in that it
established violence motivated by “gender animus” as a “proper subject of a civil rights
action.”’®' Not surprisingly, Title III generated a good deal of eontroversy, both before
and after VAWA’s enactment. The testimony given during the legislative hearings built
a case for establishing Congressional authority under the Commeree Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment. Valerie Jenness, who analyzed congressional hearings and
reports of VAWA, puts forth that “support for Title III was based less on direct pressure
from those engaging in colleetive action, and more on the previously established logie
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used to justify the status provisions now taken for granted in [federal hate crime law].”^^^
Raehelle Brooks confirms that most of the early action on the bill was the result of hard
work by insiders.^®^ While there was a good deal of insider support for the b ill/^ Title
III generated opposition from both the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the
federal judiciary prior to its enactment/^^ This controversy “stalled the bill at various
points on the road to final p a s s a g e . I n Chapter 4 , 1 further discuss the controversy
surrounding Title III and United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court case that
rendered this part of VAWA unconstitutional.
Political pressure from both inside and outside of Congress were critical to the
passage of VAWA and the larger Crime Bill of which it was a part. Also key to
YAWA’s passage were the efforts and influence of Senator Biden during the four-year
period spanning the bill’s legislative journey. Brooks contends that public pressure
caused Congress to ultimately take action on the Crime Bill, legislation it might have
otherwise been unable to agree upon. Congressional elections in 1994 motivated
legislators to listen to their constituents, who indicated that crime was an important issue
affecting their lives. Despite Democratic defeats in both houses of Congress, VAWA
became an area that no one seemed willing to consider cutting. Brooks suggests that this
was because VAWA had taken on symbolic significance as a measure to offer evidence
of congressional support for women’s issues.
Public opinion around domestic violence may have played a pivotal role in the final
preservation of VAWA. The media frenzy around the O.J. Simpson murder trial, which
began in 1994, may have served to focus national attention on the problem of domestic
violence.^*^’ A number of sources mention the significance of this case in influencing

116

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

VAWA’s passage. For example, one writer claims, “The O.J. Simpson trial help[ed] put
domestic violence on the national frontbumer.”^'*^ Another states, “The Nicole Brown
Simpson case has now put a famous face on all the statistics.”^**^ In a published
interview, Patricia Ireland, then-President of the National Organization for Women, said,
“Nicole Brown Simpson .. . get[s] murdered and we finally use that public attention to
get the Violence Against Women Act out of Congress.”^''* It appears that the Simpson
trial could aptly be described as what John Kingdon calls a ‘focusing event’— it focused
public attention on domestic violence as a policy problem.^"
As the above discussion illustrates, a coalescence of factors aided VAWA’s
e n a c tm e n t.^ In most regards, opposition to VAWA within Congress was minimal, and
VAWA as a whole generated a good deal of bipartisan support.^*^ However, some rightwing opposition surfaced as claims alleging the law’s negative effects on the family. An
article published by the Independent Women’s Forum (a conservative, antifeminist think
tank) asserts, “Since its passage in 1994, we have been warning that the VAWA is not
helpful to assault victims, and it has produced harmful effects on women and families.
A piece published by the National Coalition for Free Men states:
VAWA allowed spending of $1.5 billion a year [sic] of your tax dollars to help
promote feminism. Consider the irony: while men are out working to support their
families, their federal tax dollars are going to support feminist policies that destroy
families and the lives and rights of men.^'^
The American Coalition for Fathers and Children puts forth similar claims: that domestic
violence legislation encourages divorce culture, and illegitimacy and fosters a court bias
against fatherhood.^

These claims demonstrate that general opposition to domestic

violence programs persists—and that such opposition continues to find a basis in
patriarchal values and social prescriptions concerning women and the family. Articulated
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as such, however, this opposition seems relatively weak when compared with the
unprecedented degree of political support and attention that domestic violence prevention
and intervention policy has garnered over recent decades.

Conclusions
Examining the historical roots of a social problem—in this case, tracking domestic
violence over centuries of changing socioeconomic environments—invaluably
illuminates our understanding of that problem’s persistence in contemporary contexts.
Very broadly speaking, such a pursuit improves our capacity to assess what things
change, how and why they change, and what seems to persist more or less continuously.
Inevitably, the analysis sheds light on our current perspectives, by reminding us of what
is possible and of what assumptions we may be taking for granted. When researching the
witch-hunts, for example, I found myself going about my daily tasks and imagining what
life must have been like for women in seventeenth century Europe, what it must have
been like to witness gruesome public executions, to fear being the next one selected to
bum alive while my children watched. I also found myself seeking connections,
wondering as to the relation of events then and events now. As I walked to buy a cup of
coffee, my mind drifted to the burning stake, then to the televised coverage I saw of a
woman being shot in the head, in a spectator-filled stadium in Taliban Afghanistan.^'^
Sitting in traffic, I found myself pondering the Texan woman who was killed by lethal
injection, who had likened her days approaching execution to the experience of waiting
for an abusive husband to come home.^’^ Reading the words penned a by friar over five
hundred years ago—“Scold her sharply, bully and terrify her”— I recalled a woman who
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came to the human service ageney where I worked in the early 1990s. What I remember
most about her now is that her husband made her lick the floor.
The systemic coercion of women takes on different forms. It finds social and
political legitimation in different bases, including religious doctrine, rule of state,
‘natural’ law, and scientific authority. Such bases, in turn, shape legal rules and social
norms. Systems of knowledge and power are mutually constitutive. That said,/?eop/e
make ideology, and thus, with varying degrees of power, people are able to change it.
People, mostly men, also make laws. Laws premised on ‘the word of God’ in one
century may fully contradict laws supported by ‘empirical fact’ or liberalist ideology or
jingoism (or, again, ‘the word of God’) in another century. What appears to be a
constant, however (albeit varied in form, degree and expressed justification), is the
societal imbalance of power in relations between constructions of femininity and
masculinity, between women and men. To be clear, I am talking about systemic power,
which to begin to grasp requires both the birds eye view and the understanding that
power inequities actualize in very real social interactions and contexts.^H ow ever
systems of power are maintained—through slavery, public execution,^^® oppressive legal
doctrine, reproductive coercion, domestic violence, and countless other mechanisms—
this maintenance is frequently legitimized in terms of social conceptions of what ‘woman
is’ and what ‘woman does.’^^' Whether social norms upholding male power are framed
as women actively submitting (for example, the masochistic housewife) or more
straightforwardly framed as simple, explicit obedience to authority (for example, wife as
servant, chattel), the resultant effect is essentially the same: men’s authority over and
control of women is maintained.
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The use of violence to maintain statuses of privilege is pervasive today in our
increasingly globalized world. Although sometimes morally justified and downright
necessary, violence is a devastating social harm.^^^ While many Americans ‘get o ff on
virtual or sensationalized violence, there is arguably something inherently
‘unstomachable’ about real violenee.^^^ This feeling is magnified, I find, when a violent
act is clearly the expression of larger systems of domination. Events like the murder of
Matthew Shepherd and the surgical experimentation Marion Sims performed on black
female slaves^^'' again drive home David Peterson del Mar’s point: “The moral texture of
a violent act is contingent on its c o n t e x t . E v e n those who perpetrate such acts—
perhaps especially those who perpetrate them—must make cognitive accommodations
and/or seek to somehow justify these acts on some moral basis. Along related lines,
Barstow discusses how the witch-hunters’ accounts tend to fall silent when it comes to
the actual death of an executed witch; she poses the question, “Had they no stomach for
seeing their projects through to the end?”^^^ I suspect such a ‘lack of stomach’ to also
largely account for the positive correlation between domestic violence and alcohol abuse,
in that alcohol can mask the feelings and consequences associated with committing a
violent act. As Martin Luther King so wisely said, violence begets violence. However,
violence also begets moral dissonance, the need for moral justification, and the efforts to
erase and suppress.
As the analysis in this chapter shows, various authoritative sources have articulated a
range of moral justifications for intimate violence. Such justifications have served to
facilitate the perpetuation of violence as a means to socially control women. They have
included moral claims about beatings being good for women, and such corollary
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prescriptions as: a husband should beat his wife “not in rage but out of charity and
concern for her soul.”^^^ Justifications have been based on claims of religious authority,
as in, ‘God gives husbands dominion over wives’ and ‘God rewards wives who submit to
extreme husbands.’ They have also, as we have seen, been rooted in philosophical and
scientific claims about what is ‘natural.’
Amidst these variations, a pattern emerges: women are socially rendered as selfless.
This occurs in at least two distinct regards. Some justifications portray women as not
being o f themselves, that is, as having no self. Examples of these would include woman
as chattel, marital unity doctrine, and women’s lack of independent legal status. In the
other regard are justifications that render woman as not fo r herself. This meaning of
selflessness is reflected in Darwin’s claim about women being ‘less selfish’ and in
Alcott’s advice about ‘doing most for herself while laboring most for others.’ Robin
West characterizes how such selflessness works in the life of a battered woman:
The battered woman is .. .fo r another within an abusive marriage precisely to the
extent to which it is too frightening and too dangerous to even contemplate beingyôr
oneself . . . If you are going to be at all, you are going to be fo r him. And you are
going to be, so you are going to be for him.^^*
Regardless of which type of selflessness is employed, such social rendering of women
makes the perpetration of violence against them seem less immoral.
In addition to the mechanisms discussed above, domestic violence has been
sanctioned by the minimizing of its severity—by characterizing assault, battery, sexual
terrorism, and sometimes murder as ‘domestic disputes’ and ‘family squabbles.’ The
suppression of intimate violence is also accomplished by the silence surrounding the
issue, by its omission from public discourse, and by the selective framing of certain
‘family matters’ as beyond the purview of state intervention.
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But, one may ask, has not much of this changed? Did the battered women’s
movement not successfully challenge, for example, privacy rationale? I contend that in
many ways, yes, the movement did accomplish just that. That a law such as VAWA was
enacted at all is evidence in support of this claim. In many ways, women have also
achieved greater freedom and independence in recent decades. Gendered divisions
between the household and the market have blurred as more and more women have
entered the job market. Moreover, many women have gained access to social resources
that were heretofore entirely off limits. Despite women’s gains, however, the structural
imbalances persist; domestic violence persists. Why?
In recalling the demise of chastisement doctrine, we saw that it was undermined by
broader structural changes, economic changes that transformed the family. Using
liberalist discourse to exploit the resultant social tensions, women’s rights advocates
posed challenges to chastisement doctrine. The old doctrine was supplanted, over time,
with privacy rationale that better fit with woman’s prescribed roles as homemaker and
mother. Thus privacy rationale reflected the social norms and prescriptions of the day.
The shift away from chastisement doctrine seemed rather emancipatory in the 1800s.
The twentieth century, however, revealed the true colors of privacy doctrine—that is, its
functioning as a kind of informal immunity—which was in turn challenged by ‘second
wave’ feminisms. Again, this shift mirrored economic changes and transformations in
family structures. In the middle and late 1900s, women increasingly moved into the job
market. Again exploiting tensions between existing ideologies and changing social
norms, feminist challenges undermined much of the logic of privacy rationale.
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We now have federal laws addressing violence against women. So, where has this
shift left us? Has domestic violence gone away? No, of course not. Power relations
have in many ways been maintained despite the social and political gains experienced by
some women. Not unlike the role privacy discourse played in the 1800s, contemporary
emancipatory discourse relies on such tropes as ‘equality’ and ‘independence.’ History
suggests we ought to further examine these terms, and question the extent to which they
accurately reflect the current status of women. We also ought to look at changing
economic structures, for example those resulting from globalization and corporate
capitalism, to better understand how power relations are shifting, yet being maintained—
or, as Siegel would say, transforming yet being preserved. We ought to question the
efficacy of legal remedies in ameliorating the problem of domestic violence, as history
suggests a pattern of limitations in this regard. In the following chapter, I continue to
pursue such questions, by further examining the controversy surrounding VAWA’s Title
III and the Supreme Court case that overturned this legislation.

123

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Notes
' Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into
Category o f Bourgeois Society [original German publication 1962], trans. Thomas Burger
with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989).
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national level. For a review of literature on the history of state and local policy responses
to domestic violence in the United States, see David Peterson del Mar, prologue to What
Trouble I Have Seen: A History o f Violence Against Wives (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1996).
^The sources I examined, however, indicate a clear need for more research in this area.
"'Larry D. Eldridge, “Nothing New Under the Sun: Spouse Abuse in Colonial America,”
in Gender Violence: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, eds. Laura L. O’Toole and Jessica R.
Schifftnan (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 258.
^I elaborate on a specific example of this claim in Chapter 2: Habermas’s historical
account, which draws on a number of influential Western thinkers has been criticized for
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^In its focus on the history of domestic violence law and policy, this chapter also tends to
focus on the history of dominant Anglo/American social and legal norms surrounding the
issue. In my discussions of colonial America, for example, I do not consider here how
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of answers to such questions is indeed warranted, however, especially given the findings
of a 1999 U.S. Department of Justice report, which states: “Most striking among
American Indian victims of violence is the substantial difference in the racial
composition of offenders in intimate violence incidents when contrasted with family
violence. Among violence victims of all races, about 11% of intimate victims and 5% of
family victims report the offender to have been of a different race; however, among
American Indian victims of violence, 75% of the intimate victimizations and 25% of the
family victimizations involved an offender of a different race. Intimate and family
violence involve a comparatively high level of alcohol and drug use by offenders as
perceived by victims — as is the case for Indian and non-Indian victims. Indian victims
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need hospital care.” (Lawrence A. Greenfeld and Steven K. Smith, “American Indians
and Crime” [report online] (Washington, D C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, February 1999, accessed 11 January 2004) available from
http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/aic.pdf; Internet, 8.
^Both, for example, have been used as punishment against disobedient wives, as I discuss
further below. I also contend that a public/private distinction functions to make these
forms of violence seem more different than they in fact are, as in ‘private’ domestic
violence versus the public execution of witches.
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online] (1874, accessed 17 January 2004) available from http://www.knowledgerush.com
/paginated txt/dscmnl0/dscmnlO sl_p562_pages.html; Internet, 562.
'^^Ehrenreieh and English, 119. As these authors also emphasize, “[W]Oman’s total
submission to the ‘sex function’ did not make her a sexual being. The medieal model of
female nature, embodied in the ‘psychology of the ovary,’ drew a rigid distinction
between reproductivity and sexuality.” (Ehrenreich and English, 121.)
'’"'See, for example, Ehrenreich and English, and Margolis.
'^"Ammons, 1257.
'^"Siegel, 2129.
" ’Margolis, 17.
"^Siegel, 2145, citing William A. Alcott, Gift Book fo r Young Ladies 85 (Buffalo, Derhy,
Orton & Mulligan 1853). Recall that a women’s movement was emerging when Alcott’s
Gift Book was published.
""Ammons, 1259, citing Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 141 (1872). Interestingly, the court
cited not scientific but religious authority in rendering its decision, stating, “This is the
law of the Creator.”
""Ehrenreich and English, 19.
"'Ehrenreich and English, 122-124.
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"^As further ‘evidence’ that higher education drove women insane, a 1902 study found
that 42 percent of women committed to asylums were well educated, compared to only
16 percent of the men. (Ehrenreich and English, 128.)
""'Ehrenreich and English, 124. These treatments were expensive and thus primarily
given the middle and upper class women. However, other women—among them the
black female slaves and indigent Irish immigrants operated on by Marion Sims— endured
these experimentation phases of these treatments. (Ehrenreich and English, 124-125.)
""Ehrenreich and English, 28.
""Ehrenreich and English, 28.
" ’Siegel also makes this claim.
""Siegel, 2142.
""Commonwealth v. McAfee, 108 Mass. 458, 461 (1871).
""Siegel, 2141.
"'Siegel, 2146.
'"'^Ehrenreich and English, 12.
'"'"Ammons, 1263.
'"Siegel, 2122.
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Valente, 281. I suggest that the phrase “superior moral and legal creature‘s is
reminiscent of the evolutionary theories of the day.
'"Siegel, 2122.
'"Siegel, 2123.
'"'"Ammons, 1260, citing State v. Black, 60 N.C. (Win.) 163 (1864).
'"'"Ammons, 1260-1261, citing State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 445 (1868).
'""Siegel, 2132.
'"'Siegel, 2122.
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'"Siegel, 2160.
'""Siegel, 2160.
'""Siegel, 2160-2161, discussing Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146 (1871) and Flams v.
State, 14 So. 266 (Miss. 1894).
'"’Siegel, 2138. Whipping post laws were passed in Maryland (1882), Delaware (1901),
and Oregon (1906). For a comprehensive historical of spousal violence in Oregon, see
Peterson del Mar.
'""Siegel, 2139.
'""Siegel, 2122.
'""Siegel, 2153. The remainder of this paragraph also draws heavily from Siegel here.
'"'Peterson del Mar, 140.
'“ Margolis, 101.
' “ Margolis, 101.
'"M uch of the aspects of second wave feminism described here are presented in The New
Woman’s Survival Catalog: A Woman-made Book eds. Kirsten Grimstad and Susan
Rennie (New York: Berkeley Publishing Corp., 1973).
' “ Notably, these efforts were oriented to the stranger-criminal early on, and did not
orient until intimate partners until later.
'“ Some of these health centers published books. See, for example. The Boston Women’s
Flealth Collective, Our Bodies, Ourselves: A Book By and For Women (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1971), and The Federation of Feminist Women’s Health Centers,
How to Stay Out o f the Gynecologist’s Office, eds. Carol Downer, Rebecca Chalker, and
Lorraine Rothman.
'"’Peterson del Mar’s analysis further delves into the relationship between women’s
social and legal independence and the levels of violence perpetrated against them.
'""Howard and Lewis summarize the highlights of the emergence and development of this
movement. See also Peterson del Mar, 121-125.
'""Del Martin, Battered Wives (San Francisco: Glide Publications, 1976).
' ’"“Battered Women,” Plank 2 of the National Plan of Action from the National Women's
Conference, Houston, Texas [report online] (18-21 November 1977 accessed 8 March
2004), in National Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year, The
Spirit o f Houston, The First National Women’s Conference: An Official Report to the
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President, the Congress and the People o f the United States (March, 1978. U.S.
Government Printing Office) available from http://womhist.binghamton.edu/vawa/
docl.htm; Internet.
"Valente, 279.
""Faith McNulty, The Burning Bed: The True Story o f an Abused Wife (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980).
""Howard and Lewis, 14.
""'Howard and Lewis, 14.
""Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman (New York: Harper and Row, 1979). This
book is based on the author’s interviews with approximately 1,500 battered women.
Walker characterizes this ‘cycle of violence’ as escalating phases of tension-building,
acute battering, and kind and contrite behavior.
""Nadya Burton, “Resistance to Prevention: Reconsidering Feminist Antiviolenee
Rhetoric,” in Violence Against Women: Philosophical Perspectives, eds. Stanley G.
French, Wanda Teays and Laura M. Purdy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 182.
"Valente, 280.
""Teays, 59.
""Raehelle Brooks, “Feminists Negotiate the Legislative Branch: The Violence Against
Women Act,” in Feminists Negotiate the State: The Politics o f Domestic Violence, ed.
Cynthia R. Daniels (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1997), 68.
'""Brooks, 68.
'"'Brooks, 68.
'""Eve S. Buzawa and Carl G. Buzawa, Domestic Violence: The CriminalJustice
Response, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996), 129. Here Helms
invokes ‘traditional’ patriarchal values as well as a type of privacy rationale.
'""Brooks, 68.
'""'Brooks, 68.
'""while this case received a good deal of publicity, many other cases against police
departments during the 1970s and 1980s failed. See Howard and Lewis, 8, 12.
'""Buzawa and Buzawa, 102.
'"’Buzawa and Buzawa, 102.
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""Buzawa and Buzawa, 102.
'""Another development that may have helped to set the stage for a stronger federal
legislative remedy was the eriminalization of hate-motivated intimidation and violence as
a response to increased bias-related crimes in the United States. Valerie Jenness argues
that what was to become a significant and controversial piece of the federal Violence
Against Women Act—Title III, its civil rights remedy—was closely modeled after hate
crime legislation, specifically the Hate Crimes Statistics Act (HCSA) of 1990. (Valerie
Jenness, “Managing Differences and Making Legislation: Social Movements and the
Racialization, Sexualization, and Gendering of Federal Hate Crime Law in the U.S.,
1985-1998,” Social Problems 46, no. 4 (1999), 552.) While other scholars emphasize
Title III roots in civil rights law (see for example Victoria Nourse, “The Violence Against
Women Act: A Legislative History,” in Violence Against Women (West Group, June
1997).), Jenness claims that the HCSA provided lawmakers a template that was “easily
extended to women’s victimization.” (Jenness, 562.)
'""Brooks, 69. My account here draws heavily fi"om Brooks and Nourse.
'"'Nourse, 3.
'""See Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One
Hundred First Congress, Second Session on Legislation to Reduce the Growing Problem
of Violent Crime Against Women, August 29 and December 11, 1990, Part 2, Serial No.
J-101-80. Tracey Motuzick (formerly Tracey Thurman) was among those who gave
testimony.
'""This stage of the legislative process illustrates well how delay can happen even without
organized opposition.
'"Vourse, 44, 46.
'""Nourse, 46.
'""Nourse, 50.
'"’Buzawa and Buzawa, 129.
'""Buzawa and Buzawa, 129-31 and Violence Against Women Act, Pub L No 103-122,
tit IV, 108 Stat 1902 (1994)..
'""violence Against Women Act, Pub L No 103-122, tit IV, 108 Stat 1902 (1994).
"""jenness, 562.
""'jenness, 562. Nourse also discusses how critics argued that Title III was importantly
different fi'om previous civil rights initiative; she also discusses how the act drew upon
previous equality legislation. (Nourse, 4.)
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"“ jenness, 562.
"""Brooks, 69. However, Jenness and Brooks assert what may be conflicting claims
regarding the roles played by victims’ advocacy groups early on in the legislative
process. Jenness argues that “there is no evidence to suggest that feminist-sponsored
anti-violence projects were central in the ... early formulation of the VAWA”— i.e., prior
to 1993. (Jenness, 564.) Brooks, on the other hand, describes active involvement of the
National Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education Fund (NOW LDEF) as
early as 1991. Perhaps NOW LDEF’s early involvement did not include direct testimony
in congressional hearings, which, given Jenness’ stated methodology, could account for
the discrepancy.
""‘'See Jenness; see also Brooks.
"""David Frazee, “Gender-Justice Breakthrough: A plain English guide to the new civil
rights law against violence against women,” On The Issues: The Progressive Woman’s
Quarterly 4, no. 4 (1995), 44.
"""Nourse, 6.
""’The media were drawn to the issue during the pre-enactment phase as well. However,
media attention did not focus on the pending legislation or the controversy surrounding
Title III, but rather on sensationalized court cases. One case that generated much
publicity early on involved a former model who was slashed by her attacker with a razor.
"""jody Rabhan, “By Popular Demand: Domestic Violence Legislation,” NCJW Journal
20, no. 3 (1997), 4.
"""jen Weiss, “When Violence Hits Home: Media Campaign Targets the Mainstream,”
O ff Our Backs 24, no. 8 (1994), 21.
"'"Laura Taflinger, “What Women Want: An Interview with Patricia Ireland,” O ff Our
Backs 29, no. 7 (1999), 15.
"''john Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd ed. (New York:
HarperCollins, 1995), 94-100.
"'"interestingly, none of the sources that I encountered mentioned the significance of the
Clinton Administration’s possible role in getting the VAWA enacted (with the obvious
exception of actually signing the bill into law). During the 1980s, the Reagan
administration actively and effectively suppressed efforts toward passing domestic
violence legislation. It seems that President Clinton would have been in a position to
provide important support for the VAWA during the early years of his first term in office.
His influence in this regard, however, remains unclear.
"'"See Jenness for elaboration on this point. Another factor in VAWA’s passage may
have been to the extent to which domestic violence was successfully framed as what
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Baumgartner and Jones call a “valence issue”—an issue “in which only one side of the
debate is legitimate.” Baumgartner and Jones, p. 150. (Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan
D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1993), 150.) Again, while I briefly discuss here broad reactions to VAWA as a
whole, I further address the controversy surrounding Title III in Chapter 4.
""Anita K. Blair and Charmaine Yoest, “False Factoids, Deceitful Data: The Lasting
Legacy of the Violence Against Women Act,” Ex Femina, Newsletter of the Independent
Women’s Forum (January 2001), 1.
""Ted Williamson, “What’s Happening at NCFM,” Transitions, Newsletter of the
National Coalition of Free Men 20, no. 5 (2000), 10.
""American Coalition for Fathers and Children, “VAWA II - Just Say No,” [report
online] (accessed 13 April 2002) available from http://www.aefe.org/vawa/vawa2.htm;
Internet.
" " l do not recall (nor did I make a note of) the which program this was or when,
specifically, I watched it, except to say that it was a documentary about Afghanistan, one
of many that was aired on U.S. cable channels in the months following September 11,
2001. The woman was publicly executed for killing her hushand, and was one of many
who were killed that day. Several of her children, relatives and neighbors had plead in
her defense, claiming that the act was in self-defense, that the husband beat her frequently
and brutally, but their pleas did not prevent the execution.
""The woman was Betty Lou Beets. She was put to death for murdering her abusive
husband. According to writer Dana Cloud, Beets’ history of abuse was never presented
in her defense. (Dana Cloud, “Celebrating an execution-free year,” The Daily Texan 101,
no. 83 [report online] (30 January 2001, accessed 29 January 2004) available from
http://tspweb02.tsp.utexas.edu/webarchive/01 -30-01/2001013004_s07_Celebratin.html;
Internet.
"’"This implies that individual relations, relations of a more granular level, can vary quite
a bit in terms of power imbalance versus power equity— and a systemic pattern of
imbalance persists nonetheless.
"""‘Public execution’ can connote executions that members of the general public directly
witness, as well as executions performed under the authority of the state. Both
connotations apply here.
""’Social ideas can also challenge male power and promote women’s emancipation.
"""l discuss specific harms that result from intimate violence in Chapter 1. Explicating the
distinction between what may be appropriately considered ‘just violence’ vs. ‘unjust
violence’ is not a task I undertake here.
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"""Here I am invoking a Humean argument that “morality is determined by sentiment... .
[VJirtue [is] whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment
o f approbation; and vice the contrary.” David Hume, “The Principles of Morals,”
excerpted in Tom L. Beachamp, Philosophical Ethics: An Introduction to Moral
Philosophy, 3rd ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2001), 226.
"""'Ehrenreich and English, 125. These authors further specify here that Sims “operated
on one of them thirty times in fours years, being foiled over and over by post-operative
infections.”
"""Peterson del Mar, 7. I first reference this quotation in Chapter 1.
"""Barstow, 149.
""’Browne, 64.
"""Robin L. West, “The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory,” Wisconsin Women’s Law Journal 3, no. 8 (1987),
99.
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CHAPTER 4

FEDERALISM VERSUS CIVIL RIGHTS: ‘PUBLIC’ AND
‘PRIVATE’ IN UNITED STATESN. MORRISON
Thus far, I have reviewed domestic violence in the contemporary United States, and
traced social/historical roots of law and policy responses to the problem. I have also
described mutable conceptions of ‘public’ and ‘private’ over time—within the context of
Jürgen Habermas’s work in Chapter 2, and in discussing industrialization and ‘privacy
rationale’ in Chapter 3.’ As we have seen, a reliance on privacy rationale in juridical
decision-making emerged with the decline of chastisement doctrine during the nineteenth
century. The battered women’s movement and the broader feminist movements from
which it sprang have publicly challenged this rationale since the 1970s.
Efforts toward such challenges, especially those geared toward legislative reform,
culminated largely with the 1994 passage of the first Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA)." In May 2000, the Supreme Court overturned the most controversial part of
the act—Title III, VAWA’s civil rights remedy"—in rendering its 5-4 decision in United
States V. Morrison.^ The Court’s majority opinion in the case, authored by Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, asserts that in passing Title III, Congress acted beyond the scope of
its constitutional authority as granted under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court arrived at its decision despite volumes of testimony that
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Congress gathered over a period of four years which supported the claims that violence
against women substantially affects interstate commerce and that state actors were not
providing women equal protection under the law. In this chapter, I further examine the
dispute surrounding Title III and the Morrison ruling.
Conceptions o f ‘public’ and ‘private’— especially insofar as they frame domestic
violence— come into play a great deal in the discourse surrounding Title III. Sometimes
they are used rather explicitly, as when Senator Joseph Biden states, “Only when this
violence is seen as a public injustice rather than a private misfortune, will we truly begin
to confront the problem.”^ At other times, ‘public’ and ‘private’ function more obscurely
to frame policy responses to the problem. In the pages that follow, I examine these
relationships in greater depth. I begin by discussing issues that arose during the pre
enactment phase of V AW A, and then turn to the Morrison case. Upon summarizing the
case and reviewing the Court’s findings, I critically evaluate its basic arguments and
positions. Here, I analyze the discourse of these arguments in light of their framing
domestic violence as ‘public’ versus ‘private.’ Broadly speaking, I aim to shed new light
on recent manifestations of these frames insofar as they continue to shape domestic
violence law and policy. I contend that the Court’s decision reflects a similar ‘hands-off
approach to that supported under explicit privacy rationale, albeit one expressed in
different language. I conclude that the outcome of Morrison suggests that shifting
applications of ‘public’ and ‘private’ continue harmfully to restrict legal and policy
remedies for domestic violence.
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Title III: Legislative Foundations and
Pre-Enactment Opposition
The inclusion of Title III in the VAWA bill was supported by findings obtained
during the Congressional hearings in which survivors and others with expertise in
violence against women testified.^ Their accounts provided evidence that cases of crimes
like rape, stalking, and domestic violence were treated differently in the courts than cases
of violent crime against strangers. During the hearings, survivors testified that the police
ignored their calls for help, and the courts failed to remedy the violence perpetrated
against them.’ They asserted that state actors did not take the crimes seriously. Their
testimonies addressed the persistence of patriarchal values within the family, such as in
the treatment of wives as servants and the pervasive belief that ‘a man’s home is his
castle.’ Also expressed was that state actors regularly regarded the family’s privacy as
superseding the need for intervention by law enforcement officials. Batterers were able
to manipulate the legal system, and judicial decision-makers tended to treat them with
great leniency.^ For example, Sarah Buel, an attorney and a survivor of domestic
violence, testified about differences between prosecuting stranger assault versus domestic
assault:
I can try two cases back-to-back. If it is a stranger assault, I have no trouble getting
the maximum, absolutely none. I get the married couple in there and the judge wants
to talk about, ‘Now, are you sure you don’t want to go to marriage counseling, and
how can you do this after 30 years,’ and just complete denial about her danger.
If am terrified for her life, and the judge wants to talk about this illusion of mom,
pop, bud, sis, and dog Spot, we have to preserve .. ^
Buel also indicated that threats to witnesses typically prosecuted for drug crimes were
typically ignored in domestic violence c a s e s . S h e and the others who testified during
the hearings made the case that the legal system was failing women who were abused in
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their h o m e s . T h e y supported VAWA, and argued the need for legislative funding and
direction from the federal government. Indeed, the bill drew many supporters from both
inside and outside the legislative process.
Proponents of VAWA claimed that the states “had historically failed to provide
women adequate protection from violent, sexualized assault.”'^ While much of the
legislation was modeled after existing state laws, VAWA’s civil rights remedy was
unprecedented in that it “analyzed violence against women as a form of sex
discrimination.”’^ This remedy, founded on an equal protection rationale, granted cause
of action to victims of ‘gender-motivated violence,’ allowing them to sue their assailants
for compensatory and punitive damages in state and federal court.’"’ Title III aimed to
extend the scope of existing gender anti-discrimination laws.’^ That women had legal
protections in the workplace but not the streets or the home was a recurring theme
throughout the hearings. Victoria Nourse states:
Massive efforts had been made in the 1970s and 1980s to ensure equal opportunity
for women: equal opportunity in employment, in education, in the application of
family and criminal law. Experience had proven, however, that these formal advances
were no match for private violence.’^
In addition, the legislation, especially the cause of action provision, was modeled after
existing civil rights legislation.” Nourse points out, however, that Title III also differs
from civil rights statutes.’* For example, the latter, in some cases, requires that “the
defendant consciously intended to deprive another of ‘equal rights,”’ whereas Title III
stipulates violent crimes that are ‘motivated by gender.’’^
The scope of what constitutes ‘gender-motivated violence’ has been sharply disputed
over various phases of VAWA’s legislative journey. The American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), for example, opposed the provision on grounds that ‘gender motivation’
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would be too difficult to prove in court?” Formal judicial opposition to Title III emerged
in 1991. The Conference of Chief Justices articulated concerns that ‘gender-motivation’
was too all-encompassing, putting forth, “[T]he very nature of marriage as a sexual union
raises the possibility that every form of violence can be interpreted as gender-based.”^’
The Judicial Conference of the United States noted that the “subject of violence based on
gender and possible responses is extremely complex.”^’ The George Bush Justice
Department also raised strong concerns that the bill did not clearly distinguish between
crimes that are based on gender and those are not.^^ Concerns stemming from this
ambiguity raised early on influenced modifications to the language of the bill. As it was
finally passed in 1994, Title III defines ‘crime of violence motivated by gender’ to mean
“a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at
least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender.”^"’ The remedy explicitly
excludes random acts of violence, and the determination of whether an act constitutes
gender-motivated (and not random) violence was to be made on a case-by-case basis.
Thus, upon VAWA’s enactment (and prior to the Morrison decision), the actual scope of
‘gender-motivated violence’ would be largely left to the interpretation of the courts.
Although claims about the ambiguity and complexity of ‘gender-motivation ’ gave
rise to objection to Title III, opposition to this part of the bill really coalesced amidst a
broader federalism controversy. According to Nourse, “State and federal judges had, for
some time, raised concerns that Congress was legislating ‘too many’ remedies for federal
courts that could and should be addressed by state courts.”’^ In addition to the concerns
it raised about the potential scope of ‘gender-motivation, ’ the Conference of Chief
Justices opposed the civil rights remedy on grounds that it would dislocate “domestic
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relations” cases through its use as a “bargaining tool within the context of divorce
negotiations.”’” The federal judiciary echoed these concerns in its opposition, claiming
that the remedy would “embroil the federal courts in domestic relations disputes” and
“threaten the American family” because it would “be invoked as a bargaining tool within
the context of [often acrimonious] divorce negotiations.”” Chief Justice William
Rehnquist raised similar objections in a separate, well-publicized statement of his own,
stating that the “new private right of action [is] so sweeping that the legislation could
involve the federal courts in a whole host of domestic relations disputes.”’* Judges
worried that cases brought under Title III would flood their courts and add to already
daunting backlogs.’”
The judicial opposition prompted the authors of the bill to build a stronger case for
the constitutionality of Title III. In 1991, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing
on VAWA that addressed these concerns.’” While some authors indicate that opposition
to VAWA among legislators was relatively weak,” Senator Strom Thurmond, thenranking minority member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, raised public concerns
about Title III, though he also expressed support for VAWA as a whole.” In early 1992,
Senator Biden acknowledged mounting criticisms of the legislation, and publicly
disagreed that VAWA’s civil rights remedy “was inconsistent with the proper scope of
federal jurisdiction.”” He likened Title III to existing civil rights remedies:
No one would say today that laws barring violent attacks motivated by race or
ethnicity fall outside the Federal courts’ jurisdiction. Then why are they saying that
violent discrimination motivated by gender is not a traditional civil rights violation?’"’
Biden argued that Title III is consistent with federalist principles insofar as it addresses
gaps where state laws have failed to protect federal interests.” Nonetheless, controversy
surrounding the civil rights remedy spurred significant revisions to the bill.
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In 1993, Senator Orrin Hatch introduced his own bill addressing sexual assault and
domestic violence. Soon thereafter. Senators Biden and Hatch agreed to negotiate a
compromise version of the legislation, based on Biden’s VAWA but integrating
provisions from the Hatch bill as well.’” The redrafting of Title III aimed to impose
further restrictions on the scope of ‘gender-motivated crimes of violence,’ and to address
federalist concerns. The crimes encompassed in the provision were limited felonies only,
and cases involving divorce were excluded altogether.” The legislators added provisions
granting concurrent jurisdiction to the state and federal courts, and limiting the scope by
which the federal courts could remove cases from state jurisdiction.’*
The reach of ‘gender-motivated’ was also further restricted as part of the
compromise, as the clause, ‘due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's
gender’ was added at this time.’” This left to the courts the task of interpreting the
meaning o f ‘animus,’ which could entail ‘malice’ or ‘animosity’ in the more restrictive
sense, and ‘purpose’ or ‘motivating force’ in the more inclusive sense."’” Senator Hatch,
who illustrates the more restrictive interpretation of the remedy, described the crimes
covered by Title III as follows:
We're not opening the federal doors to all gender-motivated crimes. Say you have a
man who believes a woman is attractive. He feels encouraged by her and he’s so
motivated by that encouragement that he rips her clothes off and has sex with her
against her will. Now let's say you have another man who grabs a woman off some
lonely road and in the process of raping her says words like, “You're wearing a skirt!
You're a woman! I hate women! I'm going to show you, you woman!” Now, the first
one's terrible. But the other's much worse. If a man rapes a woman while telling her
he loves her, that's a far cry from saying he hates her. A lust factor does not spring
from animus."”
So, according to such a restrictive interpretation, a violent crime motivated by ‘love’ or
even ‘lust’ would not be cause for suit under VAWA’s civil rights remedy, regardless of
the brutality of the act or the consequences to the victim. A more open interpretation of
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‘animus’ would not require “consciousness of bias” and would include “acts used to
enforce, by violence, stereotypical gender-roles, to punish the victim for the exercise of
rights guaranteed to all citizens, or to use forced sex as a weapon of intimidation or
degradation.”"” However the redrafted legislation would come to be interpreted in the
courts, the revisions alleviated some of the opposition that had been building against Title
III. For example, the federal judiciary rescinded its stated opposition, and adopted a
stance of “no position” on the remedy."”
Despite the carefulness with which the final version of Title III was drafted to
acquiesce to judiciary opposition, the Supreme Court overturned VAWA’s unprecedented
civil rights remedy roughly six years after its enactment. When the majority decision in
United States v. Morrison rendered Title III unconstitutional, it did so on grounds that
Congress had acted beyond the scope of its authority because the law falls beyond the
purview o f the federal government. The legislation put forth the constitutional basis by
which Congress enacted Title III, as “pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress . . .
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . as well as under section 8 of Article
I ,r44 Yhe former grants Congress a role in enforcing equal protection under the law. The
latter, known as the Commerce Clause, confers upon Congress the power to regulate
interstate commerce. While the Constitution grants specific powers to Congress, the
Tenth Amendment also sets limits on such powers: those which are not explicitly
delegated within the federal government or prohibited to the states are “reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.” In the following section, I present how the
Morrison case ruled, on the basis of federalist principle, against both the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment justifications for Title III.
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An Overview of United States v. Morrison
The same month that Congress enacted VAWA, shortly after she enrolled as a
first-year student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Christy Brzonkala alleged that two
football players, Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, assaulted and repeatedly raped
her?’ Brzonkala became severely depressed, stopped going to her classes, and attempted
suicide?” In the months following the rape, Morrison announced publicly that he “liked
to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them.”"” Brzonkala later filed a complaint
under Virginia Tech’s Sexual Assault Policy, and school officials conducted two
disciplinary proceedings. The first found Morrison guilty of sexual assault under that
policy, and the second found he had violated the institution’s Abusive Conduct Policy."’*
The institution neither reported the incident to the police nor encouraged Brzonkala to do
so."’” In fact, rape was the “only violent felony that Virginia Tech authorities [did] not
automatically report to the university or town police.”’” Morrison was suspended for a
year, a punishment that was upheld by the dean of students. However, the school later
reversed this decision, and instead imposed a ‘deferred suspension’ that was to last until
Morrison graduated.” Upon reading in a newspaper that the institution had delayed
suspension and continued Morrison’s full athletic scholarship, Brzonkala dropped out of
school and sought psychiatric counseling for the rape.
In December 1995, Brzonkala filed suit against Morrison and Crawford under
VAWA’s civil rights remedy.” The federal district court that heard the case dismissed
the action, finding that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to enact VAWA’s
civil rights provision.” On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed, reinstating Brzonkala’s claim and upholding the constitutionality
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of Title III.” However, the full Fourth Circuit subsequently vacated the opinion of the
panel in March 1999, and affirmed the district court’s decision by a 7-4 vote.” Soon
after this ruling, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, and the United States
intervened on Brzonkala’s behalf to defend the constitutionality of Title III.
United States v. Morrison was argued’” on January II, 2000 immediately following
announcement of the Court’s decision in Kimel v. Florida Board o f Regents

This

decision, grounded in a federalist argument, exempted state government employers from
a civil rights law that redressed age discrimination. Announced by Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, who is often considered to cast a pivotal vote in federalism cases, the decision
set the tone for the Morrison argument. Solicitor General Seth Waxman and Julie
Goldscheid, representing Brzonkala on behalf of the NOW Legal Defense and Education
Fund, made the case for upholding Title III. Michael Rosman of the Center for
Individual Rights, a conservative public interest law firm, argued the law was
unconstitutional. One journalist described the hearing as “an hour of contentious oral
argument.”’*
Goldscheid led off by arguing Title Ill’s constitutionality under the Commerce
Clause, claiming that evidence gleaned from four years of Congressional hearings shows
that violence against women ‘substantially affects’ the national economy. She stated that
such violence restricts women’s participation in the labor force and deters them from
pursuing education. Goldscheid also pointed out that attorneys general from 38 states
formally supported VAWA’s civil rights remedy.’” Justice Antonin Scalia interjected
with a series of questions asserting that if violence against women affects interstate
commerce, then all crime affects interstate commerce. Justice O’Connor complained that
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using Goldscheid’s reasoning, “Congress could find evidence of discrimination in
alimony and enact a federal alimony law.’’”” Echoing Justice Scalia, Rosman claimed,
“You can’t distinguish the effects of gender from the effects of overall crime.””’ Rosman
also argued that, while violence against women may ‘indirectly affect’ the economy,
upholding the law could “relegate the states to a trivial and unimportant role in our
federal structure.””’ Further, in speaking to the question of Congressional authority under
the Fourteenth Amendment, Rosman stated that this amendment governs only official
state action, and thus could not serve as the grounds for a law that sanctions private
behavior. While Goldscheid’s and Waxman’s argument time elapsed before they could
address the equal protection argument. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg challenged
Rosman’s reasoning. She said that Congress did not aim to displace state authority, but
to provide an alternate forum. “We are just complementing what the states do. Why
can’t Congress do that?””’ Rosman replied, “This is violence, interpersonal violence, the
kind of thing states have had as their exclusive province ever since the start of our
country.””"’
In deciding Morrison, the Court first examined whether Title III could be upheld on
the grounds of the Commerce Clause, acknowledging that acts of Congress are granted a
“presumption of constitutionality.” Only a “plain showing” that Congress had exceeded
the scope of its authority would justify the Court’s invalidation of the act.”’ In the
majority opinion, the Court upheld three categories of activity that Congress may regulate
under the Commerce Clause, as established in United States v. Lopez.

The category

pertaining to Title Ill’s constitutionality specifies “those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.””’ The Court set about determining whether a ‘substantial effects’
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test was warranted in the case—that is, whether to go about determining if gendermotivated violent crime substantially affects interstate commerce. The Court decided
that such a test was not warranted because it had only been used in the past when “the
activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor.””* The Court ruled that
Title III is not consistent with this precedent, as “[gjender-motivated crimes of violence
are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.’’”” Moreover, the Court rejected as
grounds for constitutionality the activity’s “aggregate effect on interstate commerce,”’”
and emphasized the need for “a distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local.””
Upon rejecting the Commerce Clause as grounds for upholding Title III, the Court
turned to of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section I of which states:
.. .No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
Section 5 of the Amendment grants Congress the powers to enforce these provisions.
The Morrison Court found that, since the Fourteenth Amendment protects against
discrimination by states, and Title III sanctions violence committed by private actors, the
law has no constitutional grounds under this argument either.” In other words, the Court
determined that “penalizing private conduct could not be interpreted as an enforcement of
the Fourteenth Amendment, because private conduct is not prohibited by the
Amendment.”’"’ The majority decision cites two precedents from 1883, United States v.
Harris^^ and the Civil Rights Cases?^ In Harris, the Court ruled, “[Pjrovisions of the
fourteenth amendment have reference to state action exclusively,” and thus do not cover
“the action of private persons.” Similarly, the Court’s Civil Rights Cases decision placed
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“purely private conduct” in public accommodations outside the scope of congressional
powers, as granted under the Fourteenth Amendment. Both cases set federalist
constraints on existing civil rights law, and were held shortly after the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” The Morrison Court justified its argumentative reliance on
these cases with “the length of time they have been on the books”’* and “the [Court’s]
familiarity [at that time] with the events surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”’” Concomitantly, however, the Court added that even if its decision could
not rest on the precedents of Harris and the Civil Rights Cases, Title III is
unconstitutional under Section 5 because it fails the congruence and proportionality test
of City o f Boerne v. Flores^^ in that its remedy fails to address States or state actors.
Thus, while acknowledging, “[N]o civilized system of justice could fail to provide
[Brzonkala] a remedy for the conduct of respondent Morrison,”*’ the Court ruled that the
United States is powerless to provide such a remedy. Although Justice Stephen G.
Breyer cast doubt upon the Court’s reasoning in the equal protection argument, none of
the Justices fully dissented with the majority opinion in this aspect of the case.*’ Rather,
the dissenting opinions, and for that matter the concurrence of Justice Clarence Thomas,
focus upon the Commerce Clause justification for Title Ill’s constitutionality.
In his dissent. Justice David H. Souter stated that gender-motivated violence and
discrimination affect commerce in much the same way that racial discrimination did
when the Court approved the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice
Souter argued that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress “to legislate with regard to
activity that, in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.” He cited
Wickard v. Filburn^^ a case that “upheld the application of the Agricultural Adjustment
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Act to the planting and consumption of homegrown wheat”*"’ on the premise that “wheat
grown at home for personal consumption could either be drawn into the market by rising
prices, or relieve its grower of any need to purchase wheat in the market.”*’ The Court’s
reasoning in Wickard suggests that an activity (in this case a domestic activity) falls
within the regulatory scope of the Commerce Clause when it affects “supply and demand
in interstate commerce.” Moreover, Justice Souter reasoned that the Court’s distinction
between economic and noneconomic activity had already been abandoned in Heart o f
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, a case that “declined to limit the commerce power
through a formal distinction between legislation focused on ‘commerce’ and statutes
addressing ‘moral and social wrong[s].’”*’ Justice Souter’s dissent put forth that the
Court’s “nominal adherence to the substantial effects test is merely that” and criticized
the Court for promoting a vision of federalism through jurisprudence that is inconsistent
with precedent.
While Justice Souter argued for upholding the ‘substantial effects’ test. Justice
Thomas, in his brief concurrence, opined, “[T]he very notion of a ‘substantial effects’ test
under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress’
powers and with this Court’s early Commerce Clause cases.”** Whereas Justice Souter
criticized the Court’s application of the test. Justice Thomas bemoaned the standard itself
as “rootless and malleable,” allowing Congress to wrongfully “appropriat[e] state police
powers under the guise of regulating commerce.”*” Justice Thomas’s concurrence points
to the need for a standard more consistent with ‘original understanding,’ but says nothing
about how such a standard would be defined.
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Justice Breyer’s dissent, on the contrary, emphasizes the importance of determining
the regulated activity’s effects on interstate commerce. He questioned the problematic
nature of the Court’s difficult-to-apply “‘economic/noneconomic’ distinction.’’”” More
importantly, however, he dismissed the constitutional relevance of this distinction
altogether, arguing that only the effects on interstate commerce, and not the local or
economic nature of the cause, are pertinent to the question at hand. Further, Justice
Breyer maintained that “within the bounds of the rational. Congress, not the courts, must
remain primarily responsible for striking the appropriate federal/state balance.””’ He
observed that VAWA’s civil rights remedy seems to represent an overlap of state and
federal interests that “help[s] solve a mutually acknowledged national problem.””’
Nonetheless, as I have discussed, the Court’s decision in Morrison overturned Title III on
federalist grounds, and thus victims can no longer sue for damages under its remedy.

Critical Analysis
Having reviewed the Morrison case and the arguments put forth in its opinions, I now
turn to further evaluation of these arguments, with an overall emphasis on how renderings
of ‘public’ and ‘private’ come into play. I begin by considering the Commerce Clause
rationale for Title Ill’s constitutionality, and then further examine the equal protection
grounds of the Fourteenth Amendment. I also address the federalist grounds on which
the law was overturned, and speak briefly to the institutional relationship between
Congress and the Court. Throughout the discussion, I frequently step outside the
framework of constitutional normativity, and address the Morrison decision from a
broader moral standpoint.
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In its Commerce Clause argument, the majority’s reasoning hinges on two premises
regarding the activity that VAWA’s civil rights remedy aimed to legislate, that is,
‘gender-motivated crimes of violence.’ Specifically, the Court maintains that the activity
is both ‘noneconomic’ and ‘local’—and thus the ‘substantial effects’ test does not apply.
I agree with Justice Breyer’s assessment that determining a regulated activity’s effects on
interstate commerce remains the constitutionally relevant question. In the context of this
analysis, however, the Court’s premises about the (noneconomic and local) nature of the
causal activity warrant further examination. These claims are relevant both because they
underpin the logic of the Court’s decision—that is, within the context of satisfying the
condition of ‘substantially affecting interstate commerce’—and because both claims rely
upon a transformation of existing ‘public/private’ frameworks.”’
For one, the slippery ‘economic/noneconomic’ distinction parallels the public/private
split between the market and the household. If the market is the de facto realm that
defines the (official) economy, and insofar as the domain of the market is conceptually
separated from that of the household, the household dichotomously renders as
‘noneconomic.’ It follows that if one associates domestic violence with the household
itself, or even minimally as existing within the domain of the family, domestic violence
also becomes readily regarded as ‘noneconomic’ activity. That the language of the
VAWA hearings and legislation consistently conflates ‘domestic violence’ with ‘violence
in the home’ inadvertently serves to reinforce such reasoning. The Court relies on these
associations in demarcating the bounds of congressional authority. As Robert C. Post
and Reva B. Siegel state, the Morrison Court “tend[s] toward equating national power
with power to regulate ‘economic’ events, activities, and transactions . . . to restrict
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Congress from . . . intmd[ing] upon ‘traditional’ areas of state regulation, like . . . the
family.””"’ Characterizing domestic violence as ‘noneconomic’ facilitates claims, such as
those made by groups opposing the Title III legislation, that gender-motivated violence
only ‘remotely’ and ‘indirectly’ affects interstate commerce.”’ These claims further
undergird the argument that upholding the law would justify Congress’s regulation of
virtually any activity under the Commerce Clause.
As Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis illustrate, history suggests we ought to be suspect
of justificatory logic that hinges on a rigid market/household distinction, especially when
the issue at hand involves the expression of gendered power relations. Households (and
the families who populate them)”” are inextricably connected with the market, and serve
decidedly economic functions. On a basic level, they supply the market with its labor
force and consume goods and services produced therein. Despite its exclusion from
standard economic indicators (like the Gross National Product), unpaid labor performed
by household members in the so-called domestic sphere literally allows the market to
function as it does.”’ Viewed in this context alone, domestic violence can arguably be
characterized as ‘economic activity.’ When a violent spouse sabotages his partner’s
access to paid work—for example, by withholding transportation or beating her before a
job interview or harassing her at work upon her move to a shelter—this may be more
intuitively labeled ‘economic activity’ because of the activity’s situation with regard to
the market. However, even when a violent spouse coercively controls his partner within
the household, behind closed doors, this too can be framed as economic activity—
because the family household is structurally and fundamentally an economic unit. The
‘mountain of data’ amassed by Congress that evidences the substantial effects of gender-
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motivated violence in the (official) economy of the market only further strengthens the
claim that ‘gender-motivated crimes of violence’ constitute ‘economic activity.’”*
However, like distinctions drawn between ‘public’ and ‘private,’ the categories of
‘economic’ and ‘noneconomic’ activities are inherently mutable.””
In addition to imposing the ‘economic activity’ condition, the Court requires a
“distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.” Whereas the genderviolence-as-noneconomic claim relies on the juxtaposition of the market and the
household, the gender-violence-as-local rationale more directly draws upon the logic of
federalism. Here, the ‘national/local’ distinction mirrors “subliminal associations of
federal law with . . . the public sphere; and state law with . . . the private.”'”” In this
rubric, the family appears even more ‘local’ (more ‘private’) than state government,
making it seem to fall, even more so, outside the bounds of federal jurisdiction. Justice
O’Connor draws upon such parallels in her intimations about justification for a federal
alimony law. Domestic violence takes place in families, and the regulation of families
generally falls under the purview of state, not federal, government—or does it?
As Libby S. Adler compellingly argues, “[T]he axiom that family law belongs
exclusively within the state domain is both empirically untrue and theoretically
unsound.”' ”' In truth, the federal government concerns itself with legislating many
‘family issues,’ and only selectively adheres to this kind of federalist application. Adler
reasons:
Proponents of the liberal model might contend about some family matter which
receives federal attention, “it’s not family law, it’s taxation” or “it’s not a domestic
relations case, it’s a tort” or “it’s not like most family litigation, it involves the
constitutional right to privacy.” These areas of family law are exceptionalized
because they implicate rights or the market or some other aspect of the public sphere
from which family is supposed to be our refuge. As it turns out, however, this
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[incoherent] vision of family . . . also provides an unsound basis for the role against
102
federal governance; that is, the ideal is a falsehood, in theory and in reality.
From health care initiatives to poverty definitions to recent talk of a constitutional
amendment to ban same-sex marriages, exceptions to the federal ‘hands-off approach to
the family abound.'”’ While federalism is indeed a “dynamic system, expressed in
institutional relationships that evolve in history,”'”"' the Commerce Clause itself has
arguably, like ‘public’ and ‘private,’ become an ambiguous, transformable conception.
Nonetheless, this ambiguity stems less from an inherently ‘rootless and malleable’
standard as Justice Thomas puts forth, and more from the Court’s selective application of
the standard as Justice Breyer argues.
Still, one might ask, are there not conceptual dangers in collapsing ‘economic/
noneconomic’ and ‘national/local’ distinctions as I have done here? While it may indeed
be true that “any conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an ultimate commercial
origin or consequence,”' ”’ I do not mean to suggest an interpretation that imposes no
limits whatsoever on Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. As I have stated,
when arguing within the normative framework of constitutionality, questions pertaining
to causal activities do not necessarily address their effects on interstate commerce, and
thus do not frame the relevant argument. However, even if we were to suspend this
framework and suppose that the conditions of ‘economic’ and ‘truly national’ activity are
argumentatively pertinent, flaws in the majority’s reasoning persist. The distinctions I
have elaborated here frame continua of meaning, not rigid dualisms— and continua can
have the nasty effect of making fallacious slippery slope arguments seem plausible.'””
The Court’s ruling in Morrison is rife with slippery slope argumentation that generally
posits: If Congress is empowered to legislate gender-motivated violence, then Congress is
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empowered to legislate anything. Several of the considerations discussed above—among
them, the careful, narrow crafting of the Title III legislation—effectively call such a
claim into question. Moreover, I suggest that when reasoning is predicated upon
discerning between opposing concepts with very mutable boundaries and historically
important political import (e.g., ‘public/private,’ ‘economic/noneconomic’), the sound
approach examines and tries to account for such complexities. The Court’s Morrison
decision is logically weak in that it abandons such an approach in favor of arbitrarily
imposing rigid, dualistic constructs.
The Court’s reasoning in rejecting the Fourteenth Amendment basis for Title III is
also arguably flawed. The majority opinion holds that Section 5 of this provision only
grants Congress the authority to regulate ‘state action’ and not ‘the action of private
persons.’ The federalist underpinnings of this rationale claim that abandoning this state
action requirement would in effect grant Congress unauthorized general police powers.
Here again, the Court’s reasoning turns on yet another formulation of the ‘public/private’
distinction, in this case a distinction between ‘state actors’ and ‘private actors.’ This
distinction, because it is more clearly legally defined, is perhaps less ambiguous than the
‘economic/noneconomic’ and ‘national/local’ distinctions. However, the discursive
function of ‘private actors’ readily extends into other meanings. For example, the New
York Times reports, Rosman argued the Fourteenth Amendment “could not be a basis for
a law that applies to private behavior” because it “governs only official action.”'”’
Given that the argument is about the constitutional status of a law that applies to
domestic violence, in this context, ‘private behavior’ and ‘domestic violence’ rhetorically
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align. In another example, Ann Coulter, refers to VAWA (as a whole) as “some crazy
overreaching law enacted by Congress that regulated wholly private conduct.”' ”*
In any case, the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment remains a
contentious point of debate. Recall that Section I specifically addresses state action—
that is, “No state shall make or enforce any law . . . nor shall any state deprive . . . nor
deny . . . ” Section 5 makes no such specification, but simply grants Congress the “power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation” the provisions of the Amendment. While the
Morrison decision “conceive[s] of the legitimacy of Section 5 power as ancillary to
judicial authority to enforce Section 1,”' ”” Post and Siegel argue that this approach
“misconceives how the constitutional meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is
established.”' ' ”
As I have discussed, the Court’s ‘state action’ reasoning is predicated largely on the
1883 Harris and the Civil Rights Cases. Yet neither case is explicitly prohibitive of
Congress’s regulation of private actors. As Post and Siegel explain:
Although both Harris and the Civil Rights Cases insist that Section 5 legislation must
be “corrective of [a] constitutional wrong committed by the States,” neither opinion
purports to impose a restriction on Section 5 legislation that is otherwise properly
remedial. They are each fully consistent with federal regulation of private parties, so
long as that regulation is properly “corrective,” which is to say “adapted to counteract
and redress the operation of prohibited State laws or proceedings of State officers.”'"
In Morrison, the ‘constitutional wrong committed by the states’ is gender-based
discrimination in state enforcement of violent crimes like rape, stalking, and domestic
violence. Overwhelming evidence from the congressional hearings suggests that state
actors were not fully prosecuting these crimes, in part because of pervasive stereotypes
about women and the family."’ Under state law, women were not receiving equal
protection from assault. Title III was ‘properly corrective’ in that in provided an
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alternate, federal forum by which victims and survivors of violent, gender-motivated
assault could seek justice. Such a remedy seems especially ‘proper’ when viewed in the
tradition of civil rights law. As Nourse states, “[N]o civil rights remedy directly
mandates that a state change its legal rules or practices. Indeed, all civil rights laws
proceed by a kind of indirection, allowing individuals to bring to light the prejudice that
has left them unprotected by official sources.”" ’ With these considerations in mind, it is
not surprising that both Harris and Civil Rights Cases resulted in restrictions to existing
civil rights law.
That the Court defends its reliance on these cases with claims of stare decisis—their
‘length of time on the books’ and the 1883 Court’s familiarity with the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment— seems almost laughable. One must question, is it wise to
decide an anti-discrimination case in the year 2000 with precedents that rely on latenineteenth-century ‘familiarities’ as a touchstone? Since that time, “the landscape of
federalism ha[s] been fundamentally altered.”""* The Court acknowledges its
“interpretation o f the Commerce Clause has changed as our Nation has developed.”" ’
Why does it construe the Fourteenth Amendment so much more immutably? More
specifically, why does the Court circumscribe the major changes in civil rights law that
evolved during the 1960s? After all, by this time“[t]he struggle against discrimination by
private actors had become a legitimate end of our federal government.”" ” For decades,
common public understanding has ascribed a federal role to prohibiting discrimination.
As Post and Siegel point out, the Morrison decision fails to engage this understanding."’
Even the Court’s assertion that Title III fails the congruence and proportionality test
set forth in Boerne is logically problematic because the application of the test in Morrison
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differs conceptually from its use in Boeme. "* In Boerne, the Court is concerned with
drawing the distinction between “measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional
actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law.”" ” Toward
making such discernments, the Court asks if “a congruence and proportionality [exists]
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”” ” In
other words, the test aims to determine whether the legislative remedy reflects an actual
attempt to enforce constitutional rights.” * In Morrison, the Court holds that Title III does
not meet the conditions of the proportionality test. But in enacting Title III, unlike the
legislation which was evaluated in Boeme, Congress was clearly not attempting to
“substantively reinterpret” the Constitution.*” As such, according to the standards set
out in Boeme, Congress ought to be granted “wide latitude” in legislating remedies that
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
From the pre-enactment phase of VAWA through the Morrison ruling. Title Ill’s
journey raises important normative questions about the institutional relationship between
Congress and the courts. Congressional findings established the need for a legislative
remedy for unconstitutional judicial action. Women were not obtaining equal protection
in the courts. In a sense, VAWA correctively slapped the courts’ wrist.'” The Supreme
Court, in turn, threw out the law’s “major attempt to change the legal terms in which we
understand [violence against women] - the civil rights remedy.”' ” While a ‘presumption
of constitutionality’ is acknowledged in the majority opinion, one must question the
extent to which the Court is merely paying lip service to this principle. Further, Senator
Biden has argued that with the long record preceding VAWA’s enactment, the Court is
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not constitutionally authorized to overium Title III.” ’ That some maintain Morrison was
really about Congress and the Court competing for power is not surprising.” ”
How these power relations between the two branches play out in Morrison is cause
for great concern, which is reflected among the many legal scholars whose am id curiae
brief warns, “[T]he Court must take care not to initiate a new era of judicial secondguessing.”” ’ Moreover, Post and Siegel question “the court-centered model of
constitutional interpretations” of Morrison and other recent Court decisions.” * The
strong empirical evidence assembled by Congress further validates such protests. If the
state judiciary has problems with systemic gender bias, can we not assume that this
problem likely persists at the federal level as well? Might the congressional evidence
extend to support the claim that the Court wielded too much power in overturning this
legislation? “At stake . . . is the survival of the very institutional ecology in which social
and legal understandings o f equality have provoked, inspired, and shaped each other over
the last four decades.”” ” Not only is Morrison hugely relevant to the uncertain future of
federal anti-discrimination law,” ” it also undermines the democratic principles that give
rise to the separation of powers as laid out in the Constitution.” '
Competing normative claims about the intra-govemmental distributions of “the power
surrendered by the people”' ” —be they focused on the separation of powers or the
balance of powers—dominate the Court’s reasoning in Morrison, as well as much of the
legal discourse surrounding the case. While the judiciary is so occupied with its
federalist “distrus[t] of power,”' ” however, its arguments fail to address the very abuses
of power that VAWA sought to remedy. As Siegel puts it, “[T]he issue of gender bias
that prompted VAWA’s enactment recedes from view, and sexualized assault appears as
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a problem concerning ‘family matters.’”” "* The judiciary focus on federalism obscures
the purpose of the Title III legislation, and thus functions to maintain existing social
status arrangements.*” As I have discussed, much of the Morrison Court’s reasoning,
albeit expressed in modernized federalist discourse, pivots on ‘public/private’
classifications.*’” That it inheres in privacy rationale dating to the nineteenth century
makes such logic seem plausible. For victims of gender-motivated assault, the Court’s
decision parallels the ‘hands-off approach of explicit privacy doctrine. What had been a
widespread policy of state nonintervention grounded in ‘family privacy’ concerns,
transformed as federalist doctrine that rendered the United States powerless to provide a
civil remedy. In each context, judicial actors make claims of insufficient authority, and
effectively uphold existing status relations. Ultimately, this shifting application of
‘public/private’ reasoning, while yielding some positive reform, results in continued
injustice for victims and survivors of domestic violence.

164

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Notes
*By ‘privacy rationale’ I refer to the framing of domestic violence as a private matter to
serve as justification for the widespread informal immunity granted to violent husbands.
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”Xhe hearings also covered related crimes, such as acquaintance rape and stalking, though
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’See “Women and Violence,” Senate Hearings 101-939, pt. 2 (1990), 83-181.
*Senate Hearings, 90.
”Senate Hearings, 163-164.
’^Victoria F. Nourse, “The Violence Against Women Act: A Legislative History,” in
Violence Against Women (West Group, June 1997), 13.
**Throughout the Senate Hearings, as was the commonly the case at during the early
1990s, ‘domestic violence’ is conflated with ‘violence in the home’. While the conflation
persists, since that time, that domestic violence extends beyond the boundaries of the
home has become more widely acknowledged. I shall discuss this further later in the
chapter.
*’Reva B. Siegel, “‘The Rule of Love’: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,” Yale
Law Journal 106 (June 1996), 2195.
*’Siegel, 2196.
*"*This section of Title III states, “A person . . . who commits a crime of violence
motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right [to be free from such
violence] shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other
relief as a court may deem appropriate.” (§ 13981(c).)
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officers of the states, also opposed the legislation on federalist grounds, as I discuss
below.
^^Siegel, 2199, citing Crimes o f Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights o f the House Comm, on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1993) (quoting Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, Sept. 23-24, 1991, at Asheville, North Carolina).
^^Nourse, “Legislative History,” 20.
13981(d)(1). The legislation also further specifies ‘crime of violence.’ The phrase
“because of gender or on the basis of gender” was added in 1991. (Nourse, “Legislative
History,” 20.) The stipulation regarding the crimes being “due, at least in part, to an
animus based on the victim's gender” was added later, when Senators Biden and Hatch
together made revisions. (Nourse, “Legislative History,” 36.)
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^^Nourse, “Legislative History,” 26.
^^Nourse, “Legislative History,” 26, citing the official position of the Conference of Chief
Justices as reprinted in 1991 Senate Hearings 102-369, at 314-17.
^^Frazee, 45.
^^Siegel, 2199, citing William Rehnquist, “Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the
Federal Judiciary,” Third Branch, Jan. 1992, at 1, 3. Rehnquist also voiced opposition to
the new federal crimes defined in the legislation. (Nourse, “Legislative History,” 27.)
^^Frazee, 45. This author also suggests that the federal judiciary’s open opposition to
Title 111 prior to its passage raises ethical questions concerning judicial policy process,
noting, “Judges are not normally in the habit of commenting on legislation they might
someday enforce.”
^^Nourse, “Legislative History,” 24.
^^See, for example, Jenness and Rachelle Brooks, “Feminists Negotiate the Legislative
Branch: The Violence Against Women Act,” in Feminists Negotiate the State: The
Politics o f Domestic Violence, ed. Cynthia R. Daniels (Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, 1997), 65-82.
^^Nourse, “Legislative History,” 18. Senator Bob Dole also criticized the civil rights
remedy in VAWA. (Nourse, “Legislative Hearings,” 42.)
^^Nourse, “Legislative History,” 27.
^"^Nourse, “Legislative History,” 28, citing 1992 House Hearings at 11 (quoting S Rep No
197, at 48).
^^Nourse, “Legislative History,” 28, citing 1992 House Hearings at 11,31.
^^ourse, “Legislative History,” 33. The compromise bill also resulted in changes to
VAWA’s Title 11.
^^Nourse, “Legislative History,” 35-36.
^^Nourse, “Legislative History,” 34.
^^Nourse, “Legislative History,” 36.
'^‘’See Nourse, “Legislative History,” 37 and Siegel, 2201.
Siegel, 2200, citing Ruth Shalit, “Caught in the Act,” New Republic, July 12, 1993, at
12,14 (quoting Senator Orrin Hatch).
42

Nourse, “Legislative History,” 39.
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Siegel, 2198, citing Crimes o f Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights o f the House Comm, on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1993) (Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Mar. 16, 1993, Washington, D.C.). Chief Justice Rehnquist, however,
continued to oppose Title III.
13981(a). Interestingly, during the Congressional hearings, one witness also
suggested the privileges and immunities clause and the Thirteenth Amendment as
grounds for Title III. (Nourse, “Legislative History,” 25.)
"^^Congress enacted VAWA in September 1994. The case background information
presented here is also summarized in; United States v. Morrsion, Syllabus; NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund (NOW LDEF), “In the Courts: United States v. Morrison,”
[report online] (accessed 2 April 2002) available from: http://www.nowldef.org/html
/courts/analofdec.shtml; Internet; and Michael Richard Dimino, “Yes, Virginia (Tech),
Our Government Is One of Limited Powers,” Harvard Journal o f Law & Public Policy,
Volume 24; Issue 3 (Summer 2001), 895-920; Deborah M. Weissman, “Gender-based
Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between ‘the Truly National and the Truly Local’,”
Boston College Law Review 5, no. 42 [article online] (September 2001 accessed 13 April
2002) available from http://infoeagle.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/joumals/bclawr/
42_5/02_TXT.htm; Internet, 1081-1160; and National Public Radio, “Supreme Court
Reviews Congress’ Rulings on Age Discrimination and States Rights,” All Things
Considered [report online] (January, 11, 2000 accessed 17 January 2004) available from
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/vawOO/newsaccounts.html; Internet.
"^^Margaret A. Cain, “The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women Act: Its
Legacy and Future,” Tulsa Law Journal 34 (Winter 1999), 393.
^’Cain, 393.
After the first hearing, Virginia Tech informed Brzonkala that a second hearing was
necessary because Morrison had threatened to legally challenge the first hearing on
grounds that the Sexual Assault Policy under which he was tried had not been widely
circulated to students. The school told her that they had been in error in prosecuting her
complaint under the Sexual Assault Policy and would conduct a second hearing under the
pre-existing Abusive Conduct Policy. With this second hearing, the record of Morrison’s
offense was, with no explanation, changed from ‘sexual assault’ to ‘using abusive
language.’” Charges against Crawford were dismissed due to lack of evidence.
'^^Cain, 393.
^"Cain, 393.
^*The school also required Morrison to attend a one-hour educational session with an
equal opportunity/affirmative action compliance officer.
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^^Brzonkala also filed suit against Virginia Tech under Title IX claims of sex
discrimination. These claims were later settled by the parties.
^^Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 935 F. Supp 772 (W.D. Va. 1996).
^"^Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
^^Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999).
^^My account of the argument draws largely from Tony Mauro, “States’ Rights Triumph
in Supreme Court Kimel Decision, Oral VAWA Argument,” The Legal Intelligencer
[report online] (January 12, 2000 accessed 31 January 2004) available from
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/vawOO/newsaccoimts.html; Internet; National Public Radio,
“Supreme Court Reviews,” and Linda Greenhouse, “Justices Cool to Law Protecting
Women,” The New York Times [report online] (January 12,2000 accessed 31 January
2004) available from http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/vawOO/newsaccounts.html; Internet,
A18.
^ Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 US 62, 67 (2000).
^^Mauro, “States’ Rights Triumph.”
^^One state, Alabama, filed a brief asking the Court to find Title 111 unconstitutional.
^%lational Public Radio, “Supreme Court Reviews.”
^'National Public Radio, “Supreme Court Reviews.”
^^National Public Radio, “Supreme Court Reviews.”
^^National Public Radio, “Supreme Court Reviews.”
^National Public Radio, “Supreme Court Reviews.”
^^The Court opinions 1 discuss here reference United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) [case online] (accessed 17 January 2004) available from http://supct.law.comell.
edu/supct/html/99-5 .ZD.html; Internet. Chief Justice William Rehnquist authored the
Court’s majority opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurrence. Justice David
H. Souter dissented, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice
Stephen G. Breyer. Justice Breyer also dissented, joined by Justice Stevens, and partially
(as to Part 1—A) joined by Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg.
^^United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) [case online] (accessed 17 January 2004)
available from http://supct.law.comell.edu/supct/html/93-1260.ZS.html; Internet. Lopez
overturned the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 on the grounds that Congress had
acted outside the scope of its authority under the Commerce Clause. The Court’s mling
states, “The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity
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that might, through repetition elsewhere, have such a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.”
^^The other two include that Congress may regulate “the use of the channels of interstate
commerce” and “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce.”
^^United States v. Morrison, 529U.S. 598 (2000), C.J. Rehnquist, 11.
^^United States v. Morrison, 529U.S. 598 (2000), C.J. Rehnquist, 13.
™United States v. Morrison, 529U.S. 598 (2000), C.J. Rehnquist, 18.
^'united States v. Morrison, 529U.S. 598 (2000), C.J. Rehnquist, 18.
^^United States Constitution, Amendment XIV [document online] (accessed 17 January
2004) available from http://www.law.comell.edu/constitution/constitution.amendmentxiv
.html; Intemet.
^^United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), C.J. Rehnquist, 19-23.
’^Dimino, 897.
^^United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
’^Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). According to Erwin Chemerinsky, in the Civil
Rights Cases, “the Court suggested that slavery was a thing of the past and that there was
little need for civil rights legislation to protect blacks.” (Erwin Chemerinsky,
Consitutional Law: Principles and Policies, 2d. ed. (New York: Aspen Law and
Business, 2002), 283.)
^’United States v. Morrison, “Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners,” Amy Schulman, Counsel of Record, 24.
’^United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), C.J. Rehnquist, 22.
’^United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), C.J. Rehnquist, 22.
^‘’City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). This decision states, “There must be a
congmence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become
substantive in operation and effect.”
^'United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), C.J. Rehnquist, 28.
Justice Breyer addresses this point explicitly, stating, “Despite my doubts about the
majority’s §5 reasoning, 1 need not, and do not, answer the §5 question, which 1 would
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leave for more thorough analysis if necessary on another occasion. Rather, in my view,
the Commerce Clause provides an adequate basis for the statute before us.”
^^Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. I l l (1942).
^''United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), J. Souter, 9.
*^United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), J. Souter, 10.
^^Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
Justice Souter also notes ihsA Heart o f Atlanta “reaffirmed the cumulative effects and
rational basis features of the substantial effects test.”
^^United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), J. Thomas, 1.
^^United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), J. Thomas, 1.
^‘^Offering an example of a mugger who mugs for money. Justice Breyer questions,
“Would evidence that desire for economic domination underlies many brutal crimes
against women save the present statute?” He also points out that the Court allows
Congress to regulate “‘noneconomic’ activity taking place at economic establishments”
and questions, “[C]an Congress save the present law by including it, or much of it, in a
broader ‘Safe Transport’ or ‘Workplace Safety’ act?”
^'United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), J. Breyer, 6.
^^United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), J. Breyer, 8.
use the term ‘transformation’ here in the sense that Siegel employs it in characterizing
what she calls ‘transformation through preservation.’
^"^Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, “Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimelf The Yale Law Journal 110,
no. 44 (2000), 450.
^^In addition to Rosman’s argument in Morrison, such claims are also reflected in United
States V. Morrison, Statement of Record of Amicus Curiae, Independent Women’s Forum
[report online] (12/31/1999, accessed 1 February 2004) available from http://www.iwf.
org/initiatives/init_print. asp?ArticlelD=399; Intemet.
employ the term ‘families’ here very loosely, to include a vast array of intimate,
relational cohabitation.
^^For a range of analyses supporting such claims, see Lourdes Beneria and Catharine R.
Stimpson, eds.. Women, Households and the Economy (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 1987).
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^*For a summary of economic evidence, see “Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioners,” 3.
Again, all sorts of activity, whether classified as ‘economic’ or ‘noneconomic,’ affect
interstate commerce, which is really the constitutionally relevant matter here.
’°®Libby S. Adler, “Federalism and Family,” Columbia Journal o f Gender and Law 8, no.
2 (1999), 254.
'"'Adler, 253.
'"^Adler, 254.
'"^For examples of such exceptions, see Adler. For a discussion of exceptions to privacy
rights made in such contexts as those based on race and class, see Kathleen J. Ferraro,
“The Dance of Dependency: A Genealogy of Domestic Violence Discourse,” Hypatia A Journal o f Feminist Philosophy 11, no. 4 (Fall 1996), 77-91.
'""'Post and Siegel, 485. Here, these authors discuss changes the Court’s federalist stance
toward the regulation of employment: “Today, the employment relationship, which the
Court once confidently declared beyond Congress’s power to regulate, now appears to us
as quintessentially a sphere of ‘national’ regulatory concern.”
'"^United States v. Morrison.
'"^David A. Conway and Ronald Munson, The Elements o f Reasoning (Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth/Thomas Learning, 2000), 147. As these authors state, “The mistaken idea
behind the slippery slope fallacy is that when there is little or no significant difference
between adjacent points on a continuum, then there is no important difference between
even widely separated points on the continuum.”
107 ,

Greenhouse, A18. [Emphasis added.]

'"*Ann Coulter, “Depends on What the Meaning of'State' Is,” Human Events 56, no. 20
(June 2, 2000), 6. Coulter is not alone in her conflation of Title 111 and VAWA as a
whole. Jeremy Rabkin, for example, takes such confusion several steps further, conflating
VAWA with Title 111, but also with the legislation, domestic violence awareness and the
Clinton administration in an attempt to denounce all three. Rabkin goes on to . . . suggest
that Brzonkala really “wanted sex” and only afterward decided to “cry rape.” (Jeremy
Rabkin, “Federalism vs. Feminism,” American Spectator 32, no. 12 (December
1999/January 2000), 60.
'"^Post and Siegel, 445.
""Post and Siegel, 445-446.
Ill

Post and Siegel, 476, citing Civil Rights Cases 109 U.S. at 18, 14.
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"^“Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence,” Harvard Law
Review 106, no. 1498, Section IV A, 1552-1556 [excerpt online] (May 1993, accessed 31
January 2004) available from http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/vawOO/developments.html;
Intemet.
'"Nourse, “Legislative History,” 13-14.
'"P ost and Siegel, 496.
"^United States v. Morrison.
""Post and Siegel, 497.
" ’Post and Siegel, 502.
"*Post and Siegel, 477.
""“Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,” 25, citing City o f Boeme
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).

V.

'^"“Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,” 25, citing City ofBoerne
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997

V.

'^ '“Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,” 26.
'^^“Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,” 26. The Court has in the
past held that gender discrimination can violate the equal protection clause.
'^^In addition to the civil rights remedy, VAWA prescribed “education and training for
judges and court personnel” at the state and federal levels, 42 U.S.C. § 13991-4, 14001-2
[online] (accessed 17 January 2004) available from http://www4.law.comell.edu/uscode
/42/ch 136schlllpD.html.html; Intemet. For an argument advocating a multi-pronged
strategy for improving the judicial response to domestic violence, see Lynn Hecht
Schafran, “There’s No Accounting for Judges,” Albany Law Review 58, no. 1063 [report
online] (1995, accessed 31 January 2004) available from http://cyber.law.harvard.edu
/vawOO/schafran.html; Intemet.
'^"'Nourse, "Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet,” 3.
125

National Public Radio, “Supreme Court Reviews.”

126

Elizabeth A. Palmer, “High Court Further Circumscribes Congress’ Power in Ruling
on Violence Against Women Act,” CQ Weekly 58, no. 21 (May 20, 2000), 1188.
'^’“Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,” 4.
'^^Post and Siegel, 442.
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""Post and Siegel, 446.
""This is a central conclusion made by Post and Siegel, who also address these concerns
as they arise in Kimel.
"'T h e legislative branch is arguably the most closely in touch with the interests and
concerns of citizens. The passage of VAWA reflected a growing national recognition of
domestic violence as a problem gender-based discrimination; see Martha Matthews,
“Addressing the Effects of Domestic Violence on Children,” Youth Law News 19, no. 4
(July-August, 1998), 2.
'^’james Madison, Federalist No. 51 [document online] (Wednesday, February 6, 1788,
accessed 1 February 2004) available from http://federalistpapers.com/federalist51.html;
Intemet.
'^^Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 169 F.3d 820, 825 (4th Cir. 1999). The
majority opinion of this case, authored by Judge Luttig, begins, “We the People,
distmstful of power, and believing that government limited and dispersed protects
freedom best, provided that our federal government...”
134 ,

Siegel, 2202.

135

For another argument supporting this claim, see Catherine A. MacKinnon, “Disputing
Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison," Harvard Law Review 114, no. 1
(November 2000), 135-177. Joyce Gelb and Marian Lief Palley offer additional insights
into the mechanisms of status regime enforcement. These authors suggest that a policy
change is more likely to succeed if it is perceived as dealing with ‘role equity’ as opposed
to ‘role change’ for women. They define role equity “in terms of providing women
political and economic opportunities commensurate with those of men.” Role change
“implies a basic alteration of the distribution of sex roles in society” and “involves
movement away from women’s primary role as mother, wife and housekeeper,
economically dependent on her husband toward an independent and self-reliant
individual.” (Joyce Gelb and Marian Lief Palley, “Women and Interest Group Politics: A
Comparative Analysis of Federal Decision-Making,” The Journal o f Politics 41, no. 2
(1979), 362-392.)
136

Here again, I borrow ‘discourse modernization’ from Siegel’s analysis.
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CHAPTER 5

NORMATIVE RENDERINGS OF ‘PUBLIC’ AND ‘PRIVATE’ AND
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS
Renderings of ‘public’ and ‘private’ and the distinctions drawn between these
concepts encompass a vast range of meaning and normative claims-making. The
examination of various public/private distinctions laid out in the preceding chapters
yields insight into domestic violence policymaking and raises a host of normative
questions about liberal democratic governance. Thus far, I have aimed to integrate a
range of disciplinary approaches and analytic perspectives in the hope that such an
undertaking would enable a new synthesis of information potentially useful to domestic
violence policy formulation.
Chapters 2 and 3 are similar in that each presents social/historical accounts of
Western conceptions of ‘public’ and ‘private’—yet each paints a unique picture. While
in many regards the accounts overlap, at times they seem to tell different stories
altogether. Interweaving Habermas’s (masculinist) interpretation o f ‘public’ and
‘private’ with a (feminist) social/historical account of domestic violence policy gives rise
to some interesting contrasts. For one, the rise of nation-states in Europe yielded both a
bourgeois public sphere and public displays of state authority manifested through the
mass execution of women. In this context, charges of ‘gender-blindness ’ from
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Habermas’s feminist critics arguably take on new meaning. In addition, what Habermas
characterizes as a “tendency toward a mutual infiltration of the public and private
spheres”' in the nineteenth century may seem to contradict the contemporaneous
public/private split of market and household so often addressed in feminist discourse.
Such a contradiction is, of course, illusory: the Habermasian ‘mutual infiltration’ and the
market/household split rely on very different meanings of ‘public’ and ‘private.’ Still,
such contrasts in emphasis are generally informative—-and specifically pertinent to
domestic violence policymaking insofar as they might suggest differing normative
conclusions.
Later in Chapter 3 and in Chapter 4, my focus turns to more recent events of the late
twentieth century. Beginning in the 1970s, in certain regards, the widespread social and
legal interpretations of domestic violence as a ‘private’ phenomenon have been
challenged. Enactment of the Violence Against Women Act^ (VAWA) in 1994
represented an unprecedented change in the federal response to intimate violence. This
holds true despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Morrison^ which
overturned VAWA’s landmark civil rights remedy. Nevertheless, domestic violence
persists as a complex and consequential social problem, as I argue in Chapter 1. In some
ways, the entrenched ideas that have served historically to sanction domestic violence
endure in the form of patriarchal social values and shared understandings of domestic
violence as ‘private.’ At the same time, however, the state’s longstanding policy of
nonintervention has largely given way to aggressive arrest and prosecution policies. This
shift, in turn, has given rise to a new set of policy-related concerns.

176

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

While acknowledging that I have likely raised more questions than I could hope to
answer here, in this final chapter, I aim to draw some meaningful conclusions from the
analyses laid out in the previous chapters. I begin by examining how disputes over
public/private boundaries are employed to both challenge and defend existing status
relations. Structured power relations are a recurring theme in these discussions in at least
two important regards. First, as innumerable factors suggest, systemic power disparities
and differential access to social resources exist between men and women. Such relations
are rooted in traditions of male domination, yet are also mutable and rather complex—as
the histories of witchcraft and normative domesticity and intimate partner violence (to
name a few) suggest. Moreover, gendered power relations are further complicated by the
fact that they can play out (or not) very differently at more individualized levels of
analysis and within different social contexts and institutions. With an eye toward how
public/private distinctions serve to fi’ame these relations in matters of domestic violence,
I discuss how such violence tends to occur within culturally perceived frameworks of
‘love,’ such as the institution of marriage.
1 conclude this thesis by making prescriptive recommendations for domestic violence
policy directions. These recommendations are largely grounded in the normative claims I
put forth about public/private distinctions. I argue that such distinctions, when invoked
as justification for policy measures, always ought to be further specified. I offer
considerations toward departing from the basic liberal public/private model, and examine
some of the problems with confining social attitudes and practices to legal normative
frameworks. Further, I reconcile my overall argument against framing domestic violence
as ‘private’ with claims about the importance of privacy. Finally, I critically examine the
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criminalization of domestic violence, and advocate a holistic approach to domestic
violence prevention, intervention and recovery. Policy initiatives with these ends ought
to articulate an emancipatory approach that is informed by the real-life needs and
experiences of victims— and that grants victims and survivors of domestic violence
greater agency and control over their lives.

Obfuscatory Power o f ‘Public/Private’: Taking
a ‘Harder, More Critical Look’
The previous chapters illustrate that conceptions o f ‘public’ and ‘private’ have been
used throughout history to both challenge and maintain systemic power relations. The
terms have been rhetorically powerful in these regards largely because they are mutable,
value-laden, and seemingly dichotomous, with contestable boundaries. Moreover, at a
fundamental level, distinctions between the two concepts lie at the definitional bounds of
individuals and communities,'' and thus deeply inform cultural ideologies about shared
governance. Since liberalist ideologies supplanted monarchal rule, the concepts have
become increasingly relevant to Western political philosophy. Often more effective than
explicit coercion, hegemonic renderings o f ‘public’ and ‘private’ function to control what
counts as ‘political,’ and thus what policy issues are deemed to fall within the purview of
state authority. Along similar lines, Anita Allen aptly characterizes ‘public’ and ‘private’
as “transformable conceptions of how power ought to be allocated.”^ As we see in
United States v. Morrison, these concepts are also invoked to delimit boundaries of
institutional authority within the state. In all their influence, the discursive functions of
‘public’ and ‘private’ tend to be rather deceptive. In liberalist frameworks, for example.
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‘privacy rights’ suggest restrictions on the state’s reach into the family—but as we have
seen, this framework is not at all consistently applied in different juridical contexts.
Thus, public/private distinctions, while powerful, have little to do with setting actual
limits on state power. However, they do have the strong potential to obfuscate
institutionalized power relations.
‘Preservation through Transformation ’ - Historical Patterns
In the historical analysis of such power relations put forth in this thesis, important
patterns emerge. Many of these patterns reflect Reva Siegel’s ‘preservation through
transformation’ model, in which discourse initially employed to challenge existing status
relations shifts and later functions to uphold these relations. For example, rationalist
claims about critical reasoning and legal norms championed by liberalists centuries ago
were once used to defy monarchal authority. As I discuss in Chapter 2, such philosophies
were thought to confront the very notion of domination. Of course, history shows that
this did not happen. The glorified rationalism of such philosophies, once portrayed as
emancipatory, gave rise to new forms of oppression—as seen, for example, in the
‘scientific’ discourse that pathologizes women (and other socially marginalized groups)
and relegates them to an inherently inferior status. At the same time, first-wave feminists
were mainly successful insofar as they drew upon a liberalist ideology that was largely
never intended to include women."
While this shift subverted explicit uses of force for more ‘democratic’ hegemony—
and indeed achieved some significant reforms— structured power relations were largely
maintained. This is evident in the case of intimate violence, as an abandonment of legal
chastisement gave rise to state nonintervention grounded in ‘privacy rationale.’’ Second
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wave feminist challenges to ‘privacy rationale’ emerged in part from a legal discourse of
anti-discrimination and equal opportunity. Such latter efforts resulted in changes to
existing laws to word them in gender-neutral language. The legal language of what had
once been explicitly regulated on the basis of sex was changed to accommodate
discrimination concerns. Like chastisement’s decline, this shift carried some negative
consequences for those working for such reform. For one, the history of sex-based
regulation was soon treated as though it never happened that way. In addition, the new
language served to obscure the very power relations that activists had sought to remedy.
As Iris Young points out:
A gender-neutral theory of family values ignores the fact that, in the current gender
structure, stable marriage means that women are often dependent on men and often
suffer power inequality and various degrees of domination by men both in and
outside the home.*
In Morrison, we see evidence of Title Ill’s gender-neutral language turning against the
law’s intentions, as well as ftxrther transformation of ‘privacy rationale’ into a discourse
of federalism.
‘Public ’ and ‘Private ’ - The Need to Further Specify
Historical patterns, along with the vast political potential of normative ‘public’ and
‘private’ renderings, suggest that when these concepts are invoked as part of a
justificatory policy rationale, they ought to be well specified. In other words, we ought
reject normative policy arguments that fail to adequately specify these terms, or that
logically build upon an illusively rigid public/private model. When inferentially relying
on ‘public’ and ‘private’ claims, the sound argument involves acknowledging the
inherent mutability of the terms, and striving for clarity and specificity." In the words of
Nancy Fraser:
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In general, critical theory needs to take a harder, more critical look at the terms
‘private’ and ‘public.’ These terms, after all, are not simply straightforward
designations of societal spheres; they are cultural classifications and rhetorical labels.
In political discourse they are powerful terms frequently deployed to delegitimate
some interests, views, and topics and to valorize others.*"
So long as they are effective in such deployment, renderings of these terms will continue
to obscure entrenched and unjust power relations. Thus, truly emancipatory aims call for
the explication of how this takes place, for the analytical unmasking of public/private
distinctions, so as to bring to light their obfuscatory functions. Among the benefits of
such an approach are strengthened empirical understandings of oppressive systems of
power, and improved normative arguments and strategies toward positive social change."
Inherent problems with the dominant liberalist model of the public/private split also
call for a ‘harder, more critical look’ at ‘public’ and ‘private.’ In several regards, this
model does not reflect empirical realities. For one, it is built upon the premises of
‘private’ markets and ‘free trade.’ However, the state has regulated markets for some
time, and arguably, ‘free trade’ is hardly ‘free’ given that vast power differentials at work
in global markets exert considerable influence in state policymaking.*^ In a different (but
related) regard, the ideals of democratic citizenship espoused in constitutional
frameworks are increasingly abandoned for such practices as direct marketing to voters.
As one journalist puts it, “What candidates know about voters” has become more crucial
in determining elections than “what voters know about candidates.”*^ Moreover,
constitutional models of citizenship are also structurally unsound in that historically they
have excluded women (and other socialized marginalized groups). As Judith Shklar
states, “The equality of political rights, which is the first mark of American citizenship,
was proclaimed in the accepted presence of its absolute denial.”*'* At the very least, this
contradiction raises questions as to whether these normative legal frameworks are
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structurally even capable of ameliorating certain social problems. Luce Irigaray, for
example, speaks to such questions in her discussions on the limitations of existing legal
frameworks:
I do not think that [sexed civil rights] can be defined in the face of existing civil
codes: for example, by entrusting women juridically with a right to ‘autonomy’ or
‘self-determination’ only. This . . . is rather like granting the daughter subjective
permission with a great national or supranational family built on a patriarchal
model.
A related structural concern arises in liberalist government’s ambiguous relationship to
the family and the household. Taken together, weaknesses in the liberalist model further
suggest the need to develop alternative public/private frameworks. Such an undertaking,
in turn, would have a great deal of relevance for domestic violence policy concerns.
Privacy Rights
Liberal democratic societies thrive on the notion of closed personal and familial
relations, a fact that enables the harms of intimate violence to go undetected in the United
States.’" Indeed, “a whole range of concerns came to be labeled as private and treated as
improper subjects for public debate.”" As we have seen, the selective exclusion of
certain social problems from the domain of state authority has had enormous
ramifications for domestic violence policymaking.’* Wanda Teays states:
One reason domestic violence has been so badly handled legally and socially is that
we have erected walls around the arena where it generally takes place—the home.
That is, the premium placed on rights of privacy means certain actions have fallen
outside the public eye. And we have been reluctant to change that; for to do so has
heen seen as a violation of privacy and of the perceived need to keep government ‘off
our backs’."
Is the answer then to forsake privacy rights and allow no action to ‘fall outside the public
eye’—or what is possibly more, the eye of the state? Certainly not. Serious institutional
restrictions ought to be placed on state surveillance powers.^" Still, it would seem that a
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‘privacy rights’ justification does not suffice in defending a brutal assault or an act of
murder—and that is precisely what domestic violence often involves. As Teays goes on
to point out, “Justice dictates that human rights considerations not be forsaken for the
right of privacy.”^’
So, if at least some ‘private’ issues ought to be considered fair game for normative
public judgment, as matters of social justice, how to draw a line and uphold any kind of
privacy rights at all? Is this not possibly advocating a creepy sort of ‘talk show’
prescription whereby a person’s personal life can be aired for endless public consumption
and judgment? Consistent with the ‘analytical unmasking’ approach described above,
further specifying what is meant by ‘privacy rights’ helps in employing a more
sophisticated moral framework, one that equips us to better draw such distinctions— and
happily, if only in theory, circumvent the dreaded ‘talk show’ scenario.
Elizabeth Schneider, reminding us of the importance of privacy, states, “The
challenge is to develop a right to privacy which is not synonymous with the right to state
noninterference with actions within the family, but which recognizes the affirmative role
privacy can play for battered women.”^^ Anita Allen and Iris Marion Young are two
scholars who have taken on such a challenge. Allen breaks privacy down into three sub
categories: physical, informational, and decisional.^^ The first signifies “freedom from
unwanted physical observation or bodily contact” and is often also associated with the
sanctity of the home. The second implies “the secrecy, confidentiality, or anonymity of
information.” The third, decisional privacy, suggests “the ability to make one’s own
decisions and to act on those decisions, free from governmental or other unwanted
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interference.” Such a breakdown is useful in that it sets out a more specified
understanding of what ‘privacy rights’ can mean.^'*
Perhaps even more useful than this rubric are the arguments advanced by both of
these thinkers claiming that privacy rights ought to be framed in terms of individual
persons. In this regard Young observes, “[PJerhaps the most important defense against
th[e] legitimation of patriarchal power is an insistence that privacy is a value for
individuals, not simply or primarily households.”^^ As battered women routinely
experience violations of privacy rights in each of the regards that Allen outlines. Young’s
observation is revealing. I suggest that this approach to privacy rights embodies the spirit
of Schneider’s challenge, and, more to the point, enables the promotion of such rights for
everyone. While in some contexts the two may be related, the notion of individualized
privacy rights extends well beyond the idea of limitations of state power into the realm of
the family. We can claim that there ought to be limitations to state power, but such a
claim does not embrace the full scope of privacy rights.^"
Love/Hate Considerations
As I have discussed at length, domestic violence is a social issue that has been
especially susceptible to public/private normativity, and challenging notions of domestic
violence as a ‘private’ phenomenon has been a central focus of battered women’s
advocates during recent decades. I have also shown that marital norms and policy
responses to domestic violence have changed over time. Prior to the emergence of
‘privacy rationale’ in the nineteenth century, the state explicitly granted husbands the
prerogative to chastise their wives. In a parallel vein. Western marriage has also
transformed: whereas wives were once regarded as their husbands’ property and legal
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liability, husbands’ explicit dominion transformed into a framework of asking and
giving. 27
•

•

However, in my focus on the concepts ‘public’ and ‘private,’ I do not mean to suggest
that these are the only such factors that powerfully frame domestic violence. While
explication of these terms is crucial and remains a primary focus here, this is of course
only part of the picture. Also important is recognizing that dominant framings of
intimate partnership and marriage are couched in the language of affect. O f course, ideas
about love and marital intimacy often go hand in hand with those of familial privacy.^*
Culturally however, love and marriage are commonly conflated, which can be traced
back to Habermas’s observations about the emergence of the patriarchal conjugal family.
As I discuss in Chapter 2, Habermas claims that the (bourgeois) family emerged in denial
of its economic origins. Thus, “It seemed to be established voluntarily and by free
individuals and to be maintained without coercion; it seemed to rest on the lasting
community of love on the part of two spouses.”^" As a result, the intimate sphere has
been culturally romanticized and falsely idealized.
While most brutal assaults are perceived as a manifestation of animus or hatred,
intimate violence is often committed in the name of love. Violent relationships are
further complicated by the fact that both victims and perpetrators often experience
feelings of love for each other. Understanding violence that is perpetrated among
intimates requires a different set of questions and assumptions than those which underpin
violence between strangers. This becomes especially evident in examining VAWA’s
civil rights remedy. Victoria Nourse astutely characterizes Title Ill’s legal journey as “a
story of the law working against its own language and rhetoric, a law struggling to try to
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change its own understanding of violence against women.”^" While the legislation, with
its gender-animus requirement, was based largely on hate crime statutes, much of
intimate violence simply does not take place within cultural frameworks of hate.
Conflating Coercive Control and Common Couple Violence
In addition to marriage, love is also often conflated with sex, which has its own
relation to social constructions of ‘private.’ Such confusions, in turn, serve to facilitate
conflations between the coercive control and common couple violence models I discuss
in Chapter 1. Recall that coercive control is characterized by confinement, physical
violence, sexual violence, threats, psychological abuse, economic exploitation, and
control of the social life and work life of the victim.^’ Unlike coercive control, incidents
of common couple violence may be sporadic or ‘isolated,’ are unlikely to escalate, are
generally perpetrated at equal rates by women and men, and tend to have minimal impact
on those involved.^^ Because these differences are significant, failure to distinguish
between the two types can serve to misrepresent both. This failure can have the harmful
effect of minimizing the violence, obscuring the social isolation that victims experience,
and perpetuating the stigma and silence surrounding the issue.
Media representations, for example, commonly sensationalize isolated incidents as
‘domestic violence,’ which serves to obscure the frequency and severity of coercive
control. In one recent incident, a celebrity’s wife threw a glass at him in their Las Vegas
hotel room.^^ Cursory evidence does not suggest that this act was representative of a
larger pattern of violence, yet reports highlighted that the woman was arrested on
domestic violence charges. At the same time, research suggests that the media
underreport ‘coercive control’ violence, unless such violence culminates in homicide.
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Such representations serve to minimize the patterns of gendered domination that emerge
within coercive control. Like relegating the problem to the so-called private sphere, this
conflation further serves to depoliticize domestic violence such that it no longer
cognitively registers as violence. When the brutality is minimized in this way, privacy
rights arguments (for state nonintervention) may seem to carry more weight. In addition,
‘privacy’ takes on a different significance in matters of coercive control, as the social
isolation of the victim and the ‘profound attempts to conceal’ the violence are typically
linked to this model. Thus, along with further specifying ‘public’ and ‘private,’ domestic
violence policy discourse should seek avenues for more readily distinguishing between
coercive control and common couple violence, two very different phenomena that often
get lumped under one label.

Considerations of ‘Public/Private’ and the Formulation
of Domestic Violence Policy Prescriptions
Building upon the normative claims I put forth in the preceding section, I conclude
this thesis with a look at how these claims—along with the various analyses undertaken
previous chapters—inform directions for domestic violence policy formulation. New
policy issues have arisen from increased state intervention in domestic violence cases.
Many of my broader normative assertions about ‘public’ and ‘private’ frameworks
suggest the need for new models of public discourse that focus on eradicating domestic
violence. As I argued in Chapter 2, the democratic principles articulated in Habermas’s
model of critical publicity also normatively hold within the context of the family. In
developing such models we ought to continue to work within—but also be willing to step
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outside of—existing juridical frameworks. Effective policy remedies are built on solid
understandings of intimate violence as experienced by victims and survivors, as well as
the systemic factors involved. At the same time, we must seek to better understand how
perpetrators of intimate violence account for and construct their behavior. Holistic
prevention, intervention and recovery services with explicitly emancipatory aims are our
best chance at ameliorating this devastating social problem.
Criminalization o f Domestic Violence Unintended Consequences
By channeling federal resources and national public attention to violence against
women, VAWA has no doubt enabled countless women to escape abusive relationships.
The legislation continues to have influence; the original act has been strengthened and
reauthorized through 2005.^'* As I discuss in Chapter 1, reports suggest that rates of
domestic violence steadily decreased between VAWA’s 1994 enactment and 2001.
Domestic violence homicides also declined during this period, as did the number of
women who kill their intimate partners.^^ This suggests that legislative remedies are
having a positive effect. Since 1996, calls to the National Domestic Violence Hotline
have steadily increased by 133 percent, and presently average about 15,000 per month.^"
Law enforcement agencies have largely abandoned policies of nonintervention, and
several states have adopted mandatory arrest policies as a result of VAWA grant
incentives. Clearly, victims of domestic violence have more places to turn for help, and
the police are much less likely to turn a blind eye to domestic assault than they once
were. At the same time, however, new questions and concerns are being raised about the
criminalization of domestic violence and increased state intervention.
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In many regards, the actual effects of increased state intervention in domestic
violence cases remains unclear. Some are raising concerns about an over-reliance on the
criminal legal system in addressing violence against women, indicating that an
overemphasis on criminal legal remedies has led to an exclusion of prescriptive
alternatives.^’ Criminal legal remedies may be more concerned with prosecuting and
punishing offenders than with ensuring victims’ safety. Moreover, such remedies may
involve harmful consequences for poor women, immigrant women, and women of color.
Studies show that poor men, African American men, and Latinos represent
disproportionately high numbers of domestic violence arrests.^* A lack of trust in the
legal system stemming from institutionalized racism and other structural factors may
prevent battered women of marginalized communities from turning to state actors for
help.
Such concerns are reflected in the current debate over the efficacy of mandatory/
presumptive arrest and aggressive prosecution policies. Those who support such policies
argue that they are an effective deterrent to abusers, and have finally gotten law
enforcement and prosecution officers to at long last take intimate assault seriously.
Cheryl Hanna, for example, claims that aggressive prosecution policies can result in
reduced homicide and recidivism rates, and “communicate a stronger message that
domestic violence will not be tolerated.”^" Another advocate of such policies, Donna
Wills, argues, “We need to be able to say that despite a battered woman's ambivalence,
we did everything within our discretion to reign in the batterer, to protect the victim and
her children, and to stop the abuser.”'*" Wills points out that the scope of domestic
violence extends well beyond its effect on individual victims, and characterizes the
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problem as a public safety issue that affects all of society. She also suggests that giving
victims the discretion to prosecute only allows the perpetrator to further manipulate the
legal system and endanger lives. This claim raises normative questions about specifically
how much and what kinds of discretion victims ought to have in the handling of their
cases.
While Wills makes a good point in depicting domestic violence as a ‘public safety
issue,’ we ought to remember that the victims, and often their children, are by far the
most harmed by such violence. Linda Mills and others who oppose aggressive arrest and
prosecution policies conclude that “battered women are safest—and feel most
respected—when they willingly partner with state actors to investigate and prosecute
domestic violence crimes.”'*’ Such arguments tend to emphasize the importance of
increasing the victim’s agency and ability to control her own life. As a Ms. Foundation
for Women report states, “Unfortunately, when state power intervenes, it often takes
over. Many people who call for assistance end up having no say in the intervention once
the legal system has entered into their lives.”'*^ Some point out that police represent the
‘legitimate’ use of violence, and are largely male.'*^ Others claim that forcing victims to
testify vastly increases chances of escalated violence against them.'*'* Mills emphasizes
battered women’s clinical needs:
Clinically speaking, a battered woman needs a healing response to the intimate abuse,
one that nurtures her strengths and empowers her to act. Mandatory state
interventions, even when sponsored by feminists, not only disregard these clinical
concerns, but also are in danger of replicating the rejection, degradation, terrorization,
social isolation, missocialization, exploitation, emotional unresponsiveness, and close
confinement that are endemic to the abusive relationship.'*^
Thus, the treatment victims of intimate violence receive in the legal system is likened to
the abusive relationship itself.
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Such parallels certainly seem easy to draw in the case of Sharwline Nicholson, whose
boyfriend smashed her face and broke her arm while her son was at school and their hahy
daughter was asleep in the next room."*^ Nicholson arranged for childcare with a trusted
neighbor and sought medical attention at a local New York City hospital. While at the
hospital the next morning, she received word that local authorities had placed her
children in foster care, and charged her with child neglect under an offense called
“engaging in domestic violence.” For Nicholson, the removal of her children was far
more traumatic than the physical assault she endured. It took three weeks for her to get
her children back, and during that time one of them reported being hit by an abusive
foster parent. Nicholson’s experience represented a larger pattern. In a class-action
lawsuit charging violations of the civil rights of Nicholson, nine other mothers in similar
situations, and their children, the judge found that the mothers had been accused of child
neglect “simply for being battered.”
Another result of increased state intervention is that more women are being arrested.
Conservative groups argue that this undermines the claim that the vast majority of
batterers are men, and that women are becoming more aggressive.'*^ Notably, such
arguments aim to deny the role of male power. More likely, women are being arrested at
higher rates for incidents of common couple violence and self-defense.'** According to
the Ms. Foundation report, “Over the years, more battered women are being arrested in
domestic violence situations, even when they act to defend themselves or when their
batterer commits the violence.”'*^ The same report points out that some batterers have
learned to manipulate the system by making false accusations against their partners.^**
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Another contributing factor may be that, with increased public awareness about domestic
violence, women may indeed feel more empowered to fight back.
Among those who support and those who oppose aggressive arrest and prosecution
policies, both sides raise cogent points. So, how are we to reconcile their arguments
toward better informing policy recommendations? By suggesting explicit goals against
which to measure state intervention, Barbara Hart suggests what may be a sound
beginning.^* These goals encompass: safety for battered women and children, stopping
the violence, accountability of perpetrators, challenging perpetrators’ beliefs of
entitlement to batter, and restoration of battered women, including enhancing their
agency. Hart maintains that, while arrest may serve some of these goals, domestic
violence calls for “the employment of multiple, synchronized strategies by the legal
s y ste m .M o re o v e r, she emphasizes that law enforcement officers and other ‘firstresponders’ ought to share these goals:
Without this perspective, first-responders in “mandatory arrest” or “preferred/
presumptive arrest” jurisdictions will devise their own rationale for chosen responses
to domestic violence. If an officer’s perspective is that “women provoke violence” or
“it takes two” or “domestic violence is nuisance behavior,” then that perspective will
shape intervention.^^
Arguably, a crude emphasis on criminalization—or a singular aspect thereof, such as
arrest—does not adequately address the question of shared goals that challenge existing
status relations. Nor does it necessarily make distinctions between coercive control and
common couple violence. Notably, a United States Department of Justice report on the
criminalization of domestic violence puts forth that this phenomenon has developed
along three tracks: criminal punishment and deterrence of batterers, batterer treatment,
and restraining orders designed to protect victims through the threat of legal action.^'*
These remedial strategies only partially address the goals Hart and others set out.
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Arguing Outside Juridical Normativity
Several of the points I have raised thus far suggest that there are limitations as to the
effectiveness of legal solutions that seek to remedy domestic violence. While such
remedies remain an important piece of the puzzle, legal normative frameworks ought not
be mistaken for more comprehensive frameworks of moral reasoning. As this analysis
illustrates, legal doctrine can both reinforce and challenge immoral status regimes.
Perhaps more importantly, the legality of an act (or the manner in which such legal rules
are selectively enforced) does not equate to its moral status. With an over-reliance on
criminal legal remedies, the law’s reach in effectively ameliorating violence against
women (or in reinforcing it, for that matter) remains a fundamental question.
In considering this question, the words of Emma Goldman reflect a helpful, practical
wisdom: “The right to vote, or equal civil rights, may be good demands, but true
emancipation begins neither at the polls nor in the courts. It begins in woman's soul.”^^
Truly emancipatory aims call for alternatives and supplements to legal remedies. Indeed,
a complex social problem like domestic violence calls for a thoughtful, integrated,
multidimensional response. Alternatives to criminal legal remedies need to be further
explored. At the same time, the limitations and complexity of the criminal legal system’s
role in ameliorating domestic violence needs to be further examined. Not only is the
legal system in many ways still failing to help victims of intimate violence, too often it
actively harms them.^^ As courts are real sites of remedy (or not) in women’s lives,
effective legislation and sound judicial findings must be a part of the response. Still, we
must be eareful not to reduce the problem to one of criminalized physical assault, the
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overemphasis of which serves to obscure the unique needs of victims of intimate
violence.
New Models o f Critical Public Discourse
Perhaps a beginning to meeting this challenge lies in the Habermasian approach that
Seyla Benhabib advocates. She points out that as public agenda have expanded in recent
decades to include social issues previously cordoned off as ‘private,’ “more often than
not a ‘patriarchal-capitalist-disciplinary bureaucracy’ has resulted [that has] frequently
disempowered women and . . . set the agenda for public debate and participation.”^^
Benhabib argues that developing new models of critical public discourse are needed to
challenge such ‘juridification.’ Her argument is on the mark, and if such models embrace
the Habermasian aims of minimizing bureaucratization and promoting the articulation of
shared interests, all the better. One aim for such models, as I argue above, involves
devoting continued critical attention to explicating how ‘public’ and ‘private’ function in
domestic violence contexts. Attempts to situate domestic violence on either side of a
public/private divide are argumentatively suspect. Historically, such suspect behavior
involves relegating the problem to the ‘private’ domain as a mean to justify state
nonintervention. We also saw this play out in Morrison. However, to relegate domestic
violence wholly to a ‘public’ realm (such as the realm of state power) would also
potentially jeopardize women’s autonomy in ‘transformed, yet preserved’ ways.^* Such
an approach, for example, may not adequately protect privacy rights.
Likewise, future discourse ought to remain keen to other factors that obscure or
misrepresent gendered power relations as they pertain to intimate violence. This does not
mean blindly adhering to the rigid equations of ‘man as perpetrator’ and ‘woman as
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victim/survivor.’ To do that would be logieally and discursively misguided/^ However,
it does suggest that we ought to aim to illuminate the important distinctions between male
and female violence, sueh as that males overwhelmingly use violence as a means to
control females.^** Sueh vigilanee also implies that we focus less on attempting to loeate
the problem on one side of a rigid public/private split, and more on comprehending the
problem within the full seope of women’s publie and private lives.
Robin West charaeterizes life for battered women as a ‘life of fear’— a life involving
‘no subjectivity’ and ‘no preferences’—not just in the home but in all arenas of life. The
perpetual state of fear in whieh most battered women live tends to readily permeate
publie/private boundaries. While reeognizing that intimate violence is a systemic social
phenomenon, policy remedies ought to appropriately acknowledge and account for the
psyehology of this terror, and consider the implications for healing and recovery.^'
Holistic and Emancipatory Approach
Remedial domestie violence poliey models ought to embraee a holistic, emancipatory
philosophy, and encompass a comprehensive range of prevention, intervention, and
recovery strategies and s e rv ic e s.P o lie y measures ought to inelude legal remedies for
battered women, such as improved access to legal resourees, gains in employment-related
rights, and protections against housing discrimination. However, as I have argued, these
models ought to extend beyond legal realms. Edueation and prevention initiatives are
needed to familiarize ehildren and adults with the history of violenee against women, and
with everyone’s right to be free from coercive control. Safe environments and other
basic resources needed to escape violent partners all need to be made publicly available.
While these resources inelude fundamentals like food, transportation, and shelter, they
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also encompass longer-term needs such as decent jobs, childcare, and broader economic
justice.
Policy discourse should continue to examine and shine a light on the relationship
between domestic violence and poverty.^^ In his discussions about the origins of the
patriarehal conjugal family, Habermas links a dominant status in the market with a
dominant status in the family. Deconstructing public/private distinctions reveals strong
interconnectedness between the market and the household. Such relations play out
critically in the lives of battered women. From the nineteenth-century judicial discourse
that characterized spousal violence as common among the ‘eoarser classes’ to
disproportionately high rates among low-income populations today—the economic needs
of battered women can be neglected no longer. Successfully escaping a violent intimate
partner requires being able to discontinue financial dependence. Welfare policies ought
to accommodate the unique needs of battered women and their children. Policy remedies
ought to develop programs that promote survivors’ long-term economic security and
independence.
For these and other reasons, pro-marriage initiatives such as those backed by the
current Bush Administration ought to he wholly rejected. (What happened to those grave
concerns over federalism and the family?) Such policies promote women’s economic
dependence on men, and make it dangerously more difficult for women to escape violent
husbands. Democratization of families is far preferable to the blind and restrictive
promotion of marriage. However, I am not sure that is primarily the state’s role. In any
case, the state’s normative relationship to the family is far too ambiguous and needs to be
more clearly articulated, if not considerably reformed—and with the important normative
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connections already drawn between family life and democratic citizenship, the stakes are
quite high indeed.
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